THE

SĀMKHYA--KĀRIKĀ

Is'vāra Kṛṣṇa's Memorable Verses on Sāmkhya Philosophy
with the Commentary of Gauḍapādācārya

श्रीमदश्रीरक्षयाचरणीति: समीपस्वादाच्यः:

सांख्यकारिकाः:

Critically edited with Introduction, Translation and Notes

BY

Vidyāsudhākara Dr Har Dutt Sharma, M.A., Ph.D.,

ORIENTAL BOOK AGENCY
15, Shukrawar, POONA 2 (India).
THE
ŚĀMKHYA–KĀRIKĀ

Īś'ara Kṛṣṇa's Memorable Verses on Sāmkhya Philosophy
with the Commentary of Gauḍapāda Cārya

श्रीमद्ध्रवरक्षणविद्वान्: समग्रद्वादभाष्यः:

सांख्यकारिकाः:

विन्देहं सांख्यपत्नीत्तयतप्प्रमाणविद्वे समस्यतुः:

BY

Vidyāsudhākara Dr Har Dutt Sharma, M.A., Ph.D.,
Professor of Sanskrit, Sanātana Dharma College,
(Nawabganj) Cawnpore.

POONA

THE ORIENTAL BOOK AGENCY

1933
INTRODUCTION

I. The Origin of Philosophical Enquiry

In this world, the end of all activity is happiness. Nobody even in his imagination likes to suffer pain even for a moment. Even those who commit suicide do so only when they are sorely disgusted with the pains inherent in Sāṃsāra. Truly has it been said by our elders, “Every one desists from pain; every one desires happiness.” But what happiness is cannot be very well explained by those who lack philosophical insight. The enjoyment of sense-objects which people resort to as ‘pleasure’ day and night and for which they put forth their utmost effort is considered by philosophers as entirely undesirable, mixed as it is always with pain. So the wise leave all worldly enjoyments even as one does honey mixed with poison and seek the highest end of human existence which alone leads to final and absolute happiness; and after they have attained it for themselves, they are moved with pity for the creatures quivering in the well of miseries and for their good they apply themselves to the propagation of the truth attained. Thus do the wise explain the Origin of Philosophical Enquiry.

II. The Significance of Sāṃkhya Philosophy

Of all the philosophical systems, Sāṃkhya has been considered by all to be the most ancient. Nobody can gainsay the fact that this occupies a prominent place in all the S'āstras, since this is either supported or controverted by every philosophical system. Therefore, the importance of this S'āstra is recognised by all the systems. S'āṅkarācārya says—“The doctrine, moreover, stands somewhat near to the Vedānta doctrine since, like the latter, it admits the non-
difference of cause and effect, and it, moreover, has been accepted by some of the authors of the Dharma-sūtras, such as Devala, and so on. For all these reasons we have taken special trouble to refute the pradhāna doctrine.” (S.B.E., XXXIV., p. 289) So also in the Mahābhārata we read—

"There is no knowledge like that of Sāṅkhya, no power like that of Yoga. You should have no doubt as to Sāṅkhya being the highest knowledge.” (Śānti. 316, 2).

Though the use of the word Sāṅkhya is found first of all in the Svet. Up.—तत्कारणं सत्त्वोपाशोगियम् etc. (VI. 13), yet Sāṅkhya reflections are found even in the Rgveda and the other Upaniṣads. This proves the antiquity of this Śastra. This will be made clear in detail further on.

Sāṅkhya is derived from the word sāṁkhya. The word sāṁkhya is used in the sense of thinking and counting. Cf. "चर्चा संख्या विचारणा" (Amara I. V. 3). Thinking may be with reference to basic principles or knowledge of Self. Counting refers to the twenty-four principles and as'akti, atasti, etc. The double implication of the word has been set forth by Viśṇu-nābhikṣu in his preface to Sāṅkhya-pravacana-nabhāṣya, by a quotation from the Mbh.—

"संख्या प्रदुर्बले नैत्र प्रकृति च प्रचक्ष्ये।
तत्वपरं च चतुर्विदं संख्या प्रकृतिलयम्॥" 

So, Sāṅkhya means knowledge of Self through right discrimination. Garbe is of opinion that the word Sāṅkhya was originally used in the sense of counting, and it was then applied to the system of Kapila which enumerates the 25 principles. (For details and the opinion of Jacobi, see S.P., p. 189, 2n. and pp. 190-191). Jayacandra S'armā says with regard to Sāṅkhya in Saṁskṛta-Candrika, a magazine which became defunct long ago, that the Sāṅkhya is tawny, with deep-brown face, and has a big belly. He has a rosary in his hand and a staff, and keeps long nails and hair. (Adi-puṇḍra quoted. VII of 1821 S'aka,. Vol. 1 and 2, p. 8.). Really speaking, since the word Kapila stands both for a particular colour and for the founder of Sāṅkhya Philosophy, therefore, owing to the similarity of word the writer of the Pūruṣa has indulged in conjectures of his own. It appears that the writer of the Puruṣa at the time of writing happened to see some sage with tawny face and corpulent body and was led to describe his form and colour.

Some scholars, seeing the rejection of Īśvara in the Sāṅkhya-system, have maintained that it is vedaviruddha or opposed to S’ruti (S.S., p. 21 f.; S.P., 13 ff.). Saṁkarācārya also, seeing that Sāṅkhya is opposed to advaita, avers that Sāṅkhya is not rooted in the S’rutis.

“Although there are many Smṛtis treating of the soul, we have singled out for refutation the Sāṅkhya and Yoga because they are widely known as offering the means for accomplishing the highest end of man and have found favour with many competent persons. Moreover, their position is strengthened by a Vedic passage referring to them, 'He who has known that cause which is to be apprehended by Sāṅkhya and Yoga he is freed from all fetters’ (S’ve. Up. VI. 13). …….., we refute by the remark that the highest beatitude is not to be attained by the knowledge of Sāṅkhya Smṛti irrespective of the Veda, nor by the road of Yoga-practice.” (S.B.E., XXXIV., pp. 297-8). In deciding also the vaidika or the non-vaidika character of Sāṅkhya, the great S'ainkara says—"The scriptural passage which the pūrvavapakṣa has quoted as proving the eminence of Kapila’s knowledge would not justify us in believing in such doctrines of Kapila (i.e., of some Kapila) as are contrary to scriptures, for that passage mentions the bare name of Kapila (without specifying which Kapila is meant), and we meet in tradition with another Kapila, viz., the one who burned the sons of Sagara and had the surname of Vāsudeva.” (S.B.E., XXXIV., p. 294).
Similarly others have also maintained the opposition of Sāṁkhya to S'rutì. Truly speaking, Sāṁkhya could be divided into two—one ses'vāra, the other nīris'vāra. Let the theists not take the nīris'vāra—Sāṁkhya, propounded in the Kārikā, etc., as rooted in S'rutì, but who can take exception to the vaidika character of the ses'vāra—Sāṁkhya as propounded in the Upaniṣads, the Mahābhārata and the Purāṇas? For instance, we come across 'yathā-s'rutinidars'ana as a synonym of Sāṁkhya in—

एत्यादि नव संग्राम तत्त्वनि च नराधिष्ठिन ।
वस्तुविदातिनित्रि प्रभृतिनिविदेशनात्।

(Mbh., S'ānti, 310, 23)

In the 313th chapter of S'āntiparvan, in the section describing the intrinsic, extrinsic and super-natural aspects of the vibhūtis of Prakṛti many synonyms of the upholders of Sāṁkhya are met with; e.g., भाज्यांतरत्वनिधिनि: (p. 1) तत्त्वचारणे; (2) योगप्रशिविनि; (3) संत्वातिनिधिनि; (4) यथा-शुभनिधिनि; (5) तत्त्वविदातिनिधिनि; (6, 7, 8 and 9) तत्त्वविदेशनात्; (10) यथाशर्यविदात्तरः; (11) तत्त्वविदेशिनि; (12) यथाशर्यविदात्तरः.

(13) Here the word 'Yathā-s'rutinidars'inaḥ' being repeated four times establishes the vaidika character of theistic Sāṁkhya. Moreover, even the atheistic Sāṁkhya is vaidika in character, inasmuch as the traditional categories have been borrowed from Upaniṣads, etc. [Jacobi takes the atheistic Sāṁkhya as older, and believes that there has been an attempt for the synthesis of the theistic and the atheistic Sāṁkhya in the later Upaniṣads, the Bhagavadgītā and portions of the Mahābhārata. vide—Ent. Gott. p. 32]. Therefore, from the presence of the names of the adhyāyas of Sāṁkhya in the offering to Rśis, it may be fairly guessed that in olden times, even the most staunch theists undertook the study of Sāṁkhya. (8, 8., p. 22). This could not have been possible if Sāṁkhya was not founded on S'rutis.

III. Germs of Sāṁkhya in the Vedas, etc.

The presence of Sāṁkhya categories in the S'rutis in a germinal form corroborates the former guess. We do not mean to say that the principles of Sāṁkhya in their detail are to be sought in the Vedas and Upaniṣads as propounded by Sāṁkhya—Kārikā. That would be as ridiculous as trying to find out the great banyan tree in its minute seed. Tāmas described in the Rgveda (X. 129, 3) "तम आन्तोगीतमतमुग्तः-प्रकृतः" etc., assumed later on the form of the Unmanifest. This very S'rutì, showing the dissolution of the elements and the elemental world in its cause, the darkness, points to satkāryavāda. Śāyana also favours this interpretation in his bhāṣya on this verse. Giving this very interpretation elsewhere, the Veda even explains Aja (the unborn) as the name of Pradhāna—

तमिलृभ श्रुतम् देवर आयो यथ्रादेवा संग्राह्यन्त विषेष ।
अजस्य नामात्मैवकृमैवत्त्वम बृहस्पतिभूमानि तरस्यः।

(Rgveda, X. 82, 6)

Chronologically, Jacobi has divided the Upaniṣads into four divisions on account of their variety, their origin in different times, and their subject-matter (Ent. Gott. p. 6 and 19; H. I. P. I, p. 28 ff; I. P. I., p. 141 ff.).

1. The most ancient : as, Brhadāranyaka, Chāndogya, Taittirīya, Aitareya and Kauśitaki.

Among the most ancient ones, in the Br. Up., the Puruṣa is declared to be only a seer, not a doer, devoid of activity in as much as he is without any association with anything (in
red colour colours cloth, etc., so Rajas colours citta, because of its property of activity. Even so, the whiteness of water indicates Sattva, because white water has the property of purifying things. Sattva also purifies the mind with knowledge. The dark colour of anna = Earth is an indication of Tamas. The dark colour covers everything. Even so, the insistent Tamas covers the knowledge born of Sattva. [See, Bala, p. 3. What has been propounded by Śūryanārāyaṇa Sāstri in contradiction of this will be found in the Introduction, S. N. S.]. This very thing is propounded in the mantra **“अजगके वनीतरकूटल”** (S’v. Up. IV 5; Mahānārāyaṇa Up., p. 141, Īśādi). The triyṛkaraṇa (trebling) S’ruti found in the (Ch. Up. VI. 4 and 5) also corroborates this opinion. We also see that the word triyṛta has been used in the sense of the three Attributes in **“त्रेघ्न्यसः बिनित” etc.” (S’v. Up. I, 4) also. There the three-foldness of grain, etc., has been indicated by the gross, the medium and the small sizes. It appears that the three-foldness of the Attributes has also been used similarly. Jacobi has also accepted this (Ent. Gott., p. 32).

The Śāṅkhya categories are clearly stated in the later Upaniṣads, e.g., in Kaṭha **“मस्तकान पर शुद्धिदीर्णात्म महान्त पर:”** (III, 10). **Mahat** is the synonym of Ahaṅkara. Similarly we find Aśyaktā and Puruṣa in **“महात: परम्यकाल्पकत्वः परः” पुर्वग न किन्तु काष्ठ सा परा गति: II” (Ibid, III 11). Prof. Radhakrishnan believes that the indifference and inactivity of Puruṣa have been indicated in **“सा सृष्टिः सर्वव्यथा सब्जया समान्त हृदे शरीरयोगी अधिकारिता II”** in the Muṇḍaka Up. (III, 1) [I. P. I, 259, 1 n].

It is a well-known fact that S’vetā’svatara is essentially a Śāṅkhya Upaniṣad. It abounds in the Śāṅkhya categories. For instance in this alone, the words Śāṅkhya and Kapila have been used for the first time. **“तत्कारण सृष्टय-**
any two opinions among scholars with regard to the fact that the rise of the Sāṅkhya and Yoga systems lies between the most ancient and the ancient Upaniṣads. (Ent. Gott. p. 21).

Among the modern Upaniṣads, the mention of Sativa, Rajas and Tamas by name, the exposition of the five subtle elements, the enunciation of the five gross elements and reference to the Sāṅkhya categories of kṣetrajña, saṅkalpa, adhyāvasāya, abhimāna and liṅga clearly show that these Upaniṣads come after the formulation of the Sāṅkhya system. As—‘‘तमो वा इंस्मेनास, प्रथपात्तपरेणिरि विषमतं प्रायायेवेद्रि रजस्वोर यें’’—सुदोषोऽयं भवेतस्मात् प्रतिपुर्णं क्षेपं संकेतकाष्ठायामः. मार्गिण: प्रजापति: इति. (Maiträyani, Up. IV. 5), ‘‘पञ्चत्तमानां सूतसूत्त्वते पचमास्मुताति सूतसूत्त्वते इति. (Ibid III.2), ‘‘तु शृङ्खलेऽण्यात् च चाप्यायामात्राः. (Pr. up IV. 8) and so on.

In the Mbh. and the Purāṇas, we find Sāṅkhya philosophy fully reflected. At one place we find the mention of the five gross elements, the twenty-four categories in their manifested or unmanifested character and the three guṇas (Mbh. III. 209, 16-21; 211, 4). The distinction between Prakṛti, and Purusa has been extensively expounded in Sāntiparvan (285, 33-40). Here the word sattva stands for Prakṛti and not Brahman. But Keith, seeing that sattva was used as the subject of comparison of a spider, erroneously maintains that sattva is referring to Brahman (S. S. p. 17). It will be clear from the two verses quoted below that his explanation is erroneous, since it is opposed to the context:—‘‘हुस्ते हि दुस्मुनि, नरव लेखम्: धर्मस्य प्रयतो इति। समस्मृतयोगे स्त्रांस्कृतीतः:। ॥ ॥ स्वर्यवादिनामेव तत्त्थमान्युः सुस्तान पुणात्। ऊर्जनसिद्धिः पुरुषं विगृहतत्त्वस्य द्वारा। ॥ ॥’. We find a reference in the Mbh. of Sāṅkhya knowledge being called Vaivistika which was imparted to Janaka by Pāncāśikha of Paraśara gotra, e. g., ‘‘यस्मातःस्वतंत्रन्वया प्रामण शान्तेन अविकर्षिक्य पुरा’’ (S’anti. 330, 23a). There again, three paths of emancipation have been described. We find three from the
Sāmkhya Kārikā. A teaching of this very teacher, quite different from that mentioned above, is found in 321, 96-112 of the Sāniti. In the 274th chapter, the doctrines expounded by Devala are different from every other. But even in the midst of divergent expositions of Sāmkhya doctrines, all agree with regard to the exposition of Brahman or Is'vara. Even though the plurality of parusās has been accepted, Brahman has been described as the basis of all. (vide—"सहने पुस्मृणि स स्यात्रा मतिरन्त्रयेन,” Sāniti 350. 26.). Āsuri, having taught Sāmkhya to Pañcas'ikha, got merged in Brahman—"यते श्रावकः यद्य मानार्यस्य प्रद्यानं आसुरिविवेगते तत्त्वमात्र तत्त्वमः॥" (Sāniti, 218, 13).

In the Bhagavadgītā also, we do not find atheism among the Sāmkhyas. Rather we find the antiquity and dualism of Sāmkhya propounded in it (Tilak's Gītārāhasya, Hindi translation by Sapre, p. 514, 1917 edn.). Kapila, the pioneer of Sāmkhya philosophy has been described by Lord Kṛṣṇa as an example of his own glory: e. g. "विद्वानं कष्ठितं गृहितं।" (Bh. G. X, 26.). Here the Sāmkhya path without karman is only a synonym of Jīvana. Therefore Sāṅkara says explains the word kṛṣṭa as "इत्यतंतिर कार्यं। तत्त्वं: परमात्मातिविधं स। हृदयं: कर्मणिः सत्त्वं।॥" (Bh. G. XVIII, 13.). Sāṅkarācārya explains the word gunasāṃkhyaṇa (Bh. G. XVIII, 19) as the system of Kapila the subject-matter of which is the exposition of the three gunas, vis. Sattva, Rajas and Tamas.

Again in the 3rd chapter of Bhāgavata Purāṇa, the Sāmkhya doctrines in detail tend to propound devotion to Viṣṇu. Among the Purāṇas also, the various traditional schools interpret Sāmkhya doctrines in their own way (see P. F. VI. 5, 2-8; VI. 4, 35 Sk. P. Prabhāsa-khaṇḍa, 18, 13-15; Brahm. P. ch. 213 ff).

In the Manu-smṛti also which is contemporary with the Mbh. (S, S, p. 52) there is a detailed description of Sattva, Rajas and Tamas (XII. 24-52) and reference to the three pramāṇas (ibid., 105). But the word Sāmkhya is not found...
another support in the name of the town Kapilavastu of the Buddhists (S. V., 2. § 3). Keith, on the other hand, opines that Kapila was not a historical person as he is found identified with Agni or Visnu or Siva, and is, therefore, another name for Hiranyagarbha (S. S. 9. In; Mbh. S'anti, 339, 66-67; 342. 92-93). KavirajGopinatha also agrees with this opinion as expressed by him in the introduction to Jayamangali published by me (p. 3). Balarama Udaisina, in his footnotes to Yogabhāṣya 1. 25: "आदिविद्या म्हणिष्टिविद्या कार्याययात्मक परस्परस्मृत्यु विश्वासमानाय तदन्तः प्रायाच।" says —

"(1) आदिविद्या=सगुणावविश्वतो हिरण्यामेवः स्तुत्सः, निष्पर्विद्या=स्यमंदनस्य स्मितिविद्या=स्यमंदनस्य स्मितिविद्या कार्याधिकारसः आवृत्तो तदन्तः प्रायाचायः। (2) 'कर्म प्रस्तुते कार्यान्ते यस्मते' इति स्याद्विद्याय जात्मानेन ज्ञानात्माय:। (3) विवेकेन्द्रीय नाम सिद्धेऽः कार्याधिकारसः। प्रायाचायः साधयात्वमेव। (भगवाण्वर्षिको तत्त्वाधिकारिययः।) इति तस्याद्विद्याय प्रायाचायः। 'अतः' स कार्यान्ते नाम साधयात्बचः। प्रवेशात्वमेव:। (4) ज्ञानाधिकारसः 'कर्म प्रस्तुते कार्यान्ते' इति कार्याधिकारसः। प्रायाचायः। (भागवतस्य पुराणसाध्यात्बचः।) इति स्याद्विद्याय प्रायाचायः।"

From a quotation in the Baudhyāyana (2, 6, 30), we learn that an asura Kapila divided the four āśramas. There is another Kapila also who wrote a Kapilasmṛti dealing with the śāradha, vigha, praśya sūtra ceremonies (H. Dh. I, pp. 25, 252). S'ankaracarya also thinks that the Kapila of Śāṅkhyas is different from the Vedic Kapila (Br. S. Bhāṣya II, 1, 1). Anandagiri, commenting on this says that the Vedic Kapila is that one who reduced the sixty-thousand sons of Sagara to ashes. He is quite different from the Śāṅkhyas teacher. But we find in the Padmapurāṇa that one Kapila alias Vāsudeva taught the Śāṅkha doctrines to Brahman, Bhrigu, etc., supported by the Vedas; another Kapila taught (the Śāṅkhya) as opposed to all the Vedic tenets (quoted in N. B. S. II, 1, 1,
2. Āsuri

There is a difference of opinion also with regard to the reality of Āsuri, the first disciple of Kapila. Kaviraja Gopinatha thinks him to be a historical person (Jay., Int., p. 3). But Garbe and Keith are opposed to this view (S. S. Y. pp. 47-48: S. Y. pp. 2-3: Garbe adds that if Āsuri is really historical then he is different from his namesake mentioned in the S’atapatha-Brāhmaṇa). The two interesting accounts as to how Kapila taught Āsuri are found in the Jayamangala and the Maṭhara-vṛtti. In the Mbh., Āsuri is made the teacher of Pañcas’ikha “tāv tathāvāciḥ abhiṣamānānām mahāsuḥ: ... ānurūpyaḥ: pravrtya śūyaḥ etc.” (Sānti, 218. 6. 10). We find only one quotation ascribed to Āsuri, vis. “vivāke ṛṣipariparitvaruḥ bhuvah bhāmakah kathateḥ pravāhabhāvyaḥ: śūyaḥ yathā chaṃsastomaḥcittah” in the commentary of Haribhadra on the Saḍdars’anasamuccaya (p. 36).

3. Pañcas’ikha

Pañcas’ikha, the disciple of Āsuri is found quoted in the following works:

A. Y. Bh.—

(a) “एकमेव द्वाराय स्वातिरेक द्वाराम्” [1. 4] (b) “आदिविद्वान निर्माणिक्षमविशाय कारणाद्वाराय परस्परसुरुयं विजातामनाय ततैः सहस्र’” [1. 25] (c) “तमुण्यामामामामामास्मिनिवासामवेव तात्त्वास्मात्त्वान” [1. 31] (d) “ध्रष्टामयमः वा स्वत्भास्मित्त्वाद्विद्वानस्मात्त्वाय तत्स्मिन्नुववयस्मांस्माय सन्त्वामत्तस्मिन्नुववयस्मायम् तत्स्मिन् सतं सर्वोत्तिदुः” [2. 5] (e) “वृजिन्त: वर्णः परं

This verse is ascribed to Pañcas’ikha by Bhāvāganes’a in his Tattvavātārthādipana and by Haribhadrasūri in S’astravārtasamuccaya (see Int. to Maṭhara-vṛtti). Bhāvāganes’a was the disciple of Vijñānabhañjikau and flourished in the 17th century A.D. The time of Haribhadrasūri is about 725 A.D.
We find no account of this Pañcas'ikha born in the family of Parāśara (Mbh. Sānti 320, 23). All the quotations ascribed to him are in prose except the "E". It is just possible that he wrote a prose treatise. According to Garbe Pañcas'ikha flourished in the first century A.D. (S. Y. p. 3). Vyāsa, the author of the Yogabhāṣya, flourished in the 4th century A.D. (I. P. II, 342). It is possible that the writings of Pañcas'ikha were very common in the 4th century A.D., and, therefore, Vyāsa did not give his name while quoting. As Vācaspati frequently mentions his name, we can safely infer that the writings of Pañcas'ikha were known to him. Was it the Commentary on the Sāmāsūtras which fell into the hands of Vācaspati? Vijñanabhiṣkṣu refers to Pañcas'ikha as the author of a commentary on the Sāmāsūtras or the Tattvasamāsa; Bhāvaganeśa also says the same thing: "समाससूत्रांप्रणव्यम् वायायम् प्रद्विधिवस्य च।" (Int. to Māth. p. 2). According to Chinese tradition, Pañcas'ikha is the author of Śaṣṭiśāstra (S. S. 48). But this account is not to be believed, as is proved by many writers. Vācaspati, on the other hand, thinks that Śaṣṭiśāstra is a book on Yogaśāstra and its author was Vāraṇagayā (see Tattv. V. on Y. S. IV. 13; and Bhāmati on Brahmasūtra II. I, 3). Kaviraja Gopinatha is of opinion that Vācaspati never saw the Śaṣṭiśāstra (Jay. Int. pp. 4-7). But, according to the late M. M. P. Rāmāvatāra Saṁānā, Vācaspati knew Śaṣṭiśāstra (Bāla. p. 226). That this Pañcašīkha is different from his namesake in the Mahābhārata is evident from their views; he is different from Gandhabba Pañcaśīkha also (S. S., pp. 48, 51).

4. Vindhyavāsa

The view that Vindhyavāsa is to be identified with Īśvara-krīṣṇa is not sound (Jay. Int. pp. 6-7). We find one quotation from him in the Rājamārtanda of Bhoja: "सत्यतपत्तिः पुरुस्तालम् (Y. S. 14 23). Medhātithi also quotes his opinion in his Bāṣya on Manu I. 55: "सांख्य हि लोकसभारामभवतिहासति तिन्यासः प्रथमः". This seems to be derived from the S'lokavārtika: "अनुसारवर्षेण निम्पितो विन्यासितस्ति।" (p. 704). Also in the Saḍdarśanasamuccaya we find a quotation from him: "पुरुषो-विन्यास स्थाप्तिसंतुतथा। मनः कर्तति सांख्याद्विपयो स्तविको यथा।" (p. 36). Vallālasena, king of Bengal (12th century A.D.), has given a list of works which he consulted while compiling his Adbhutasāgara. There we find a work of a certain Sāṁkhya teacher named Vindhyavāśin (H. Dh. I, 341, 793n). This proves that the work of Vindhyavāśin was available as late as the 12th century A.D. Tanusukharāma, in his introduction to the Maṭhavṛtti (Ch. S. S.), has established an identity between Vindhyavāśin and Vyādi on the basis of quotations from the Trikāndaśa, the Haimakośa and the Sāṁkhyaminīmālamā. He says: "तत् च मात्रात्तील्या वर्ण्ये निष्प्रकार-कालन्त: (Kathāsaritsagāra, I. 2) पारिवर्तनार्थानि संहासिताय: कस्यविच वेदेऽदिनत्व: प्रदेशार्य पुरूषांमिति सांख्ययागच्छाय:।" (p. 3). This leads us to suppose that Vindhyavāśin alias Vyādi, flourished in the 4th century B.C. According to a Chinese tradition Vindhyavāśin wrote a Sāṁkhya work called Hiranyasaptati (Bh. Com. p. 175). According to Dr Belgakar, Hiranyasaptati is a commentary on the Sāṁkhyakārikā (ibid 177). But Kaviraja Gopinatha says: "The Anuyogavārasūtra of the Jainas preserves a list of Brahmical works, which contains the name of Kanegasattari (Kanakasaptati), which I take to be equivalent to the Suvarnasaptati or Hiranyasaptati, the name of Sāṁkhya-saptati familiar in China." (Jay. Int. p. 8, 12n). But it must be noted here that along with the Kanagasattari, we find Maṭhara also in the list of the Anuyogavārasūtra. If Maṭhara stands for the Maṭhavṛtti then it is impossible to conclude that Anuyogavārasūtra was written in the 1st
century A.D. (F. O. Schrader in a letter to me from Kiel, March 1, 1927). In the Mātharavṛtti we find: "यथा द्वियामात्र अनादायः" a quotation from the Hastāmalakastotra which is of the age of Sāṅkarācārya (i.e., 780–812 A.D., See Int., Māth., p. 5). Therefore, it is wrong to decide the age of Vindhyavāsa or Īśvaraśrīṇa on the basis of the Kanagassattari. And, if Vyādi alias Vindhyavāsin, is the author of the Hiranyasaptati, then the latter is certainly different from the Sāṅkhīkārīka and Vindhyavāsin is different from Īśvaraśrīṇa. Otherwise the date of Īśvaraśrīṇa will have to be pushed back to the 4th century B.C. Therefore, it is safe to conclude, as Keith also says, that there are more than one Vindhyavāsins and that their dates are uncertain (S.S., 79 in; also, Karma., p. 59).

5. Vārṣaganyā

We are as uncertain about Vārṣaganyā as about the former teachers of Sāṅkhya. We find two quotations from him in the Vyāsabhashya: (1) "सुधीरविजयविधानाभावमात् वृत्तः पुत्रकम्य इति व्याप्तम्:।" (III 53, 2) "गुणानो न बन्धनं न द्वियामात्रामात्। वलतु द्वियामात्रां प्राप्तं तन्मयेत् सुधीरविधानाभावम्।" (Ibid. IV, 13) Vācaspati thinks that the latter quotation is taken from the Sāṣṭītantra. This very verse is quoted by Vācaspati in his Bhāmati with the remarks: "अत रायोगवाच्याय व्याकरं आहो स्म भवनी: व्याप्तम्:।" (on the Brahmasūtrabhashya, II 1, 3). Another quotation from Vārṣaganyā, "पञ्चपशीं अवस्था इति: इस्तमालाय भवनी: व्याप्तम्।" is found in the Tatt. K. (on Kārikā 47). The quotation—"गुणानो न बन्धनं प्राप्तं प्रवर्तनम्।" found in the Gaud., and the Māth. (Kārikā 17), is ascribed to Vārṣaganyā by Keith (S.S., 73, 3n). All these lead us to the conclusion that the Chinese tradition ascribing the authorship of the Sāṣṭītantra to Pañcasākhā is not trustworthy. There is also considerable doubt as to Vārṣaganyā being the author of the Sāṣṭītantra (Jay. Int. pp. 4–6; Hiriyanna: "Sāṣṭītantra and Vārṣaganyā").

6. Jaigisayava

According to the Kūrmapurāṇa, Jaigisayava was a classfellow of Pañcasākhā (S.S., 51). This Jaigisayava is quoted as an authority on Yoga (Y. Bh., II. 55 and III. 18). Vācaspati also refers to him in his Nyāyavārtikātātparyākhyā as the author of Dhāranāśāstra (on Nyāyasūtra III. 2. 43). But, according to the Buddhacarita (12. 67), Arājagālakāma refers to Jaigisayava, Janaka and Parāsāra as persons who obtained salvation through Sāṅkhya (Jay., Int. p. 2, 2n.). In the present state of our knowledge, we can say nothing more about Jaigisayava.

7. Vodhū

Vodhū is also familiar by name alone. We have not come across any of his writings or quotations. In the list of the names of the sages pronounced in the Rṣītarpana, we find the name of Vodhū after that of Āsuri, and before that of Pañcasākhā. The opinion of Weber that it is the Brahmānised form of Buddha's name, is quite untenable (see S. Y. p. 6). Keith has, however, discovered Vodhū's name before that of Āsuri in one of the pariśīṭas of the Atharvaveda (S.S., 51).

8. Devala

We find a dialogue between Asitadevala and Nārada in the Mahābhārata (Sānti., Ch. 274). There we find eight kinds of bhūtas (bhūva, abhūva, kāla, prthvī, āpas, vyu, akāśa and tejas); and kāla impelled by bhūva creating all the five elements, viz., earth, air, water, wind and glow. The senses themselves are not the knowers but produce knowledge for the kṣetrajña. Higher than the senses is citta, higher than the latter is manas, higher than it is buddhi and the highest of all is puruṣa. The ear, the skin, the eye.
the nose, the tongue, the citta, the manas and the buddhi are the eight instruments of knowledge, etc. It is said: पुप्पापक्षाय र्हि सांख्यानां निद्धाये। तत्त्वे यस्य पस्यन्ति चजयाने पराः गतिः। " (Verse 39). Thus we see that this dialogue deals with theistic Sāmkhya. The quotations from Devala, as found in the Aparārka, a commentary on the Yājñavalkya-smṛti, resemble the Tattvasamāśa very much (See Yājñavalkya-smṛti, Anandārama, Edn. II, pp. 986–7). Kane, in his H. Dh. Vol. I, p. 121, says that Devala was a contemporary of the Śrīvikāras, viz., Bhāspati and Kātyāyana. And the age of Kātyāyana according to him is between the 4th and 6th centuries A.D. (see p. 218). But Udayavirāśtri says that Devala is frequently alluded to in the Mahābhārata, his age must be determined by the age of the epic in its present form. The Mahābhārata according to western scholars (says Mr. S’āstri), assumed its present form by the 2nd century B.C. (P. O. C. Lahore, II p. 865). But according to Prof. Winternitz, the epic assumed its present form by the 4th century A.D. (See H. I. L. I. pp. 465–475). Devala does not seem to be much older than Īśvarakṛṣṇa. The theory to the contrary does not seem to be convincing. It is based on the following quotation from the Mātharvṛtta: काविदभागुणि: प्रायमिद्भवं तत्त्वेऽसया, मूढः अववोच्य-स्मृति-वास्तव-दृष्टि-द्वेषैरेऽरुच्य यत्त्वीनामदेश। " (p. 84), where the word prabhṛti is taken to indicate a wide gap between Devala and Īśvarakṛṣṇa. But the traditional list found in the Mātharvṛtta does not tally with any other such list. Therefore, Māthara’s quotation can only establish Devala’s priority to Īśvarakṛṣṇa and nothing else.

9–26. Sānaka, etc.

Gauḍapāda (on Kār. 1), quotes a verse and a half in which he enumerates the names of the seven sons of Brahman. They are: Sānaka, Sananda, Sanātana, Āsuri, Kapila, Vṛddhu and Pañcatikṣha. But in the Mahābhārata, the list is different (S’ānti 340, 67–69), viz., Sana, Sanatsujāta, Sānaka,

Sanandana, Sanatkumāra, Kapila and Sanātana. Unfortunately we find no information about Sanaka, Sanandana, Sanātana, Sana, Sanatsujāta and Sanatkumāra, except a reference to Sanandana-cārya in vīśva-rātraṇiṃadvāhinaṃ nandana-cāryaḥ (s. Sū. VI, 69). There is a reference to a Sanatkumāra, author of some Śrīti, in the Nirnayasindhu and the Tristha-lisetu (H., Dh., I, 565). Similarly we find Bhṛgu, S’ukra, Kaśyapa, Parāśāra, Garga, Gautama, Nārada, Arśīṣena, Agastya, Pulastya and Harita mentioned as writers of Śrītis (Ibid, index). The dialogue between Parāśāra and Janaka named the Parāśāra-gītā, and found in the Mahābhārata (S’ānti, chs. 290–299), deals with the duties of the varnas and āśrāmas and has no vestige of Sāmkhya teaching in it. It is just possible that Parāśāra came to be regarded as a teacher of Sāmkhya because he happened to be born in the same family as Pañcatikṣha (Mbh., S’ānti, 320–23). Ulīka is a synonym for Kaus’ika. In the Chinese translation of the Śrīmāhābhārata, Īśvarakṛṣṇa is referred to as born in the Kaus’ika family (Jay. Int. p. 2, 2n). We know absolutely nothing of Vālmiki and S’uka as teachers of Sāmkhya.

V. Standard Works on Sāmkhya

A. Available:

Of the standard works on Sāmkhya, only three are available. They are "Sāmkhya-Sūtras", "Tattva-samāsa" and "Sāmkhya-Kārīkā".

Some scholars are of opinion that S. Sū. are not written by Kapila. The reason is that we find many passages from other works in them. For example, "अनुसूति सूतपरिवर्तन।" (Br. S., IV. 1, 1) = S. Sū., IV. 3; "उत्तमः प्रकृत्युद्ययः किःश्रिविषः।" (Y. S., II. 46) = S. Sū., III 34 and VI. 24. Again, in the sūtras establishing the authority of the Vedas (S. Sū., V. 40–51), the influence of the Vedānta is clearly visible. Again, we find many passages from Sāmkhya-Kārīkā, quoted in the
hand, when S'āṅkarakārya and others quote from Saṁkhya-Kārikā only, there is no doubt that the Sūtras did not exist in their time. Had the Sūtras been existent, then S'āṅkarakārya and others would not have deliberately left aside the composition of a rṣi and quoted from the work of an ordinary mortal like Is'vāmsīna

Mr. S'āstri further tries to prove that V. Bh. and others have borrowed from the Sūtras. His contention is:

(1) "भास्करन्नदियांत्यविपरितकार्यं नातस्तु उपादानमित्वः—कस्यविद्वाननवस्येन निमित्तम्" (V. Bh., on N. S., IV. 1, 48) here उपादानमित्व is borrowed from "उपादानमित्वः" (S. Sū., I, 115). This very sūtra has been quoted again by Vātsyāyana in his gloss on the next N. S., viz., "वर्णुनम्—प्रागुपले: कार्यं नातस्तु उपादानमित्वः इति". Here the insertion of the word इति shows that it is a quotation from some other work. That other work is S. Sū.

To this we reply—If the word इति is a sure sign of quotation from another work then why did not Vātsyāyana put it after "उपादानमित्वः" in the first passage (V. Bh., on N. S., IV. 1, 48) quoted above? And as regards the presence of इति in the second passage, it should be noted that this word is not connected with only "उपादानमित्वः" but the whole passage, viz., "प्रागुपले: कार्यं नातस्तु उपादानमित्वः". Here Vātsyāyana merely repeats his own words with slight change. Therefore, it does not show that V. Bh. has borrowed from the S. Sū., rather, it may be just the reverse.

(2) In the Aparārka, a commentary on the Yājñavalkya-Smṛti (Prāya's citādhāya, v. 109), we find quotations from Devala which resemble the sūtras in S. Sū. very much. Therefore, Devala must have borrowed them from the S. Sū.

Mr. S'āstri starts here on the presumption of the priority of the S. Sū., to Devala, a fact which he has to prove.

(3) Patañjali, in his Mahābhāṣya, lays down the six causes of non-perception. Thus—"पदभिः: प्रकारः: सत्तमा भावासामु—
Avyāpi in (a) has not been commented upon by Aniruddha. The word pravartate in (b) is not found in the Ms. in Mr. Sāstri’s possession.

The arguments of Mr. Sāstri do not stand a close examination. If Aniruddha did not comment upon the word avyāpi, then it alone does not mean that the word did not exist formerly. Moreover, Viśnabhiṣṇu has commented upon this word. Again, what is there to prove that the Ms. in Mr. Sāstri’s possession is the oldest and the only correct Ms., whose one reading should decide so important a question as the authorship of Kapila. In his zeal to disprove the theory that “the Sūtras were composed on the basis of the Kārikās,” Mr. Sāstri says that if we change the order of words in “sāmanatkarṇaḥ: praṇayaḥ vāyaḥ: pṛthuḥ” and read it as “sāmanatkarṇaḥ: praṇayaḥ: pṛthuḥ vāyaḥ:” we attain anuṣṭubh metre in place of āryā. But this flight of imagination, viz., changing the reading itself, is too much to be swallowed even by ordinary people. Therefore, Mr. Sāstri has failed to disprove that the 8. sū. are based upon the Kārikās.

There is a tradition that Paramārtha translated the Kārikās into Chinese in 557–569 A.D. (Bh., Com., pp. 175–178). According to Paramārtha, Buddhhamitra the teacher of Vasubandhu, was vanquished in debate by Vindhyavāsa, the Śāṅkhya-teacher; Vindhyavāsa died before Vasubandhu. Thus, Vindhyavāsa and Vasubandhu were contemporaries. There is another tradition, according to which Vindhyavāsa was a contemporary of king Bāładīya and pupil of Vārṣaganyā. A third tradition tells us that the pupil of Vārṣaganyā composed Hīranyasaptati. But all these traditions should be taken as having no historical value. Otherwise, if Vindhyavāsa, the author of Hīranyasaptati and īsvārkaṇa, the author of Śāṅkhya-Kārikā are both identified then it would lead to a historical confusion, as stated above. [Das Gupta also thinks īs’vārkaṇa and Vindhyavāsa as two...
different persons, see H. I. P., I, 218, 3n]. The only definite conclusion that we can arrive at is that Īs'varākṛṣṇa is older than Vasubandhu [in 300 A.D., see V. A. Smith: *Early History of India*, 3rd edn., pp. 328–334; also Kalipada Bhattacharya: “Some Problems of Sāmkhya Philosophy and Sāmkhya Literature”, I. H. Q., Sept., 1932, pp. 519–520. According to Bhattacharya Īs'varākṛṣṇa flourished in the 1st century A.D.] and flourished in the second or the third century A.D. The remark of Śvapnesvara, identifying Īs'varākṛṣṇa with Kālidāsa, should be rejected as mistaken (See I. P., II, 255, In.).

The work of Īs'varākṛṣṇa had 70 verses in it. But now, finding the bhāṣya of Gauḍapadapu running up to the 69th verse only and finding that the verses following the 69th have nothing of Sāmkhya in them, it is believed that one of these verses is missing. The question has been discussed in detail in the foot-note to 61st Kārikā. Mr. S. S. Pathak has also attacked this problem (see, “The Problem of the Sāmkhya–Kārikāś”, I. A., Vol. LII, 1923, pp. 177–181). He says—

(1) In the 72nd Kārikā we read the phrase “परंतमामितरात्माय” which means “free from the opinions of others”. This goes against the Kārikā found by the late B. G. Tilak, as the latter expounds the opinions of others in the shape of God, Soul, Time, or Nature being the causes of Creation.—To this we reply: In the Kārikā of Mr. Tilak, the opinion of others has been merely referred to and not expounded. The phrase परंतमामितरात्माय means the exclusion of the expounding of others’ opinions and not the exclusion of mere reference even. Otherwise, “नवत्रंहुप्रविषि: स विनिविस्तिर्याधित्ययुक्तः” would also be open to fault, for, here there is no exclusion of the opinion of the Mimāṁsakas. (2) Īs'varākṛṣṇa has summarised the work of Pañcas’ikha in his own ‘āryās’. Now in the Sastra Tantra, there is a mention of five alternative opinions (viz., making one of Brahman, Puruṣa S’akti, Niyati, and Kāla, the cause of creation) which are to be rejected. But in this

Kārikā of Tilak, we find only four. There is nothing to represent S’akti—To this we reply: Īs'varākṛṣṇa has summarised the work of Pañcas’ikha. But in the first place, it is not as yet definite that Sastra Tantra is the work of Pañcas’ikha. Secondly, even if it were so, yet it is not binding upon Īs'varākṛṣṇa to give every detail in his summary. The other points raised by Mr. Pathak are covered by the footnote alluded to above.

B. Unavailable.

(1) Sastra Tantra. Something has already been said with regard to the controversy of regarding Pañcas’ikha or Vārṣāganyya as the author of Sastra Tantra. Here, the question is examined further. Following are the references to Sastra Tantra in Jay.

(a) “तेन च पानपत्रतन्त्रम् अर्थितिहस्य परिप्रेक्ष्यः” (p. 1). (b) “विग्रहप्रयत्नमात्रस्य शत्तपतित्त्रयार्थम्” (p. 17). (c) “पायेण पायेत् परमप्रथायेत्” (p. 56).

From the above passages, Prof. Hariyana infers the following facts (See—“Sastra Tantra and Vārṣāganyya”, J. O. R., April–June, 1929, pp. 107–112).—(a) Sastra Tantra has 60 parts, (b) its author is Pañcas’ikha and (c) it deals with 60 topics, and is, therefore, called “Sastra Tantra”. Vārṣāganyya is not its author, as others think. As regards the verse—

गुणानां परमं दृष्टं न दर्श्यतः प्रत्ययः

which is quoted in Y. Bh., and Bhāmata, Vācaspāti alludes it to Sastra Tantra in Tatt. V., and to Vārṣāganyya in Bhāmata. On the basis of these two references, people have come to
Therefore, the question of authorship of Saṣṭiṭantra is still undecided.

(2) Rājavārtika. In the Tatt. K., we find the following three verses from Rājavārtika—

“प्रथमासततिलखितवर्तमाणी सत्यमात्राः
पारस्य च तथा नैव च विधियोऽयोऽगच्छ एव च॥
शेषानि तत्त्वादि सविद्यायेः सत्यता दुः॥
विक्षिप्तं विद्विन्दृत्तो नव तु तुष्माण्॥
कल्पणानायास्यस्यमित्वाविद्वितिविनास्य समस्याः॥
इति पद्ध: प्रतार्थानामस्य: सदा सत्यिनि: ” “

The first verse is quoted also in the Sarvopakārini (Ch. S. S., No. 246, p. 100.). These sixty categories resemble the sixty categories treated of in the Ahirbudhyā Samhītā (Jay., int., p. 5; S. S., pp. 70-73). It is impossible to determine the authorship of Rājavārtika. Garbe thinks Bhoja is the author (8, y. p. 7). These maulikārthas are enumerated with slight variations in Jay., Māth., Saṁkhya-tattva-vidyācana (Ch., S. S., No. 245, p. 22.), Tattva-yaçārīya-dipana (ibid, p. 80) and Tattva-samāsā-sūtra-vrtti (ibid, p. 133).

VI. The Teachings of Saṁkhya

It has already been pointed out that the activity of all rational beings is directed towards acquiring happiness and avoiding misery. Thoughtful people, on the other hand, avoid happiness even as it is mixed up with misery. Now the nature of this misery, although known generally, is still outside the purview of ordinary people. Īsvākr̥ṣṇa has broadly divided that misery into three classes; viz. (1) intrinsic, (2) extrinsic, and (3) superhuman. (1) The intrinsic misery is due to the disorder of wind, bile and phlegm, and is also caused by passion, anger and so on. (2) The extrinsic misery is caused by men, beasts, reptiles and the rest. (3) The superhuman is the outcome of evil influences of spirits, stars and so on.
It may be asked—Why should we engage in philosophical remedy, when we see that ordinary and obvious remedies can very well remove all the miseries? We see that intrinsic miseries in the shape of various diseases are removed by physicians by means of medicines; as regards miseries due to passion, anger and the rest, they are removable by the acquisition of desires for objects in the shape of flowers, scent, women and so on. The extrinsic miseries can also be removed by the knowledge of Politics, residence in safe places and the rest. Similarly superhuman miseries can also be avoided by charms, incantations and the rest. Thus, when obvious means can uproot all the kinds of miseries, it is useless to engage in inquiring into the philosophical remedies.

We reply, yes; but these remedies are not absolute or final. Nobody can take the guarantee that the obvious remedies suggested above will remove the miseries certainly and absolutely.

Thus, as we see, the obvious remedies are not helpful to us, and we should, therefore, enquire into extraordinary remedies for removing the miseries.

If it be said,—‘Well, granted that the obvious remedies are not of any help to us; but there are means revealed by the Vedas. By performing the various sacrifices prescribed by the Vedas, we can get over the miseries and acquire heaven and other higher regions,—then our reply is the same as above. We know that stay in the higher regions even is of temporary character. After enjoying the fruits of good actions performed on this earth the dwellers in heaven have to revert back to this earth and undergo all the miseries again. Moreover, there is impurity in the Vedic rites. One has to kill animals in performing some of them. Again, the heaven-dwellers are not free from jealousy. If one particular sacrifice leads to bare residence in heaven, the other leads to supremacy over there. This must give rise to jealousy in the minds of the people over there. Thus, we see even the Vedic rites are not absolute or final means for releasing one from misery. Therefore, we should enquire after some other means.

That means is the discriminative knowledge of the Manifest, the Unmanifest and the Knower. The Sāmkhya Philosophy divides the objects into four kinds viz., (1) Root-matter, (2) Evolvent and Evolute, (3) Evolute and (4) the Spirit.

(1) The Root-matter or Nature is not a modification. It is the root-cause of all matter. Intellect and the rest are the evolutes of this Nature. Intellect, which is the product of Nature, produces Ego. Ego, born out of Intellect, produces the five subtle elements and the organs of sense and action. The five subtle elements, which are produced from Ego, produce the five gross-elements. The five gross-elements and the eleven organs produce nothing, and they are, therefore, Evolutes only. The Spirit is neither produced from anything nor itself produces anything; so it is neither an Evolute nor an Evolvent. Among these, the Nature has been termed as Unmanifest, the Spirit as the Knower and the rest as Manifest. So, by the discriminative knowledge of these three, one attains salvation.

The means of Right cognition (or Pramāṇas) recognised in this Philosophy are Perception, Inference and Valid Testimony. The other Pramāṇas recognised by the rival schools are included under these three. The process of Perception may be stated thus:

Suppose there is water in a tank. On account of the absence of any outlet, this water, the very nature of which is to flow, is tranquil. But now a small channel is dug. Then water flows through this channel and assumes the form of the object into which it flows. It will be rectangular if it
enters a rectangular field and so on. Similarly, intellect, the very nature of which is to apprehend all the objects, is at a stand-still, being enveloped by the Attribute of Tamas or Darkness. But after the contact of an organ of sense with any object, this darkness is removed. Then this intellect flows through the channel of an organ of sense and assumes the form of the object with which the organ of sense is in contact. This assuming of a particular form of an object by the intellect is called Perception or determination or knowledge. Of course, the result of this perception is experienced by the Spirit. For, intellect being a modification of matter and non-intelligent can produce only a non-intelligent determination. And the phrases like “I am happy” refer to the Conscious Spirit. So what really happens is this:—A part of intellect runs out through an organ of sense to assume the form of an object. The other part reflects the image of the Conscious Spirit. Now, the out-going part of intellect, having assumed the shape of an object presents itself to the part remaining behind and reflecting the Conscious Spirit. So the Spirit, which in reality is free from activity, contact, agency and such other qualities, becomes active or agent through its image reflected in the intellect. The real enjoyer or agent is the reflected image of the Spirit.

Inference is based upon Perception. The materialists like Carvaka deny the authenticity of Inference. But, they may be asked—suppose you talk to a man. After his departure if you are asked about that man, you will very readily say about him that he is intelligent or ignorant. Now, how can you perceive ignorance or knowledge of another man? You will have to infer them. Therefore, inference will have to be recognised as a means of Right Cognition. Inference leads to conclude the presence of Major term in the Minor term on the basis of the concomitance of Middle and Major terms and the cognition of the presence of Middle term in the Minor term. For example,—we see smoke (Middle term) on the Hill (Minor term). Now we remember the concomitance of smoke (Middle term) and fire (Major term). Thus we conclude that there is fire (Major term) on the Hill (Middle term).

The Inference is of three kinds viz., Purva, (A priori), Sastra (A posteriori) and Samanayadrgsa (commonly seen). These are defined and explained in the notes on the 5th Karika.

Valid testimony is the assertion of a reliable person. A reliable person is that, who ascertains facts on the basis of strong proofs; and when he states a fact exactly as he has seen it, then his assertion is Valid Testimony. The other means of Right Cognition are included under these three. This has been exhaustively explained in the notes on the 4th and 5th Karikas.

Thus, Nature, Spirit and the rest are cognised by Inference or Valid Testimony. It may be asked—why should not the non-perception of these lead us to conclude their total non-existence? We reply—Mere non-perception of an object cannot lead to its total non-existence in every case. We see that even existent objects are not perceived for various reasons. For example, a man in Conjeevaram cannot perceive the Himalayas; one cannot see a piece of straw fallen in one's own eye; a deaf person does not apprehend the sound of music; a person absorbed in something does not perceive anybody seated near him; one who is not a yogin cannot perceive an atom which is existent; people cannot see the moon or stars during the day-time because their light is overcome by the sun; drops of water, falling in water cannot be differentiated afterwards. Therefore, the non-perception of Nature and the rest is due to their minuteness and not total non-existence. For, when we see the effects of Nature,
in the shape of intellect, ego and so forth, we infer Nature as the cause of these effects.

Now, we state the theory of cause and effect according to the Sāmkhyas. They state that an existent effect is produced from an existent cause. The Buddhists proclaim that the existent Effect is produced from the cause which is non-existent. The Vedāntins assert that there is no existence of Effects, but they are illusory forms of one existent. The followers of Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika say that the non-existent Effect is produced from the existent cause.

The Theory of the Buddhists is:—"The existence comes into being from non-existence, for without destruction nothing can be produced." (N. S. IV. 1. 14) We observe that a sprout is produced out of the destruction of seed, curds are produced from the destruction of milk. Thus, we see that destruction (= non-existence) produces an object.

But, really speaking, the Buddhists have missed the point. It is not the destroyed seed that produces sprout. It is simply the modification of the structure of particles of a seed that we see in a sprout. That is, when particular kinds of particles are in a particular form, they constitute a seed. When that particular form is changed, then those particles constitute the sprout. If non-existence in shape of destruction were to produce existence, then it will lead to great confusion. The point has been clarified by Śaṅkarācārya (Br. S. Bh. II. 2. 26) as follows:—

"If entity did spring from non-entity, the assumption of special causes would be purposeless, since non-entity is in all cases one and the same. For, the non-existence of seeds and the like after they have been destroyed is of the same kind as the non-existence of the horns of hares and the like, i.e., non-existence is in all cases nothing else but the absence of all character of reality, and hence there would be no sense (on the doctrine of origination from non-existence) in assuming that sprouts are produced from seeds only, curds from milk only and so on. And if non-distinguished non-existence were admitted to have causal efficiency, we should also have to assume that sprouts, etc., originate from the horns of hares, etc.,—a thing certainly not observed." (S. B. E. XXXIV, p. 416).

The view of the Vedāntins, viz., the cause alone is existent, the effect being only an apparent change, is also untenable. They say that as the cognition of silver in pearl-oysters is false, for it is contradicted by the subsequent cognition of the real pearl-oyster, so the superimposition of this inanimate world on the intelligent Brahmān is also false. To this we reply:—The cognition of silver in pearl-oyster is contradicted by perception; we subsequently cognize pearl-oyster and thus our first cognition of silver is contradicted by the second cognition. But we do not find any such thing in the case of this world. There is no subsequent cognition which could render our first cognition of this world false. Therefore, this world cannot be regarded to be mere illusion. Moreover, we find a similarity between silver and pearl-oyster. Both are white. But what similarity is there between the non-intelligent world and the intelligent Brahmān, both being poles asunder? How can the world now be superimposed on Brahmān?

[The Vedantic replies—For the sake of illusion it is not necessary that only similarity between two objects can lead to superimposing of one on the other. We see that people whose minds are highly excited by passion, experience the illusion of embracing their wives in dream. The same can be said of waking state also. Moreover, when ignorant people superimpose dark colour on the sky which is beyond perception, then the question of similarity does not arise at all.]
The Naiyāyikas assert that the effect is non-existent before the causal operation. Non-existence is produced out of existence. From the existent lump of clay is produced a jar which is non-existent in that lump of clay.

Their view is not correct. For, non-existence cannot be produced. Nobody can bring non-existence into existence. Who can produce yellow colour out of the blue wherein the yellow colour does not exist? It may be argued:—People use phrases like ‘The jar is non-existent,’ with regard to the lump of clay from which jar has not yet been produced, and ‘The jar is existent,’ after it is produced from that clay. Therefore, the jar has the quality of existence at times and non-existence at other times; otherwise, these phrases cannot be used.—To this we reply:—All agree to the view that a quality exists in the qualified. According to the objector’s view-point, the jar was non-existent before it was produced. That is, the qualified (jar) did not exist then. Then, where did the quality of non-existence reside in the absence of the qualified? Therefore, the objector will have to admit the existence of jar even against his will in the lump of clay. Moreover, the objector had stated, non-existence is a quality which resided in the jar before its production; for, otherwise one cannot use such phrases as ‘The non-existent jar.’ To this we reply:—How can you use such a phrase.—‘The jar is non-existent before its production? Before its production, the qualified (jar) being non-existent, how can the quality of non-existence be appended to it? For example, we say ‘A blue lotus.’ Here lotus is the substratum of the quality of blueness. Similarly, ‘A non-existent jar’ means that the jar is the substratum of the quality of non-existence. Now, when the jar is not existing before its production, then how can it become the substratum of any quality as the lotus is of blueness; therefore, an effect does exist even before the operation of cause.

It may be asked:—If the effect does exist even before the operation of cause, then, wherein lies the utility of the causal operation? To this we reply:—In the stage of cause an object remains latent and minute. The causal operation simply makes that object gross and patent. Thus the causal operation brings about the manifestation of an effect which is already existing in the cause. For example, the pressing of sesame seeds manifests the oil which is already existent in those seeds.

Again, the effect is existent in its material cause, because the former is related to the latter. A lump of clay is related to a jar even before its production. If the jar were non-existent, then it could not have any relation with the lump of clay. A lump of clay cannot produce anything which is not related to it. If unrelated things could be produced out of anything, then why not produce cloth out of a lump of clay? Or for that matter, why not produce everything from everything. But this is not so. On the other hand, wherever cause is patent enough to produce a particular effect, that cause will produce only that effect. The sesame seeds have the potency to produce oil and not jar or cloth. The yarns have the potency to produce only cloth. This potency is always related to a potent effect. Had there been no existence of jar before its production, then who can instil the potency to produce it in a lump of clay.

Again, it is observed that an effect is of the same nature as its cause. An effect is not different from its cause. A jar is not different from a lump of clay, but is of the nature of clay. If the jar were different from clay, then the jar could not be of the nature of clay. Only those things differ from each other which are produced out of different materials, as a jar and the yarns. The objects which are different can have conjunction or separation. A jar and a piece of cloth can be brought together. The Himalayas
are always separated from the Vindhyas. But in clay and jar there can be neither separation nor conjunction. Moreover, the weight of clay from which a jar is made is the same as the weight of the jar. For example, a seer of clay will produce a jar weighing neither more nor less than a seer. Therefore, jar is not different from clay.

An objector says:—Well, jar is different from clay, because (1) We find that with regard to jar, we say it is born, and not with regard to clay; (2) It is the jar which is destroyed and not the clay; (3) The notions about the jar and clay are also different; (4) One is named jar, the other clay; (5) The jar serves the purpose of bringing water which clay does not; (6) We say that the jar exists in clay and not the reverse.

To this we reply that these arguments for proving a difference between a cause and its effect, do not prove the real difference. For, these apparent differences can be explained away by “attributing the notions to be appearance and disappearance of certain factors.” For instance, the limbs of a tortoise appear from its body and again disappear into it. Nobody on this basis can call these phenomena to be the birth and death of its limbs; similar is the case of a jar etc., which are said to be produced when they emanate from clay, etc., and destroyed when they merge into clay, etc. The difference of notions also can be similarly explained; we call clay as clay as long as jar has not emanated from it. As regards the usage of such expressions as, jar exists in clay, it is like the usage of such phrases as, “Tilaka trees exist in forest.” Really speaking the whole forest is made up of Tilaka trees only, still we use a phrase like that. With reference to the difference of purposes served by a cause and an effect (e.g., by clay and jar), we reply that the same things serve different purposes collectively or singly. The atoms of clay collected in the form of a jar, can bring water:

they cannot do so when they are single. “Each individual bearer performs the function of indicating the path, but not that of carrying the palanquin, while collectively they carry the palanquin.” If the Naiyāyika were to say again:

You say that an effect already existing in its cause is manifested by the operation of the cause. Now, tell us, does this manifestation exist before the causal operation or not? If it does, i.e., if manifestation exists before causal operation then what is the use of the latter? If, on the other hand, you say that manifestation does not exist before causal operation, then it would mean that causal operation produces a non-existent thing. This goes against your sat-kārya theory.

We reply:—

The Naiyāyika has overlooked his own fault. For the same fallacy can be shown to exist in his theory also. He says that a non-existent effect is produced from its cause. Now, we ask—does this production exist before the cause or not? If it does then what purpose does your cause serve? If it does not, then that production must have another production and the latter another and so on ad infinitum.

If, on the other hand, it is said that this production of jar is nothing else but jar itself, then “jar is produced” would be tantamount to production is produced, which is absurd. It will be still more absurd when we say, “jar is destroyed,” for, it would then mean production is destroyed.

Thus it is proved that the effect is always existent.

Pradhāna, Prakṛti and Atyakta are the synonyms of Nature. It is uncaused as it is not produced out of any other thing, eternal, one, of the nature of three Attributes and pervades all its products. The three Attributes are Sattva, Rajas and Tamas. Sattva is of the nature of pleasure and illumination, and is light. Rajas is of the nature of pain
and activity, and is mobile. Tamas is of the nature of delusion and enveloping, and is heavy. These Attributes are able to bring this world into being, and carry on its business by their nature of being mutually subjective, and supporting and productive, and co-operative. Sometimes, Sattva subjugates the Rajas and Tamas; sometimes, Rajas subjugates Sattva and Tamas; sometimes, Tamas subjugates Rajas and Sattva. These Attributes have no power of creation singly; they become productive by taking the support of each other. They are always found in union, all three together. And for the purpose of serving the end of the Spirit, they are seen to co-operate, although they are mutually opposed. The end of the Spirit is the worldly enjoyment or emancipation.

It may be argued that under these circumstances, every existing entity should have all the three qualities of pleasure, pain and delusion, as it is composed of the three Attributes. Vacaspati argues—If these external objects themselves are of the nature of pleasure, pain and delusion, then sandle should impart pleasure in winter even. Sandal never ceases to be sandal. Similarly, paste of saffron should be pleasant even in summer. Saffron-paste never ceases to be what it is. In the same way, thorns which are pleasant to a camel should be pleasant to men also. They do not change their nature in the case of any particular individual. Therefore, sandal, saffron, etc., are not of the nature of pleasure, pain and delusion. They give rise to these different feelings on account of the difference of individuals, times, and condition, etc. (Bhāmati on Br. S. II 2:1).

To this Bala replies (p. 141)—Although pleasure, pain and delusion are common to all objects, still they do not spring up accidentally, so as to affect everybody uniformly. They require certain conditions for their generation. Pleasure for its generation, depends upon virtue, and stands in need of Sattva. Pain, for its generation, depends upon vice and stands in need of Rajas. Delusion, for its generation, depends upon vice and stands in need of Tamas. Vacaspati has also explained it well (Tatt. K., Kar. 13)—“A single girl, young, beautiful, gentle and virtuous, is a source of delight to her husband,—why?—because for him she appears in the form of Pleasure; she pains her co-wives,—why?—because for them, she appears in the form of Pain; and lastly the same girl deludes or stupefies another man who is unable to get her,—why?—because for him she appears in the form of Delusion. The case of this woman illustrates the nature of all things.” (Dr. Jha’s translation, pp. 49–50)

Thus, the Nature also is made up of the three Attributes, because it is the cause of all the manifest objects which are made up of the three Attributes. The Attributes in the Nature are in equilibrium. Of course, the Attributes are not free from modification even at this stage, for modification is their very nature; but the modification of each Attribute is similar. Sattva is modified into Sattva, Rajas into Rajas and Tamas into Tamas, till the Nature does not come into contact with the Spirit. The moment Nature comes into contact with the Spirit, the equilibrium of the Attributes is disturbed. On account of this disturbance, diverse forms in this world are created from the Attributes. For example, one and the same water produces different kinds of juices in coconuts, lemon, grape, etc.

It has already been pointed out that all this creation by Nature is for the enjoyment of the Spirit. Now, the existence of the Spirit is proved. We observe that all composite objects are for another’s use. Bed, seat, etc., do not serve any end of their own, but are meant for a man. Similarly, the composite Pradhāna, Mahat, etc., being composed of Pleasure, Pain and Delusion, much exist for another’s use. This another cannot be a composite object. For, the latter would then require to serve another composite, and
this another and so on ad infinitum. Therefore, this another, viz., the Spirit, whose purpose is served by Pradhāna, etc., must be recognised to exist. Again, all what is of the nature of Pleasure, Pain and Delusion is seen to require a controller, as a chariot does. Therefore, Buddhi, etc., also require a controller. And that controller is the Spirit. Moreover, Pleasure, Pain and Delusion presuppose the existence of an enjoyer who enjoys them. This enjoyer is the Spirit. Pleasure, etc., cannot be enjoyed by anything of the nature of Pleasure, etc. For, nothing can operate upon itself. Therefore, we must admit an entity devoid of Pleasure etc. And that entity is the Spirit. There is also another argument, which proves the existence of the Spirit. The scriptures tend to bring about Isolation, which is the final cessation of the three kinds of pain. Buddhi, etc., cannot be isolated, because, they are of the nature of Pleasure; Pain and Delusion. Pain is one of their ingredients from which they cannot be separated. Therefore, we have to admit the existence of something distinct from Buddhi, etc. And that is the Spirit.

There are as many Spirits as the bodies, and not one Spirit. Īśvāraṇaḥ establishes the plurality of Spirits in the following verse (18)—“(1) Because there is definite adjustment of birth, death and the organs, (2) because there is non-simultaneity of activity and (3) because there is diversity due to the three Attributes—the plurality of the Spirits is established.” (Dr. Jha’s translation, p. 64).

We see in this world that one man dies, the other is born, one is blind, the other sees well,—one is deaf, the other listens well. All this can be explained only when we admit different Spirits in different bodies. If there is only one Spirit in all the bodies, then, when the Spirit renounces one body, all beings should die; or when the Spirit takes up a new body, all beings should be born. Similarly, when one becomes blind, all should be blind. Therefore, there is a plurality of Spirits.

If it be argued that just one Ākāśa appears many on account of coming into contact with jar, house, etc., similarly, one Spirit appears many on account of coming into contact with different bodies, then it would not be correct. For, as body is the upādhi (condition) of the Spirit, so the limbs are the upādhīs of a body. And when we see the appearance and disappearance of the limbs in a body, would such phenomena be called the births and deaths of the same body?

Moreover, if there is only one Spirit in all the bodies, then when that Spirit moves one body all the bodies should move simultaneously. Again, we see that beings are divided into gods, men, beasts etc. on the basis of the three Attributes. Those abounding in Sattva are gods, those in Rajas are men and those in Tamas are demons. If there were only one Spirit, then these differences would never arise, but the whole creation would be uniform. Thus, the plurality of the Spirits is established.

The Spirit, being devoid of the three Attributes, is the seer or witness of this creation, which is of the nature of the three Attributes. The Spirit is isolated, inactive and indifferent, again because it is free from the three Attributes. This different Spirit appears to be active, although the activity really belongs to the three Attributes. This illusion arises out of the union of the insentient Nature with the Sentient Spirit. As a result thereof, the activity belonging to the insentient Nature is transferred to the Sentient Spirit.

A question arises—why should there be a union between the Nature and the Spirit? The reply is:—The Nature is an object of experience; it stands in need of the Spirit, the experiencer. Therefore, one cause of union is that the Spirit may experience the Nature. But, when the Spirit imagines
itself as suffering on account of its union with the Nature, then it desires isolation. This isolation is the discrimination between the Spirit and the Nature. And as this discrimination is impossible without the Nature, the second cause of union between the Nature and the Spirit is the purpose of bringing about the Spirit’s isolation.

The Nature, having exhibited itself to the Spirit, desists like an actress who has shown her skill on the stage. The Spirit then attains isolation. And as a delicate and newly-wedded girl when seen by a stranger does not appear again before that stranger, so the Nature also, when seen by a Spirit does not come into union with that particular Spirit.

Thus, bondage and isolation which really belong to the Nature are ascribed to the Spirit by mistake. By practising such discriminative wisdom, a person never errs about bondage or emancipation. That is, he attains isolation or salvation.

Har Dutt Sharma

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>अथ कारिकाणा सूची.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(अक्षरदिशेन)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>कारिकाणा:</th>
<th>प्राक्तं:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>७ अतिरूत्तम सामीयत:</td>
<td>८</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>२३ अपस्यथायो टुट्टनाचपो ज्ञानस:</td>
<td>२५</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>३३ अन्तःक्रमः सिद्धिः</td>
<td>३३</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>२४ अभिमानोऽहंकारः</td>
<td>२७</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>१४ अविचारः सिद्धिः</td>
<td>१७</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>५३ अविचारः सौऽैव</td>
<td>४९</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>९ अस्तुरणात् उपासनः व्रहणात्</td>
<td>१०</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>५० आप्यासिकालः</td>
<td>४६</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>५६ इस्पेष प्रकृतिष्ठित:</td>
<td>५१</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>२७ उपासात्मकरं मनं:</td>
<td>२८</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>५५ ऋष्याः सत्याविवाहः</td>
<td>४९</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>५१ उह: शान्तिज्ञानम:</td>
<td>५७</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>४८ अधारोऽशिनियवधाः</td>
<td>५५</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>३ प्रस्तवितत्वमयः</td>
<td>६१</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>३६ पूर्वत विपर्यायमः</td>
<td>३५</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>६७ पूर्वत तच्छायसात्</td>
<td>५८</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>४४ पुष्प प्रयासारः</td>
<td>४३</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>५८ अधूर्युच्यत्वस्य:</td>
<td>५८</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>६२ कलं वचारसिद्धिः</td>
<td>३३</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>६१ कारणमिश्रायणचस:</td>
<td>१९</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>६१ विक्रम मद्यवचस्:</td>
<td>३५</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>१८ जननमजनकानाप्रति-नियमात्</td>
<td>२१</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>५५ तत्त्र जस्मामर्कुसः</td>
<td>५०</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>३८ तम्मात्त्रात्मविशेषः</td>
<td>३६</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>१९ तस्याः विपर्यासात्</td>
<td>२५</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>२० तस्याः तस्यात्ममोऽग्रः</td>
<td>२२</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>६२ तस्याः विद्योऽङ्गः</td>
<td>५७</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>६५ तेन नित्यायसः</td>
<td>५८</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>१९ निगृहानिवेशः विषयः</td>
<td>१२</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>१ हुः सत्यविवाहात्</td>
<td>१</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>२ दुर्बात्वदुध्रवः</td>
<td>३</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>४ दृष्टमुमुन्नात्मवचनम:</td>
<td>४</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>६६ राज्य दृष्टयेष्क एको</td>
<td>५९</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>४४ वर्णम गममूण्डसः</td>
<td>३६</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>६२ न विना भावितियः</td>
<td>५८</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>६० नारायणिकाश्याम:</td>
<td>५३</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>४७ पञ्च विपर्यायव्यः</td>
<td>४५</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>२१ पुरुषस्य वर्णाङ्गस:</td>
<td>३५</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>६९ पुरुषस्य जानिकिर्म:</td>
<td>६१</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>३२ पुरुषस्येतुकार्विविदम्</td>
<td>४०</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>३२ पुरुषस्य जानिकिर्म:</td>
<td>६१</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>३२ पुरुषस्येतुकार्विविदम्</td>
<td>४०</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>७ प्रतिविद्यायज्ञसात्यः द्वाय:</td>
<td>७</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>६८ प्रस्तवितसः बारिकायेः</td>
<td>६०</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>१२ श्रवणप्रतिविद्याद्रासमकः</td>
<td>१४</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>कारिकायां सूची</td>
<td>पृष्ठां</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-------------------------------------------</td>
<td>--------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>34 बुद्धिनिविषयरूपोष्टमा</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26 बुद्धिनिविषयरूपोष्टमा रूपोष्टमा</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>48 मेवालसंसारदिभिः</td>
<td>44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>35 मेवालनामपरिपासावधाना</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 मूलभ्रोणितविखंति</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30 तुल्यपदकृत्यधेयतु द्रूढति</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>59 राहस्य दर्शिवस</td>
<td>52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>61 रूपेष्टमुखिनितविधिः</td>
<td>53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>52 बस्तविद्वृत्तिनिमितम्</td>
<td>52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>44 वैराग्यात्म प्रकृतिलय</td>
<td>44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28 श्रवणविदु पदावां</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>अा दियात्मरिपारमात्मक</td>
<td>61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>33 सचां लघु प्रकाशकमिर्मम्</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

श्रीमद्वर्षक्रम्यप्रणीति:

सांख्यकारिका:

गौडपाददितिविदितत्त्वार्थप्रकृतिः

श्रीमणेशाय नमः


c

कविलाय प्रलिपितमवे सेनाविद्यादेशी जगति महेोः

कारणयासांस्कर्यमयो नौरिक्ष विहित तत्रतराया िि

वधयान्तर शङ्कर प्रमाणविद्याद्वितेहदत्वनिपुष्टकः

शाश्व समेट्यवित्त त्वमलस्वदेहं प्रबन्धायाः

हं दुःखद्वाभिधानातिज्ञासाः तद्भविष्यकः हेतुः

हं सार्वपाठी चेतनेकान्तस्ततोदभवायः

अन्यायः। — हं दुःखद्वाभिधानातिज्ञासा तद्भविष्यकः हेतुः विषया

भवति) सा हं (हेतु) अपार चेत, न, एकान्तावतोभवातः

हं दुःखद्वित्ति। अश्रो आरोप उपेक्षा किये। इह भगवान्त्र ब्रह्म-

मुनि कपिलो नामा। तद्यथा——

कनकक्षर सन्तनदेहः वृत्तियश्र गनातेः

आसुरिः कपिलब्रह्म बोधुः पञ्चविश्वलाभः

इस्विते भगवः: पुजा: सा ग्राह्य महर्षिः।

कपिलस्य सहोदरस्यानि प्रभो शान्तवैराग्यमेय शेति। एवं प्रेमवर्गः

सन्न्यासेः तमस्य मंगलमंदकोशम् संसारपरम्पर्येण संकारण्यो विशालानाय

आसुरिकाग्रमा द्वाराकायेऽर विश्वनिर्भित्तवचाना मानसुकान्तः। यथा शान्तः

हं दुःखद्वित्ति।

1. वि०सनन्दकिर्मी पाठांतरम्

2. बि० ‘सन्न्यस्यात्मत्त्वाद्’

3. वि० वेदत्त्वाद्

4. वि० सन्न्यस्यात्मत्त्वाद्
सांख्यकारिका:

फळाचित्त-दासानं देवानं कला आचारी, कथं वयमुद्दता अभूतिति बिचारे। संरामायमपम सोंम वौतंत्र: सोंम तस्मादमुता अभूत, अमरा मुत्तन्त इत्यतः। किं च अभूत ज्ञोति, गावते वयमद्वैतं वौति: स्वमिदि। अभिदाम देवान, विद्यानु विदितवतं। एवं व किंतुनमायमानु नरात्मकता बनार; नूनं बिदितं किं आरति: वासुसेवनानु मूर्त्तं कर्तिते।

किं मुर्तिसृष्टिश्रस्त्रम, कृतिभीर्म विषया किं किं कारिकावत्तम अमृतमय्यं। अयु: वेबे यूस्तेव अत्याअस्तिक कें पुरुषाचे बसा — कला हरिक्ष मुंड तरंग पापं तत्रं तवहलं तत्रं तत्रं सवाधिन्यच बये। किंतु न अनुज्ञायस्यत:। अन्तः वेबे वै अथवा कं अथवा चालक नये।

द्रायुवादावलिक: स स्वाधिश्रविश्वास्य। अन्तिपरिणाम: येन अस्वत्वानुवादिविवाहानुपात ।

2 अन्तः: अनृत्वकितः (हेतु: ) द्रायुव, स हि अविच्छिन्न-व्यावहारितयुक्त:। अस्वत्वानुवादिविवाहानुपात ।

द्रायुवादावलिक इति। द्रायुव तुवो द्रायुव। योतोऽस्तु अनुरक्षकितः नरात्मक स द्रायुव, यस्मपि—

अविच्छिन्न-व्यावहारितयुक्त:। अविच्छिन्न:। पुरुषचाच्यात । तथा चोकम्।

पुरुषात्मक निपुलयते पद्यनाम मधुमेधविनि।

अमोधमयय वचनवादविन्यस पुषुभिषिमि:।

वयाथि अतितमुतिविविाति चर्मक्षेत्रपि मिश्रितमयविद्विष्टिकुक्ति इति। वाथः—

हरिन्द्राभिन्धानानां कर्ता युग्म युग्म। कहेर नारीलाई कालेक हि दुर्गतिकम्।

एसतिम्त्वदिनात्मानानां तस्ययुक्त:। तथा भविषययो विशेषज्ञ कुक्त:। विशेषसुदा- दृश्यान्तरस्य दुःख स्वयं विदितत । एवमानुवादिकोरं हेतुददृश्यत । कल्पहि एसति।

श्रेयस्य—इति चैत्यदीते.
तद्विरितं: श्रेयाः।
ताभ्यं दध्यानुशब्धिकाश्या विपरीत: श्रेयाः निधित्वात्।
एवैव निधिकर्षात्।
तथाम दध्यानुशब्धिकाश्या विपरीत: श्रेयाः।
आविष्कारिकः श्रेयाः।
व्यक्तिकह्यं दध्यानुशिष्याः।
तत्त्व भविष्यति: श्रेयाः।
पञ्चाकास्त: विकारः।
पञ्चाकास्त: विकारः।
पञ्चाकास्त: विकारः।
पञ्चाकास्त: विकारः।
पञ्चाकास्त: विकारः।
पञ्चाकास्त: विकारः।
पञ्चाकास्त: विकारः।
पञ्चाकास्त: विकारः।
पञ्चाकास्त: विकारः।
पञ्चाकास्त: विकारः।
पञ्चाकास्त: विकारः।
पञ्चाकास्त: विकारः।
पञ्चाकास्त: विकारः।
पञ्चाकास्त: विकारः।
पञ्चाकास्त: विकारः।
पञ्चाकास्त: विकारः।
पञ्चाकास्त: विकारः।
पञ्चाकास्त: विकारः।
पञ्चाकास्त: विकारः।
पञ्चाकास्त: विकारः।
पञ्चाकास्त: विकारः।
पञ्चाकास्त: विकारः।
पञ्चाकास्त: विकारः।
पञ्चाकास्त: विकारः।
पञ्चाकास्त: विकारः।
पञ्चाकास्त: विकारः।
पञ्चाकास्त: विकारः।
पञ्चाकास्त: विकारः।
पञ्चाकास्त: विकारः।
पञ्चाकास्त: विकारः।
पञ्चाकास्त: विकारः।
पञ्चाकास्त: विकारः।
पञ्चाकास्त: विकारः।
पञ्चाकास्त: विकारः।
पञ्चाकास्त: विकारः।
पञ्चाकास्त: विकारः।
पञ्चाकास्त: विकारः।
पञ्चाकास्त: विकारः।
पञ्चाकास्त: विकारः।
पञ्चाकास्त: विकारः।
पञ्चाकास्त: विकारः।
पञ्चाकास्त: विकारः।
पञ्चाकास्त: विकारः।
पञ्चाकास्त: विकारः।
पञ्चाकास्त: विकारः।
पञ्चाकास्त: विकारः।
पञ्चाकास्त: विकारः।
पञ्चाकास्त: विकारः।
पञ्चाकास्त: विकारः।
पञ्चाकास्त: विकारः।
पञ्चाकास्त: विकारः।
पञ्चाकास्त: विकारः।
पञ्चाकास्त: विकारः।
पञ्चाकास्त: विकारः।
पञ्चाकास्त: विकारः।
पञ्चाकास्त: विकारः।
पञ्चाकास्त: विकारः।
पञ्चाकास्त: विकारः।
पञ्चाकास्त: विकारः।
पञ्चाकास्त: विकारः।
पञ्चाकास्त: विकारः।
पञ्चाकास्त: विकारः।
पञ्चाकास्त: विकारः।
पञ्चाकास्त: विकारः।
पञ्चाकास्त: विकारः।
पञ्चाकास्त: विकारः।
पञ्चाकास्त: विकारः।
पञ्चाकास्त: विकारः।
पञ्चाकास्त: विकारः।
पञ्चाकास्त: विकारः।
पञ्चाकास्त: विकारः।
पञ्चाकास्त: विकारः।
पञ्चाकास्त: विकारः।
पञ्चाकास्त: विकारः।
पञ्चाकास्त: विकारः।
पञ्चाकास्त: विकारः।
पञ्चाकास्त: विकारः।
पञ्चाकास्त: विकारः।
पञ्चाकास्त: विकारः।
पञ्चाकास्त: विकारः।
पञ्चाकास्त: विकारः।
पञ्चाकास्त: विकारः।
पञ्चाकास्त: विकारः।
पञ्चाकास्त: विकारः।
पञ्चाकास्त: विकारः।
पञ्चाकास्त: विकारः।
पञ्चाकास्त: विकारः।
पञ्चाकास्त: विकारः।
पञ्चाकास्त: विकारः।
पञ्चाकास्त: विकारः।
पञ्चाकास्त: विकारः।
पञ्चाकास्त: विकारः।
पञ्चाकास्त: विकारः।
पञ्चाकास्त: विकारः।
पञ्चाकास्त: विकारः।
पञ्चाकास्त: विकारः।
पञ्चाकास्त: विकारः।
प.nz=
सांख्यारिका:

तथा किं व्यणेतेदाह—
प्रतिप्रयाध्यवसायो द्वे, विप्रयनमानामार्थामुम्
तत्तिथिनिष्पूर्वकं, आपशुरुतिरात्सनं च ॥ ५ ॥

अन्वय: — प्रतिप्रयाध्यवसाय द्वे, अगमान्यो विप्रयनमानामार्थामुम्
तत्तिथिनिष्पूर्वकं, आपशुरुतिरात्सनं च ॥ ५ ॥

प्रतिप्रयनेवो बोधिनां वद्यादिविप्रयनमाय अच्छसयो द्वे प्रतयक्षममिथः।

द्विज्ञमुनामार्थास्मादम्। पूर्वबिं, नेपाबिं, सामायतो द्वे चेति। पूर्वस्मायस्तीति पूर्वबिं यथा — मेनोज्याया दृष्टी वाष्पति पूर्वबिं यथा।

चेतियाः — सुप्रादिनेव जलबल वेयमासाय घोषः, वार्तकम वायुम । सामायतो द्वे देवातिः गमां द्वे गतिमचं धृतत्वं, वेदविभात । यथा — वैतनामाय देवातिः गमां द्वे गतिमचं धृतत्वं, वेदविभात।

तथा पुष्पतानावदनं पुष्पम आयां इति सामायतो द्वे वी सायंति। इति द्वे आध्यवसायं द्वे शब्दमानं तथा।

किं तत्तिथिनिष्पूर्वकमिथि। द्विज्ञाय बिशुपूर्वकं च तव बिशुपूर्वकं तव विशुपूर्वकं विशुपूर्वकं तव विशुपूर्वकं तव बिशुपूर्वकं तव बिशुपूर्वकं तव बिशुपूर्वकं तव बिशुपूर्वकं तव बिशुपूर्वकं ।

आपशुरुतिरात्सनं च। आता आचार्यं ब्रह्मादय:। श्रुत्येति:। आतापुष्टिः आस्तुपुरुष॥, तद्विमासामान्यामिथि ॥ ५ ॥

प्रतिविविचरम विमानञुकं, तत्र केवल प्रमाणेन किं साध्यमुख्यते—

| 1. विद्याय जमयामायवंश यवेद । | 1. विद्या जयामायवंश। |
| 2. लंश जयामा कुंदसां: | 2. वि०—पुष्पतामा। |
| 3. मात सुन च। | 3. मात सुन। |

धर्मविधिः ॥ ॥ ॥ ॥ ॥
सामान्यतः हस्तांकनमाग्यां प्रस्तुतिरुत्तमानानुतः।
तसाक्षरुः चारित्रनुकृत परोक्षमााणामानुतः सिद्धम्॥ ६॥

अन्य: || अविनिर्देशार्थमां तु सामान्यवेद हस्तां अनुमानानुतः
प्रस्तुतिरुत्तमानानुतः।

सामान्यतः हस्तांकनमानानुतः अविनिर्देशार्थमां सामान्यतः
वर्त-मानानाः सिद्धम्।

प्राचार्यस्थायातः सामान्यतः हस्तान्तः साध्यातः
वस्तुप्राप्तिर्मायाः सिद्धम्।

तसाक्षरुः चारित्रनुकृत परोक्षमााणामानुतः सिद्धम्॥ ६॥

अत्र कुञ्जकारिका: ]

व्यवहारानुतः।

अन्य: ||

व्यवहारानुतः। अविनिर्देशार्थमां प्रस्तुतिरुत्तमानानुतः
अभिमानानुतः।

महाद्वारिका चतुष्कृतिः सर्पं प्रत्यक्षच | ८॥

8 19.

"संस्कृत कृतिः" इत्येवं सर्वेणा।

1. विहार्य ज्ञानमालाधिपोऽधिकारिः
2. मातृपति, सत्यां।
3. ऐसे, प्रत्यक्षितं।
4. ग्रंथि वचनः।
संख्याकारिका:]

द्यत्र भूतपूर्वमतम्। हेतुमद्विद्विषीय् प्रधानोऽष, हेतुममणहऽि दुःख, पञ्च तथाप्राप्त एकादशसिद्धीयार्थ्यं हेतुमस्वयंस्वरत्, अकारां ब्रतनमात्रेण हेतुमत, बायुः स्थतमात्रेयं हेतुमान, तेनो रूपनमात्रेयं हेतुमत, अयो स्थतमात्रेयं हेतुमस्वयंस्वरत्ती। एवं भूतवर्षयं द्यत्र भूतपूर्वमतम्।

किं च न, अनिन्यम म्। यथसमाद्यस्माद्यद्वितीये, यथा-मूलतिविद्धाप्तः घरः, च शान्तिः।

किं च, शान्तिः। अस्वागितमः। यथा प्राणपुरुषिः श्रवण्ती, नेव भक्तम्।

किं च नामसाते, सक्रियम्। संसारकालं संसर्गदिते, नरोद्धारभिः कर्मणं संयुक्त सूहमं शरीरस्माणि संसर्गदिते, तस्मात् सक्रियम्।

किं च न, अनेकान्। बुद्धिभुजाः। पञ्च तथाप्राप्त एकादशसिद्धीयार्थ्यं पञ्च महाभूताति चेताः।

(किं च न, अधितमः।) लक्षणोऽभावं। प्रधानाश्रयति बुद्धिः।

किं च, महतम्। लक्षणवाहिनी। लक्षणवाहिनी। क्रियान्तः तथाप्राप्त एकादशसिद्धीयार्थ्यं पञ्च तथाप्राप्त। तथा, नामसाते।

किं च, अनेकान्। बुद्धिभुजाः। पञ्च महाभूताति चेताः।

सांख्यपादमाफ्याः:

शाश्वत, शाश्वत, शाश्वत, कारणभाग, सक्रियम्॥ ९ ॥

शाश्वत, शाश्वत, शाश्वत, कारणभाग, सक्रियम्॥ १० ॥

शाश्वत, शाश्वत, शाश्वत, कारणभाग, सक्रियम्॥ ११ ॥

9. अन्यायः।

10. अन्यायः।

11. अन्यायः।

प्रथमवर्गमलक्षणम्॥ १० ॥

प्रथमवर्गमलक्षणम्॥ ११ ॥

प्रथमवर्गमलक्षणम्॥ १२ ॥

प्रथमवर्गमलक्षणम्॥ १३ ॥

प्रथमवर्गमलक्षणम्॥ १४ ॥
तथा अनिह्यः त्वम्, नित्यमप्यात्, अनुत्तमादानाचारुः। नहि मूलाभी।
कृतित्वा च, अभ्यासं च, यथादेशम्, यथात्।
श्रमित्वा च, अथिवादित्वा, नि-स्वात्मावतः।
यथा अनेक स्त्रीलोकानां प्राधनेः कारणं, तस्मातं| प्राधनेः।
तथा अथिभिः स्त्री, अनान्तिमप्यात्, अकार्यवात्। नहि प्राधनात्ति किं तिरित्वां यथा स्त्री।
तथा स्त्रीपतिः चिदं, अविष्कृतमप्यात्, नित्यात।
यददायुं सिद्धं प्राप्तस्य प्रदीप्यते, नैवं प्राधनं, तस्मादविश्वं| प्राधनम्।
तथा साधवं यथात्, स्त्रीवेदवर्तक, नहि शब्दस्वर्तर्खवर्णमः।
प्राधनेः स्थितः।
तथा परस्तं यथात्, स्रवनामप्यात्, प्रभवतामः। ॥ १० ॥
एवं व्यक्तिः कोऽविष्कृतं साध्वस्थितः। यद्य कर्मचा—
त्रिगुणानविकार्य विषयम्: सामान्यस्मातेन प्रस्वर्णम।
यथात् प्राधनाः, तद्विद्वित्त्वा च पुमाः। ॥ ११ ॥
एवं अनुम:— यथात् प्राधनाः प्रिगमय, अथवे विषय: सामान्यम् अनेकेऽन प्रस्वर्णम। पुमाः| तद्विद्वित्त्: तथा ह।
त्रिगुणम् व्यक्तम्। सत्तमस्तमस्त्स: तत् गुणम् यस्य: हति:।
अविभिः व्यक्तम्। न सिद्धस्वास्त्तिः। इंद्र ज्ञातमम् गुणम्
इति न विषये ३ कै च यति, अथि गौरवमस्त इति यथा। ये गुणाधिपतिः, यथानं ते च गुणम् इति।
तथा विषयोऽन्तूः: मोक्षसिद्धिः। सर्वपुरुषणां विषयात्मावतः।

1. वि०—मुनान।
2. मद्रय: पाठ:। वि०—मुनान।
3. वि०—हृदय—। वि०—हृदय—।
संस्थितारिका: }

१२ अन्वय: ——गुणा: प्रीत्याविद्वादामका: प्राकाशप्रभुतिनिय-मार्गः: अन्योथ्याभिमभायजनमिनुषुनुकृतायः।

प्राकाशमिन्त, अन्योथ्याभिमभायजनमिनुषुनुकृतायः। अन्नपुष्पक, विपाकादिकाश: गुणा:—सर्वरजस-माणीवर्धः। तत्र प्राकाशमिन्त, प्रसिद्धिः देव्य तदादर्शंकित, अन्नपुष्पमिन्त, अन्नपुष्पकमृत:।

तथा—सर्वरजसप्रभुतिनियमार्गः। अयोध्याद: विनायकाचः, प्राकाशमिन्त, प्रसिद्धिः प्राकाशमिन्तनियमार्गः। प्रसिद्धिः रजः। निन्यामकात:।

तथा—अन्योथ्याभिमभायजनमिनुषुनुकृतायः। अन्योथ्याभिमभायजनमिनुषुनुकृतायः। अन्योथ्याभिमभायजनमिनुषुनुकृतायः। अन्योथ्याभिमभायजनमिनुषुनुकृतायः। अन्योथ्याभिमभायजनमिनुषुनुकृतायः।

नन्दिपुष्पे महाविद्वादामका: विन्यादः।

नन्दिपुष्पे महाविद्वादामका: विन्यादः।

नन्दिपुष्पे महाविद्वादामका: विन्यादः।

नन्दिपुष्पे महाविद्वादामका: विन्यादः।

नन्दिपुष्पे महाविद्वादामका: विन्यादः।
सांख्यकारिका:

अविवेकायार्दं सिद्धं १७ चैगृह्याचतिप्रयामियोभावात्।
कारणगृहालमकरात् कार्येष्वायविकारपि सिद्धम् १४ ॥
१४ अन्यव: १७ चैगृह्याचतिप्रयामियोभावात्।
कारणगृहालमकरात् कार्येष्वायविकारपि सिद्धम्।

गोडवक्षिप्रवेषार्दं १७ सैगृह्याचतिप्रयामियोभावात्।
अविवेकायार्दं सिद्धं १७ चैगृह्याचतिप्रयामियोभावात्।
कारणगृहालमकरात् कार्येष्वायविकारपि सिद्धम्।

अन्तरमणो भवति १५ ॥

अन्तरमणो भवति १५ ॥

अन्तरमणो भवति १५ ॥

भेदादनां परिमाणान् समन्वयान् शक्तिः प्रवचनं ।
कारणकार्यविभागम् अविवेकायाचार्यस्य १५ ॥

1. वृद्-वृद्। 2. वृद्-वृद्। 3. वृद्-वृद्। 4. वृद्-वृद्।


सांख्यकारिका:

अतर—

कारणस्वलक्षणं प्रवहते निगुणत: समुद्रानां 

परिणामत: सलिलवतू प्रतिप्रतिगुणात्रिविशेषात् ॥ १६ ॥

१६ अनुच्छ: — अतः कारणम् असि (यत्) निगुणत: समुद- 

राशि निगुणवतू प्रतिप्रतिगुणान्यात्रिविशेषात् परिणामत: (महावादि) 

प्रवहते।

अतः प्रवहतात कारणम् चतुर्दशवर्षिनेव दिन्न प्रवहते।

निगुणत: निगुणतः सत्यरसमयोगुणा: विरसतः निगुणा: तत्क- 

सुभवितः—सत्यरससङ्गसूतिन्तः सामावत्स्य व्रतानम्।

तथा समुद्रानां। यथा गुद्धाः बौद्धाविष्टाः जिद्व समुद्रानि विद्वति एवं निगुणम् कन्तुति 

एव निगुणम्। 

तथा अति प्रवहतात कारण, कुतु: कारणकार्यभिमानात् गोरतीति 

कारणास्थल: स्रियाम। कथितात् इति कारणम्। कारणस्य कार्यं स्रिया:। 

यथा पर्यं 

दिन्नहृदयवर्षिनिः प्रवहतात समयम् न तथा मृत्युः 

मृत्युः वा पर्यं निवार: 

परिवर्त्यात्, न चैव यत्र मृत्युः। 

एवं महामहादिक्षुः दृश्यान्यातीते—अति 

विन्यमं तत्र कारणं यथा भवाय इति विश्वामिति।

हस्तः, अविभावधिश्रृः ध्यायत। विषं ज्ञात, तत्स्व स्वयं धक्तः 

विश्वामिति मात्र भवेत ध्यायत। 

तथा अविभावधिश्रा प्रवहतात् यथा प्रवहतात् यथा 

वैविध्यवर्तं निर्माणहीनोऽत्र भवेत अविभावधिश्रा प्रवहतात्। निर्माणात् भवेत 

राशिः भवेत। यथा भवेत 

दिन्नहृदयवर्षिनिः प्रवहतात समयम् न तथा मृत्युः 

मृत्युः वा पर्यं निवार: 

परिवर्त्यात्, न चैव यत्र मृत्युः। 

एवं महामहादिक्षुः दृश्यान्यातीते—अति 

विन्यमं तत्र कारणं यथा भवाय इति विश्वामिति।

हस्तः, अविभावधिश्रृः ध्यायत। विषं ज्ञात, तत्स्व स्वयं धक्तः 

विश्वामिति मात्र भवेत ध्यायत। 

तथा अविभावधिश्रा प्रवहतात् यथा प्रवहतात् यथा 

वैविध्यवर्तं निर्माणहीनोऽत्र भवेत अविभावधिश्रा प्रवहतात्। निर्माणात् भवेत 

राशिः भवेत। यथा भवेत 

दिन्नहृदयवर्षिनिः प्रवहतात समयम् न तथा मृत्युः 

मृत्युः वा पर्यं निवार: 

परिवर्त्यात्, न चैव यत्र मृत्युः। 

एवं महामहादिक्षुः दृश्यान्यातीते—अति 

विन्यमं तत्र कारणं यथा भवाय इति विश्वामिति।
सांख्यारिकाः

अतोद्वारां—मोक्षावत्। यथा मूलभूतबालकुमकालरहस्यादि—
पुष्पाविहित्रत्वं संवृत्तस्वाध्यात् साध्यतं, एवं मद्धित्विइत्रो भोज्यतादि—
माहादिन स अत्यथा यहं भोज्यं शीर्षिते।

इत्यत—कैवल्यार्थं प्रवृत्ते। कैवल्यार्थं माह: कैवल्यमू। तत्तत्त्त्वं
यथा प्रत्यत्तत्वं साक्षात् स्त्रावणिकार्थ्यं सकाशारणाय अस्तव्यमात्यः।
यत: स्त्राविधानविहीनं संसारस्वार्तेत्तथ। एवमेविहीनस्वामत्ति शारीर:-
राज्यरिकाः। १७॥

यथा धर्मसिद्धं विविधता महिमसात्तमकृत्वं, आहोसित बहव आव्यमानं—
प्रतिपार्थिविधानार्थं इत्येवच—
जननमरणकरणायं। प्रतितिकाव्यमुण कृपाव्यवस्थे।
पुरुषवहुंव सिद्धं त्रैःगुप्तविषयावैच। १८॥

जगा न मरणं न करोणम् न जननमरणकरणां। तेषां प्रतितिकान्ततुं
प्रत्येकार्यमादिष्ठाय:। यथेकु एवामां स्वस्तं एकवयं जनमम सवं
एवाजानु एकाल मरणं स्त्राविती प्रतियोग, एकवयं करणवेदः वाचित्याः—
अर्जोपुत्रुक्तकुकुम्कर्त्यर्य मध्यप्रस्तरित: सहनं विधं बिधार्यकुकुम्कर्त्या: सत्य:। न स्वेतं
मयं भवति तस्मान जननमरणस्वाध्यात्मां प्रतितिकाम महादिन वहुशुवः सिद्धम्।

इतथा—अनुपपत्त्रव्यवहाराः। दुरोपरकार्यम्, न दुरोपरस्त्रपद्वत् प्रवर्ति
नमु। कृपाहुः परमादिशु प्रविदिष्टं एवं। यथे परमी प्रविद्या:। अवेदेवम्ब:,
कृपाहुः परमी प्रविद्या:। त्यस्मात् प्रहस्तविशेषाः बहव इति सिद्धम्।

किं चाहि—त्रैःगुप्तविषयावैच। त्रैःगुप्ताविषयावैच। पुरुषवहुंव सिद्धम्।
यथा सामायी जनमां एक: सातिक: दुष्णी, अन्यो राजसो दुष्णी, अवतात्कामो मोहवाद। एवं त्रैःगुप्तविषयावैच। सिद्धम्। १८॥

कृपाहुः प्रविद्याईति भोजः। भोजा, भोजावस्था। इति वस्त्रमायः। २। २। अत्र 'भोजः' इत्यहृत्ततमाः।


[ सार्वज्ञापादार्थः]

हि पुरुषेष्वनानां। तनेचेतनावभाषामस्यकः महादि विषयं चेतनाविविविविविविविविविविविविविविविविविविविविविविविविविविविविविविविविविविविविविविविविविविविविविविविविविविविविविविविविविविविविविविविविविविविविविविविविविविविविविविविविविविविविविविविविविविविविविविविविविविविविविविविविविविविविविविविविविविविविविविविविविविविविविविविविविविविविविविविविविविविविविविविविविविविविविविविविविविविविविविविविविविविविविविविविविविविविविविविविविविविविविविविविविविविविविविविविविविविविविविविविविविविविविविविविविविविविविविविविविविविविविविविविविविविविविविविविविविविविविविविविविविविविविविविविविविविविविविविविविविविविविविविविविविविविविविविविविविविविविविविविविविविविविविविविविविविविविविविविविविविविविविविविविविविविविविविविविविविविविविविविविविविविविविविविविविविविविविविविविविविविविविविविविविविविविविविविविविविविविविविविविविविविविविविविविविविविविविविविविविविविविविविविविविविविविविविविविविविविविविविविविविविविविविविविविविविविविविविविविविविविविविविविविविविविविविविविविविविविविविविविविविविविविविविविविविविविविविविविविविविविविविविविविविविविविविविविविविविविविविविविविविविविविविविविविविविविविविविवि

1. वि-अन्यत्। 2. वि-मुख्यत्। 3. वि-महादेवायुक्तं। 4. जः-कर्तृविद्वृत्।
सांख्यकारिका: 

कि च, पञ्चभूमि: पञ्च भूतानि। तस्मात् पौडङ्कानुत् गणात् पञ्च-भृतमात्रोऽवे। साक्षात् पञ्च येन महाभूतानुवत्तते। यद्यपि—िबद्धमात्रा-दाक्षिण्या, स्वतंत्रमात्रा, तुष्ट्यतमात्रा, सक्षमात्रा, यथात्मकात् तृतिया। एवं पञ्चभूमि: परमाणुभूमि: पञ्च महाभूतानुवत्तते।

युद्धक्षेत्र—यथायत्त्वीष्यानवमोचन इति, तद्यथा भूवानिमोचन यथो-विश्वतिमेहे व्याक्तित्वम्। अध्यक्षिन इति सिद्धान्त, परमाणुभूमि इत्यादिन। यथायत्त्वम् इति सांवत्तिर्वाक्षरायति। वायुमिस्तिर्मिहविष्यायति।

एवं पञ्चभूमि: पञ्च भूतविविधात्वचावि। यथेते बोधकस्मवे व्यास जानानि। इति तत्त्वज्ञानस्य, तत्रम्।

पञ्चभूतविविधात्वचावि यथा कुर्त्राष्ट्रे रतः।

चतुर्दश्चरिती वाची वाची मुख्ये नानां नादः।

तात्त्विन्द्रोऽक्षिन मुख्योऽवेचाः।

तत्त्वसेवोऽक्षिन मुख्योऽवेचाः।

अध्यक्षिन इति इति।

साधारणमेतेकानुि तामससमस्याविशेषम्।

२३।

अध्यक्षिन इति।

अध्यक्षिन इति।

अध्यक्षिन इति।

अध्यक्षिन इति। 

अध्यक्षिन इति।

अध्यक्षिन इति। 

अध्यक्षिन इति। 

अध्यक्षिन इति। 

अध्यक्षिन इति। 

अध्यक्षिन इति। 

अध्यक्षिन इति। 

अध्यक्षिन इति। 

अध्यक्षिन इति। 

अध्यक्षिन इति। 

अध्यक्षिन इति। 

अध्यक्षिन इति। 

अध्यक्षिन इति। 

अध्यक्षिन इति। 

अध्यक्षिन इति। 

अध्यक्षिन इति। 

अध्यक्षिन इति। 

अध्यक्षिन इति। 

अध्यक्षिन इति। 

अध्यक्षिन इति। 

अध्यक्षिन इति। 

अध्यक्षिन इति। 

अध्यक्षिन इति। 

अध्यक्षिन इति।
संस्कृतार्थिका:]

एवं वृद्धिलक्षणमुक्ते, अहंकारलक्षणमुक्ते—
अभिमानोऽहंकारस्वादिस्विधिः प्रवत्ती तस: ।
एकादशकश गणस्तन्मात्रा: पञ्चक्रिक्षेऽ ॥ २४ ॥

२४ अन्यः: —अभिमान: अहंकारः। तस्मात् एकादशकः गणकः
पचकः: तमप्रत्यत्र (हिति) द्रविष्ट: सर्गः प्रवत्ती ।
एकादशकश गणः: एकादशोद्रविष्टः। तथा तस्मात्ते गणः
pचकः: पञ्चक्रिक्षेऽविष्टः। तस्मात्त्वाद्यः गणः

किंलक्षणात् सः: इत्येदादाः—
सारिके एकादशकः प्रवत्ती वै चैतुद्धारारात्रः ।

मूर्द्धत्स्तमात्रा: सः तामसः, तेजसाहुमयमः ॥ २५ ॥

२५ अन्यः: —वैकटात् अहंकारात् सारिकः एकादशकः प्रवत्ती ।
भूतः: तममात्र: (प्रवत्ती) सः तामसः। तेजसः (अहंकारः)
उमयं (प्रवत्ती) ।

सत्तनामविष्णुः यदा: जस्ततःस्ती अहंकारे भवतस्तदा सोद्धारः
सारिकः: तथ च पूर्वश्चायं संस्कृता काळ्कः वैभवटि । तस्मात् वैकटायुः
अहंकारेद्रविष्टः हितिग्रस्तम् उपवत्ते। तस्मात् सारिकानि विशुद्धारादेशिनिः
द्रविष्टानि स्वविस्मपमयानि। तस्मादुन्यः—‘ सारिकः एकादशकः’ हिति ।

कि चान्तम्, मूर्द्धत्स्तमात्रा: च तामसः। तस्मादेवमद्येव सत्ततः
रजस्ती अहंकारे यदा भवतः: सोद्धारस्तमात्र उपवते । तथा पूर्वश्चायं
संस्कृता मूलादिः। तस्मादुन्यादिः: अहंकारः तमात्रा: पञ्चकः गण: उपवते।
मूर्द्धत्स्तमात्रा: चतुर्दशोद्रविष्टः: सः तामसः हिति । तस्मादुन्यादिः: पञ्चकः
गणः: च।

कि, तेजसाहुमयमः यदा रजस्तामबुधविशेष भवतस्तदा
तस्मात् सोद्धारेनविश्वस्त्र विशिष्टः संस्कृतः उपवते।
तस्मादुन्यादिः: पञ्चकः गणः: ।

१। वा:— तममात्रपञ्चकः द्रविष्टः। २। वि:—वैकटात् ।
সাঙ্কেতিক কারণ:

২৩ অন্যায়: । — অত মন: উমায়কাম। সঞ্চার সাম্যায় ইন্দ্রিয় চ। গুণপরিমাণবিশেষায় নানায় বাহামেন্দ্র।

অতিক্রমে মন: উমায়কাম। বুদ্ধিমেন্দ্র, বুদ্ধিমেন্দ্র, কোনঃ মেন্দ্র কম্পবৃত্ত। কম্পবৃত্ত, বুদ্ধিমেন্দ্র প্রত্য কম্পায়তি। কম্পবৃত্ত বাহামেন্দ্র চ। তসাদুরামনে: মন। সঞ্চারতীতি সঞ্চারকাম।

কি চায়ন, ইন্দ্রিয় চ সাধারণ। সাধারণমান। সাধিক-হারাত্মক বুদ্ধিমেন্দ্রব্যক্তিবিশেষ মনস সহোপসহায়। মনস: সাধারণ প্রতি ( পােথতি )। তসাদু: সাধারণমানোর্নন্দ্রিয়। এবমেন্দ্রলেক।

ধৈতাত্তর কৃত্তি বিশেষ বিশেষায়। সাধারণ বিশেষায় কৃত্তি বিশেষায়।

অতিক্রমে বিশেষায় বিশেষায় বিশেষায় বিশেষায়। বিশেষায় বিশেষায় বিশেষায়।

এবমেন্দ্রলেক। বিশেষায় বিশেষায় বিশেষায়।

এবমেন্দ্রলেক। বিশেষায় বিশেষায় বিশেষায়।

সাধারণমান। বিশেষায় বিশেষা।

ভূমিতে বিশেষায় বিশেষায়।

ভূমিতে বিশেষায় বিশেষায়।

ভূমিতে বিশেষায় বিশেষায়।

ভূমিতে বিশেষায় বিশেষায়।

ভূমিতে বিশেষায় বিশেষায়।

ভূমিতে বিশেষায়।
सांविकारिका:

स्वल्कश्रवणमाभाषा स्वल्कश्रवणा। अध्वर्यायों बुद्धिमति लक्षण-मूक, सौच बुद्धिमति। तथा अभिमानोक्तिः अभिमानलक्षणोऽनन्तः प्रमाणन्निविष्कर्तः। संकल्पक मन इति लक्षणमूक, तेन संकल्प एव मनसः कृतः। जवस्य बुद्धविद्यारम्भस्य स्वल्कश्रवणा वृत्ति।

असामान्य। या प्रागमिष्ठाना बुद्धिमत्राणां च वृत्ति: साधयशा-मात्रेवेते।

हृदयी नामान्य। बुद्धिमत्राणेऽति: सामान्यसन्धानेऽति: सामान्यसन्धानेऽति: द्वितीयाः प्राणाः प्राणाः बायः प्राणाः प्राणाः कर्मनां इति। प्राणाः प्राणाः प्राणाः प्राणाः बायः प्राणाः प्राणाः कर्मनां इति। प्राणाः प्राणाः प्राणाः प्राणाः बायः प्राणाः प्राणाः कर्मनां इति। प्राणाः प्राणाः प्राणाः प्राणाः बायः प्राणाः प्राणाः कर्मनां इति।

मान्यत्वानेऽति: असमान्यसन्धानेऽति: द्वितीयाः प्राणाः प्राणाः प्राणाः प्राणाः कर्मनां इति। प्राणाः प्राणाः प्राणाः प्राणाः बायः प्राणाः प्राणाः कर्मनां इति। प्राणाः प्राणाः प्राणाः प्राणाः बायः प्राणाः प्राणाः कर्मनां इति। प्राणाः प्राणाः प्राणाः प्राणाः बायः प्राणाः प्राणाः कर्मनां इति। जवस्य बुद्धविद्यारम्भस्य स्वल्कश्रवणा वृत्ति।

अन्यत्वानेऽति: असमान्यसन्धानेऽति: द्वितीयाः प्राणाः प्राणाः प्राणाः प्राणाः कर्मनां इति। प्राणाः प्राणाः प्राणाः प्राणाः बायः प्राणाः प्राणाः कर्मनां इति। प्राणाः प्राणाः प्राणाः प्राणाः बायः प्राणाः प्राणाः कर्मनां इति। प्राणाः प्राणाः प्राणाः प्राणाः बायः प्राणाः प्राणाः कर्मनां इति।

अन्यत्वानेऽति: असमान्यसन्धानेऽति: द्वितीयाः प्राणाः प्राणाः प्राणाः प्राणाः कर्मनां इति। प्राणाः प्राणाः प्राणाः प्राणाः बायः प्राणाः प्राणाः कर्मनां इति। प्राणाः प्राणाः प्राणाः प्राणाः बायः प्राणाः प्राणाः कर्मनां इति। प्राणाः प्राणाः प्राणाः प्राणाः बायः प्राणाः प्राणाः कर्मनां इति।

अन्यत्वानेऽति: असमान्यसन्धानेऽति: द्वितीयाः प्राणाः प्राणाः प्राणाः प्राणाः कर्मनां इति। प्राणाः प्राणाः प्राणाः प्राणाः बायः प्राणाः प्राणाः कर्मनां इति। प्राणाः प्राणाः प्राणाः प्राणाः बायः प्राणाः प्राणाः कर्मनां इति। प्राणाः प्राणाः प्राणाः प्राणाः बायः प्राणाः प्राणाः कर्मनां इति।

युग्मवल्लक्षण स्वल्कश्रवणा वृत्ति: कमास्त्रज्ञ च निन्त्रिता।

बुद्धविद्यायाः नात्र तत् तत्त्वाय: वृत्ति: || २० ||

बुद्धविद्यायाः नात्र तत् तत्त्वाय: वृत्ति: २० अन्याय: ||

बुद्धविद्यायाः नात्र तत् तत्त्वाय: वृत्ति: २० अन्याय: ||
सांख्यकारिका:

किर्मिर्मिक चेत—पुरुषार्थ एव हेतु:। पुरुषार्थ: कत्व इति मिश्रयमें गुणान्तः प्रतिनिधिः। तसाधातानि कराणि पुरुषार्थ प्रकाशयति। (यथेचतुर्वाचीकरनिति) । कथं तथं प्रवर्तने—न केनस्तु कायलि करणम्। पुरुषार्थ एवैक: कार्यतित्वी वाक्यार्थः। न केनस्तु इति छेतु सुपरेषां कार्यं प्रोचयः करणम्। ॥ ३१ ॥

बुद्धादि करित्विविध करित्व। करणं त्रियोदशविविधं तद्वारणप्राचरणकारिकम्। कर्मं च तथं दुःखस्सहायं चारे प्रकारं च ॥ ३२ ॥

३२ अन्वयः।—करणं त्रियोदशविविधः, तद आदरणप्राचरणकारिकम्। तथा कर्मण्य दशच्या आहारी चारे प्रकारं च।

करणं महादेशी त्रियोदशविविधं बोधयम्। पञ्च बुद्धिम्नः बादार्थिनः, पञ्च कमेंद्रियाणि आदिर्गिनः। इति त्रियोदशविविधं करणम्।

तत्काल करित्विविधं यथाधिका तद्वारणप्राचरणकारिकम्। तदावरणं चारणं च कमेंद्रियाणि कृत्तिनं, प्रकाश बुद्धिम्नः।

करित्वविविधतं करणं स्पहति च। कर्मं च तथं दुःखस्सहायं। तस्य करणस्य कालं कर्त्तव्यं दशच्या दशाप्रारंभम्। शब्दशृंखलास्वस्तश्च, चन्द्र-चन्द्रविविधोगोपरामान्यतेष्कस्य तथा करणं, बुद्धिम्नः। प्रकाशविबे कमेंद्रियाणिः कारणानि। मायाण्यायः चारणं चायस्यं च। ॥ ३२ ॥

किर्मिते—अन्तःकरणं चिन्तिष्यं दशाया बाह्यं तथं विषयम्।

सांख्यविद्या बाह्यं त्रिकार्योऽभ्येन चारणं च। ॥ ३२ ॥

३२ अन्वयः।—अन्तःकरणं चिन्तिष्यं, बाह्यं दशच्या दशाप्रारंभम्। (तत्त विषयम्। बाह्यं सांख्यविद्या बाह्यं आध्यात्मं चारणं च चिन्तिष्यं।

१. चन्द्रस्ता चारणं दशं च ।
२. चेतनम् केलं वै—चारणं च। एतच मातृभूते पुस्तकम् ।
३. अन्तं—'बुद्धार्थं मन;’

सं. १
सांवल्याकारिका:]

श्रेष्ठाणि बाह्यमतिकनेन पाणिनादापापसंबंधितानि पञ्चबिषयः। पञ्च विषयः: श्रावायो शेषां तानि पञ्चबिषयाणि। सब्रद्वर्शपूर्वसरसरचा: पाणि संहितः। श्राब्दालिक्षणाय भूषण पारो विहरति। पानिनेन्द्रियं पञ्चक्षरं उस्मां करोति। तत्परसेवियं पञ्चशब्दं शुक्मानन्दयति। ॥ ३४ ॥

सांवतः करणा बुद्धः संव विषयमवागते यस्मात्।
तस्मात् त्रिलिङ्कं करणं द्वारे द्वाराणि शेषाणि। ॥ ३५ ॥

३५ अन्तः:— यस्मात् सांवतः करणा बुद्धः संव विषयम अवगमते तस्मात् त्रिलिङ्कं करणं द्वारे शेषाणि द्वाराणि।

सांवतः करणा बुद्धः। अश्रावायम:सहितेऽयः। यस्मात् संव विषयमवागते ग्रहानि, त्रिलिङ्के कालेयु श्राब्दादिनु ग्रहानि, तस्मात् त्रिलिङ्कं करणं द्वारे। द्वाराणि शेषाणि। करणानीति वाचवेषां: ॥ ३६ ॥

कि चाँगलं—
एते ब्रम्हाकल्यं पर्चरविश्लेषणं गुणविशेष:।
क्षत्रं पुरुषस्यायं प्रकाश्युद्धो प्रवचित्त:। ॥ ३६ ॥

३६ अन्तः:— एते प्रदीपकल्यं पर्चरविश्लेषणं गुणविशेष:।
पुरुषस्य क्षत्रं अवं प्रकाश्य बुद्धो प्रवचित्त:।
णावि करणानुपुक्ति। एतेपुणविशेष:। निर्विशेष:। ब्रम्हाकल्यं—
पर्चरविश्लेषण:। अत्तत्त्वस्य, भिन्नविशेष:। (गुणविशेष: इत्यादः)

गुणविशेष:। गुणेयो जाता:।

१. व०—‘ पञ्चशब्दं ’ इत्ययः।
२. अश्रुविन्दुभावत: पाठो-पाठ।

व०—पञ्चक्षरं: नौपत्तं:।
संख्याकारिका:]

यानि पद्म तन्मात्राणि अहंकाराद्वयनं तादि । शब्दतमार्कं, सर्वीतमार्कं, रुक्तमार्कं, सत्तमार्कं, गन्धतमार्कं—एतानि अविषेधा उभयं । देवानांमिते सुकलक्षणं विशेषा दु:कोमोहितः ।

तेष्यं: प्रकृत्यं: तन्मात्रेयं: पद्म महामूलचिनि, वृहत्वस्योजावस्याकारसंगगानि, नायुस्यानि, एते स्मृता विषेषा:। गन्धतमार्कं गुरुविक्री, सम्भृतमार्काद्य: । श्रवणमार्कादाङ्काध: । इत्येवलोकनानि एतानि महामूलचिनि ।

एते विषेषा मानुषाणि विषेषा: । श्राणि मुख्याणि: । गोरा दु:कलक्षणां । मृतां मोहननां: । वयवादां इत्यचिदनकालीतदानं हार्दिनन्तं तरसु गुह्यमयेकारणं शास्तं महति, तदेव पनवां गच्छति बननामात्रेण भ्रष्टो दिक्षोद्धान्मूलं भवितं । एवं वायुर्मांचेतस्य शास्तं महति, शीतार्जुनस्य च्वरी, घूमीरकवर्षिस्तिनिवार्यां मूढ़ हि। एवं तेजः महुलकान्तं द्रष्टमा । १८ ॥

अध्याये विषेषा:—

सुध्मा मातापिरजाः सह प्रभुरोक्षिष्पाविषेषा: स्थूः । सुध्मास्तेषयं नियता मातापिरजाः निरवर्जने ॥ ३५ ॥

३५ अनुच्छायं:—सुध्मा: मातापिरजाः प्रमृतः सह निष्ठा विषेषाः: स्थूः:। तेषुम् सुध्मा: नियता: । मातापिरजाः निर्वर्जने: ॥

सुभास्त: । तन्मात्राणि: । पठास्ते हि सुभास्तेरः महादिकिंको सदा तिष्ठति संसारं च ते सुभास्त:।

तथा मातापिरज: सुभास्तीरोपाचार्यम् कतुकालं मातापिरजस्य शोभितस्यक्रमिक्षभावं उदयम्: सुभास्तीरोपाचार्यं कृत्तिन्ति । तत् सुभास्तेरः पुनन्तरितीतीतनारिविवरणम् नामतिरीतिनाम्यादयेत् ।

तथा प्रारंभं सहिन्ते सुभास्तेरिविविशेषाः सह महामूः: निःशय विषेषाः: । तौदशंस्याकारणं: दिः सुभास्तिरोपाचार्यं ।

१. मद्याय: च । विषे—पुस्तके: ।

२. विषे—कृत्तिनं.
सांख्यकारिका: ]

निर्माणमयम्। मोगरहितम्। तदु सृष्ट्यारां पिठामुद्रेन्। वास्यनो-पचनेन किर्यांमयम्। भोगु; समयं महत्त्वयितं।

महारंगिणिस्त्मृ॥ पुरस्तात्रावान् रमार्दीन् वशयम्।। तैरि-वाचितमयः।

ढिखिजमिति। प्रख्याके महादिसमयमप्तं करोगतं प्रमणां तीतै। अर्थसंसरणुकत सत्ता आयामकालमो वहते, प्रकृतिमोहिनया वन्धे तदसरणः।

ढिक्रियासमयमिति। पूजनाताद्विः वर्षाम्बृतात्। वाचितममयः।

पुनः वर्षाके संसरत तस्मात् स्निन्द सृष्टम्। ४०॥

किंचिदीयोत्रे निरोदशविचं करण संसरीतिः करते सवारे... चित्रं यथाक्रमे स्थायिकार्यो थथा बिना छाया।

हरिना विशेषः न तिर्तिः निराधमयः ढिखिजम्। ४१॥

अन्यत्।: --यथा आयामे चतो चित्रं न ( तिर्ति, थथा स्थायिकम्; बिना छाया ( न तिर्ति), तदरु आयामे; बिना निराधमयः चित्रं न तिर्ति।

चित्रं ध्यायते कुण्डकार्यम्युः न तिर्तिः, स्थायिकार्यम्; कीक्षारिष्ठो बिना छाया न तिर्ति, डैविना न महत्त्व। आदिसमयाम् शैवं बिना नाशी महति दैविक। आदिसमया शैवं। बिना नाशी महति दैविक। आदिसमया शैवं। बिना नाशी महति दैविक। आदिसमया शैवं। बिना नाशी महति दैविक। आदिसमया शैवं। बिना नाशी महति दैविक। आदिसमया शैवं। बिना नाशी महति दैविक।

निराधमयः। आयामहिते चित्रं, निरोदशविचं करणसयितं:। ४२॥

---

1. वि-सरति। वि-पुस्तकापाठः।
2. वि-पुस्तकापाठः। वि-नवः।
3. वि-लोकायतपाः।
4. वि-सरति।
5. वि-पुस्तकेके वेषं ‘निखः’ हिति। वि-पुस्तकेके वेषं ‘निखः’ हिति।
भावावज्जि हिंदुत्वाने—सांस्कृतिक: प्राकृत बैठकादाय | तत्त प्राकृतिक: यथा उभवता: कविल्यांदीयां उद्योगानां चवारे भावः। सहोदरण:— चां, शां, वैराग्यें, अध्यममिति। प्राकृता: कविलयां—बाध्यकर्मः। वाग्व: वनकल्यांनांवनमनान्यसंशयक चवारे। लेखकाश्रयांकारणां शारीरिको पोधनार्खां एवं माया चार्म चवारे। सुमुख्य: प्रत्येकें, तत्सामान्य, प्रकृती तत्सामान्य, प्रत्येकें, चार्म चवारे। तत्सामान्य, प्रकृती तत्सामान्य, प्रत्येकें, चार्म चवारे। तत्सामान्य, प्रकृती तत्सामान्य, प्रत्येकें, चार्म चवारे।

भावावज्जि हिंदुत्वाने—सांस्कृतिक: प्राकृत बैठकादाय | तत्त प्राकृतिक: यथा उभवता: कविल्यांदीयां उद्योगानां चवारे भावः। सहोदरण:— चां, शां, वैराग्यें, अध्यममिति। प्राकृता: कविलयां—बाध्यकर्मः। वाग्व: वनकल्यांनांवनमनान्यसंशयक चवारे। लेखकाश्रयांकारणां शारीरिको पोधनार्खां एवं माया चार्म चवारे। सुमुख्य: प्रत्येकें, तत्सामान्य, प्रकृती तत्सामान्य, प्रत्येकें, चार्म चवारे। तत्सामान्य, प्रकृती तत्सामान्य, प्रत्येकें, चार्म चवारे। तत्सामान्य, प्रकृती तत्सामान्य, प्रत्येकें, चार्म चवारे।

भावावज्जि हिंदुत्वाने—सांस्कृतिक: प्राकृत बैठकादाय | तत्त प्राकृतिक: यथा उभवता: कविल्यांदीयां उद्योगानां चवारे भावः। सहोदरण:— चां, शां, वैराग्यें, अध्यममिति। प्राकृता: कविलयां—बाध्यकर्मः। वाग्व: वनकल्यांनांवनमनान्यसंशयक चवारे। लेखकाश्रयांकारणां शारीरिको पोधनार्खां एवं माया चार्म चवारे। सुमुख्य: प्रत्येकें, तत्सामान्य, प्रकृती तत्सामान्य, प्रत्येकें, चार्म चवारे। तत्सामान्य, प्रकृती तत्सामान्य, प्रत्येकें, चार्म चवारे। तत्सामान्य, प्रकृती तत्सामान्य, प्रत्येकें, चार्म चवारे।

भावावज्जि हिंदुत्वाने—सांस्कृतिक: प्राकृत बैठकादाय | तत्त प्राकृतिक: यथा उभवता: कविल्यांदीयां उद्योगानां चवारे भावः। सहोदरण:— चां, शां, वैराग्यें, अध्यममिति। प्राकृता: कविलयां—�ाध्यकर्मः। वाग्व: वनकल्यांनांवनमनान्यसंशयक चवारे। लेखकाश्रयांकारणां शारीरिको पोधनार्खां एवं माया चार्म चवारे। सुमुख्य: प्रत्येकें, तत्सामान्य, प्रकृती तत्सामान्य, प्रत्येकें, चार्म चवारे। तत्सामान्य, प्रकृती तत्सामान्य, प्रत्येकें, चार्म चवारे। तत्सामान्य, प्रकृती तत्सामान्य, प्रत्येकें, चार्म चवारे।
सांख्यकारिकाः

एव निमिते: तह नैमितिकः पोद्वाचिन व्याख्यातः, स किमातकं

हलाह्

एव प्रत्यस्वरूप विवर्तवावककतिनिलगतस्वाभावः॥

गुणवेदनान्वितमेवते ३ तथा ३ उदासात् पशुरासात् ॥ ४५ ॥

४५ अन्यत्र: ।—विवर्तवावककतिनिलगतस्वाभावः । प्रत्यक्षस्वरूप: ।

न्यायोऽवैधिन्याः विधियाँतः भवाविषयः ॥ ४५ ॥

धातृमात्रार्थत्वं न तत्त्वात् । तत्त्वात् अध्यात्मिकः वैराग्यात्

प्रकृतिर्वातः, चुङ्खोन्दुः प्रकृतिपुष्टिः प्रातिनिःश्वासनात्मान्। चुङ्खमेव न भवते

तथा । यथा भूयाणिः संविधिः ।

तथा यथौः । राजसः रागः:—वजः, दिक्षिणः, ददिमः, देवामुखिः

होके० दु: माइं भरमुखः माइम्—एवः । राजसः रागाः

संसारः भवति ।

तथा यथैवधिन्यः विविधः: || एतदेवयूः, अद्यावस्थितस्वाभावः || तत्त्वान्वितमात्रार्थतः अन्त्यन्तिवात् नैमितिकः

कि चातरितः, विविधाविन्याः विविधाः: । तस्यविधात्स्य प्रविधायोऽविधायो

विधातः भवति । अनेकविधाः सर्वत्र विह्यते ॥ ४५ ॥

1. वि०—पुस्तकमः भाष्येः च

2. । । सिद्धाभ्यासः: । वि०—पुस्तकमः तु

‘विधायकः’ इति भाष्येः उपस्थिते ।

अथेव पाठोऽविधायकर्मसः संस्कृतः ।

2. वि०—पुस्तकमः च ।

आयमः, मातरत्नः, भाष्यच ।

3. वि०—पुस्तकमः । बच-
[ सगौन्दकाभाष्यः ]

मेदा: कथने—
पंक्ति बिपशेषमेधा भव्यंशक्तिकुर करणरकाशयात्।
अस्तितिशिरेष्ठान तुम्हनिवासादात्म सिद्धा:॥ ४७॥

४७ अन्याय: — भिषमेदा: पंक्ति मध्यि, करणरकाशयात् अशक्तिकुर अस्तितिशिरेष्ठान तुम्हनिवासादात्म सिद्धा: ( मध्यि )।
पंक्ति बिपशेषमेधा:। ते यथा—तम, मोह, महामोह, तामिल, अवश्यात्मक हति। एवं मेदान्ति नातार्ति वश्यकृतकात्रेष्ठति।
अस्तितिशिरेष्ठानिशिरेष्ठान: मेदा: मध्यि, करणरकाशयात्। तामिल, वश्यात्मक वस्त्रयात।
तथा च तुम्हनिवासात्। कर्षीनोति राजसानि शानानि।
तथा अप्रूप्तिका सिद्धा:। सामविकानि शानानि तावृष्टि ताकृष्ट्विवृष्टोति।
प्रत्ति क्रमश्च वषयते॥ ४७॥

तथा बिपशेषमेधा उच्चन्ते—
मेदात्ममोदशिविविवुहस्य च, दशस्विवुहो महामोहः।
तामिलोष्ट्विवात्म, तथा मध्यित्वात्मक:॥ ४८॥

४८ अन्याय: — तथा: मेदा: अप्रूप्तिका मोहस्य च ( अप्रूप्तिका मेदा: महामोहोः। तामिल: अपाराशया: ( मध्यि )। तथा अवश्यात्मक: ( अपाराशया: मध्यि )।
तमसाबलबुधात् मेदा:। प्रक्ष: । अबानाति निम्पत्ते। सेतुप्राणः प्रकृतिष्टि लीले, प्राणायुजयहर्षप्रसन्नात्मकाणां।
तत्त्व हीतमात्रानि मन्यते मुक्तोपचितम, तमोऽभरे एव:।
अष्टीपाणिः मोहोः मेदात्ममोदशिविवर्यं:। ब्रजागुणाश्रये तत्त्व सम्बंधादायो द्वे न मोहोः प्राणनुष्टिः। पुन: तथाय सम्बंधादायो मोह इति।

९। 'मल: 'हति पपोगीपुराः ॥ अभ्र मानाश्रतिद्वियाणा। तमस: पर्यायनां च मलाश्चारः।
सांत्वकारिका:

एवमाध्यमिनमकाश्यपेन नव तुढ़य। ताता नामानि शाश्वादने प्रौकानि—अन्नः, सहिः सभीः, श्रीकतः, सतमः, पारसः, सुर्येन्द्रः, नासतः, अनुपूर्वप्रक्रमार्थितः। आच्छादनानि विशयानि अन्तर्गतेदारः बुद्धिवचा भवति। तदात् अनम्मः, अन्तिमः, अनोच्च हवामिश्रितव्रहस्य बुद्धिवचा हृदि || ५० ||

अनवण्य: ||

अध्यायमिव (तुढ़यः) प्रक्ष्णादनकालभागमायः। बाह्यः। विषयोपरमात्राः। बाह्यः। प्रक्ष्ण (हृदि) नव तुढ़यः। अभिभि ||

विषयोपरमात्राः:।

अध्यायमिव (हृदि)। अध्यायमिव (हृदि)। अध्यायमिव (हृदि)। अध्यायमिव (हृदि)। अध्यायमिव (हृदि)।

तथा प्रक्ष्णादनकालभागमायः। तथा प्रक्ष्णादनकालभागमायः। तथा प्रक्ष्णादनकालभागमायः।

एवात् अनवण्य। तथा प्रक्ष्णादनकालभागमायः।

अनवण्य: ||

उहः श्रवणे च नुक्षिप्तायात्मकः सुहोमध्यः।

द्वारानन्तर च नुक्षिप्तायात्मकः। पूर्वाकारः पुरुषार्थविद्याचिबः || ५४ ||

अनवण्य: ||

उहः श्रवणे च नुक्षिप्तायात्मकः सुहोमध्यः।

द्वारानन्तर च नुक्षिप्तायात्मकः सुहोमध्यः।

अनवण्य: ||

उहः श्रवणे च नुक्षिप्तायात्मकः सुहोमध्यः।

द्वारानन्तर च नुक्षिप्तायात्मकः सुहोमध्यः।
संस्कृतकारिका:

भावे: प्रवरसंगीतिना बि० न, तन्मात्रसमग्र न, पूर्णपूर्वकार्यकाल- कारितचाहूतरं चेतायेकरमि ।

छिंड़न तन्मात्रसमग्र च बिना भाविनिर्णितिः, स्थूलसूचनेदृश्य- त्वादंसमग्रादि । अनाविनाश सत्यं ब्रजानुकुलद्वैपात्मायार्थोऽऽन्ने न दोयाम, ततव्यावस्थेऽधिकारे मात्राकाराणि परस्परप्रेमविलावतु । तस्मात् भावायो छिंड़काम्य द्विविधः प्रवति सर्ग हित ॥ ५२ ॥

किं चात्म्—

अशुद्विकरो दैवस्तैग्योनस्म पञ्चाया महत् ।

मानवविद्विध: समात्तनोदयं बर्तु सर्गःः ॥ ५३ ॥

५३ अनव: च चैत्य (सर्गः) अविनाशः । तैव योनस्मां (सर्गः) पञ्चाया महत् । मानुपः सर्गः पुनःविधः (हित) अर्थं समासं कौमः: सर्गःः ।

तन्न दैवमन्नयकाखम्—इण्ड, भारवत्यं, शैलं, वेद्यं, मञ्चन, सर्वसं कमलं, रामं, राजसं, दैवचमकितः । पदमामुक्खिकृतस्वप्नचवाणि मूलाविन, वर्णास्तविच स्त्रावः । मानुषोनिरेकैः हितं च चुत्तं मूलावि ॥ ५३ ॥

दियोपिपि लोकेशु गुणचरमसति, ततु कस्मिन स्मृतिकोमविभूषयेन—

उँचं सत्यविवेकतमोबिशाल्यत्व मूलानि सर्गःः ।

सवये राजविवेचलो श्रद्धाविश्वस्त्यत्वःः ॥ ५४ ॥

१. बि०—धृकुलसमानयोऽधारम् ।

२. बि०—प्रकाशितसंज्ञायः ।

३. पाठदायं जयमक्षकारूपकाः स्वस्तिविशेषितेः । बि०—पुस्तके तु—

आदि विकल्पं दैवमे स्वयं तैवोन्तु चं पंचाया महत् ।

मानुषम् लेखकविधं समास्तनोदयं बर्तु सर्गःः ॥

४. ' बि०—प्रकाशितः ।

मूलानि: प्रथल्यु प्रमादेभिः, मयन् ।

५. ' 'थांत्राद्' हितं बि०—पुस्तक-विरोधाद् ॥

सा. का. ४
तत्त्ववाद तथा सत्त्वपूर्वकान्तकायानितावस्थेन् कथित:।

विश्लेषण: ।

1. वि०-अभासस्त्र: किंवितमारम्भः।
2. अभासस्त्रः: पादः वि०-पुस्तकः।
3. पुस्तकः: मूलांकः।
4. पुस्तकः: पादः।

प्रकृति: ।

1. वि०-कथित: किंवितमारम्भः।
2. अभासस्त्रः: पादः।
3. पुस्तकः: मूलांकः।
4. पुस्तकः: पादः।
सांख्यकारिकः 

59 अन्यष्टः —यथा नर्तकी रजस्य दृश्यितवा दृश्यात् निविदते तथा प्रकृतिः पुरुषस्य आत्मानं प्रकाष्य निविदते।

यथा नर्तकी उक्ताविदयः कि तद्विद्यतवादि बहस्ता रजस्य दृश्यितम् उत्तरायं रुपायितवे तथा प्रकृतिः पुरुषस्य आत्मानं प्रकाष्य उद्याद्वायांनिविद्यतमहामहामेव निविदते।

59 कथो तथा अन्य निर्दोषोको हृदयताहः —

नानाविवेधपत्रप्रकारिणृणां पुनः।

गुणवल्लभस्य सत्तसद्यानामायां भरतं।

60 अन्यष्टः —नानाविवेदः उदायः उपकारिणे गुणावति ( प्रकृति:) अनुपकारिणे। अग्रहस्य सम्यं तथापुः। अध्यं अध्यायं भरतं।

नानाविवेदायः प्रकृतिः पुरुषायोपकारणि, अनुपकारणि।

पुणः। कथय—देवमातुरुकितियमावन, सुभारमोहात्मकावन शब्दाधिकृतियमावन।

60 नानाविवेदपत्रसरसानं प्रकाष्य, अहमन्या तस्मात् इति, निविदते। अतो निविदयत्तथावर्तमानं, अपारं च भरतं कुदः। यथा कक्षितः परवर्त्ती वर्तमानसः निविदते, नान्यन: प्रत्युपकारिणेह्न, एवं प्रकृति: पुरुषायं च भरतं करोष्यायांमथ।

59 पश्चातेन —आद्धान्यं प्रकाष्य निविदते। निरूचा च न किं करोतीधारः —

प्रकृति: उक्तामानस न किंवितहितवी मेव मतिविनिधव।

याद्रप्रामिति पुनर्धनिष्ठमुदुपुरुषायं।

1. पाटेष्यक आत्मा हराहिती। 'विलामातिमाववेश' इति पद्यानिन्यम। 'विलम-महोदयानुवाचस् in situations drawn from history or tradition नातिमोहस। 'विलासलक्ष्यं श्वाकाच्यात्मा श्वाले। 6-7 वृत्ति—

ि विश्वस्यनाहे तु नेतृभुक्तकर्मम् कामम्।

विश्वेदोऽहैस ष्ठितायणािगुः ॥

2. भिलौ—कुदः चरति ।

7. भिलौ—कुदः ।
संख्याकारिता:

' काल: पञ्चमि भूस्माणि काल: चंहरे जसमे ।
काल: पुहुसु जागरी कालो हि दुरुतिकमः ॥

'स्मार्कायमुखः' च य: पदार्थः, तेन कालोद्वस्तलोत्तरिति ॥
स हि व्यक्तः सर्वेष्वरहरू वर्णयति प्राणविवक्षाय कारणम्।
स्मार्कायमुखः च जीवः। तथातुत कालो न कारण, नार्ति समाहि इति।
तथातुत्त प्रभुवित्र कारणम्, न प्रकटः कारणात्वकारिति ॥

न पुन्नसेविः तु कारणम्। अतः प्रकटः सुखार्दा तु सुमोकार्तरेन किंचिदिनराविकारमस्ति ने मतिभेः ॥

1. वि०-पञ्चमि । म००-चंहरे । 4. वि०-दुरुतिकमः ।
2. म००-पञ्चमि । 5. 'हि' इति वि०-पञ्चमि वाच्यः ।
3. म००-सर्वेष्वरहरूः ।

---

1. 'केचित्' इति वि०-पञ्चमि वाच्यः। 2. वि०-पञ्चमि स्मार्कायमुखः।
3. वि०-सर्वेष्वरहरूः। 4. 'हि' इति वि०-पञ्चमि वाच्यः।
5. म००-पञ्चमि।
तथा च लोके रूढ़ं पुरुष: पुरुष: संसर्तिति चोरिते आहे ॥
तस्सात् बध्यते नापि सर्वते नापि संसर्तिति कथिन् ॥
संसर्तिति बध्यते मुख्यते च नानाश्रया प्रकृति: ॥ ६२ ॥
दूः अन्यव: ॥—तस्सात् कञ्ठितः (पुरुष: ) न बध्यते, नापि सर्वते नापि संसर्तिति।
प्रकृति: संसर्ति बध्यते मुख्यते च।
तस्सात् कराराम् पुरुषोऽन्तः न बध्यते नापि मुख्यते नापि संसर्तिति
यस्सात् कराराम् अथविति नानाश्रया दैवमानुष्यतिर्योग्याया दैवध-हजारतमात्र्यस्मृत्तिर्युक्तमिकाम् बध्यते मुख्यते संसर्तिति।
अथ पुरुषं एव स्वामात् स संसर्ति—आपात्मावाया संसर्धिमिति।
तेन पुरुषो बध्यते पुरुषो बध्यते पुरुष: संसर्तिति व्यपदिश्यते तेन संसारिनो न विषयते।
सत्तपुरुषान्तहतानात् तत्च पुरुष: स्वामात्तिर्युक्तप्रवर्तिते, तत्मित्यकाव: श्रुद्धे मुख: स्वामात्तितः।
अथ यदि पुरुषः कथोऽन्तः कथो न कथाते मोक्षविद्याना नासित।
अथोऽयस्ते—प्रकृतिर्यवांगाना भाषाते मोक्षित्वाना च।
यत्र सूक्ष्मशारीर तन्मात्रां भिन्नविभाजनोऽयस्ते च।
सत्तपुरुषान्तहतानात् तत्कारणोऽयस्ते, उपकरणोऽयस्ते, उपकरणोऽयस्ते।
सत्तपुरुषान्तहतानात् तत्कारणोऽयस्ते।
सत्तपुरुषान्तहतानात् तत्कारणोऽयस्ते।
सत्तपुरुषान्तहतानात् तत्कारणोऽयस्ते।
सत्तपुरुषान्तहतानात् तत्कारणोऽयस्ते।
सत्तपुरुषान्तहतानात् तत्कारणोऽयस्ते।
सांख्यकारिका जानकारी

65 अन्वय: तेन निम्नित्रयां अर्थवशात् सत्त्वपक्षविनिवृत्तां प्रकृति स्वरूपः पुष्पः प्रापत्वत अर्थसेवितः प्रयत्तः।
	तेन विनुस्त्र अर्थसेवितः पुष्पः प्रकृति पद्यति । प्रेक्षकः प्रेक्षकः घट्यमः। अर्थाविषय: तत्त्वः। यथा ज्ञेयेकः देवतार्थमः। तत्त्वाविषय: सङ्क्रमणार्थमः।

tथमूलार्थ प्रकृति— निम्नित्रयसभाः। निम्नित्रयसहार्थकार्याः।

अर्थसाहित्यार्थ सत्त्वपक्षविनिवृत्ताः। निम्नित्रयमूलयमुन्योगसाहित्याः।

त्रिषु: समाधिकारानां अंतः तत्त्वाविषय तत्त्वाविषय तत्त्वाविषय: सत्त्वपक्षविनिवृत्तां प्रकृति पद्यति।
सांख्यकारिका:]

चर्मार्घ्यज्ञसंस्कारध्यायात् प्रामे शरीरमेवे चरितार्थवञ्च
प्राधान्य निर्देतौ, ऐकान्तिकमवञ्च, आश्यत्तिकमनवञ्चाति कैवल्यं,
कैवल्यानामोऽत्, उस्मैकान्तिकाचतुर्भिद्विंशितं कैवल्यमात्रिति

पुरुषार्थानिमित् गुणं परमाणु मानसातम।
सिद्धविवेकानाथादिन्तं यत्र भूतानाम। ६९।।

६६ अवयवः। — इद्य गुणं पुरुषार्थानाम परमाणु समाश्चातम।
यत्र भूतानाम। निरस्यविप्रकायः चिन्त्यन्ते।

पुरुषार्थां शरीरः तद्यथा गुणं परमाणु श्रीकल्पिक विस्तारानहं
समाश्चातम, सन्तुक्षमम्। यत्र नाना भूतानाम। शास्त्रात्
कर्मध्येण शास्त्रात् सत्यार्थोऽस्मिन विचार्यन्ते। यथा धर्मपा विचारात्
सम्पूर्णविशेषत्विचारनामध्ये विचार्यन्ते। ६९।।

येन: निर्मलामोऽन्तः सन्तानविकुलकारणं हि।

एकत्रितमेन्य सुनिरागुयेदुकामयां प्रवृद्धि।
आसुरिरिपि प्रविष्काय तनं य शुभं कङ्क तत्त्रमू। ६।।
शिष्यपरस्परायांसततीर्धश्रृङ्खलनं चैतंप्रयासम:।
संस्कृतसंचारत्तिनाशमिकाय सिद्धान्तम्। ६।।

सत्यां हि जो येतासि तेथं। कृतस्य प्रतिनिधिः।
आज्ञायिकाविहितिः। परावदार्ज्ज्ञानात्मकं। ६।।

अवयवः। — दृश्यं एतद्: अन्यथा पवित्रं अनूः। श्रद्धार्थं
प्रदद्धी। आसुरिरिपि प्रविष्काय सदिदे तनं य शुभं कङ्क तत्त्रमू।
आवर्तमानं विध्यपरस्परायां अागमेत् एतद्: आय्यमतिनां
कृतस्य प्रतिनिधिः। स्तत्यां सर्वां निर्मलत्वं सर्वं निर्मलतं
अय्यः। आज्ञायिकाविहितिः। परावदार्ज्ज्ञानात्मकं। ६।।

साहसादम्: समृद्धाध्यायः सांख्यकारिका।

१। 'पाते शरीराचे चरितार्थवञ्च, इति ६०—पुस्तकसाठी नाति।
An English Translation of
ĪŚ'VARA KRŚṆA'S SĀMKHYA KĀRIKĀS
WITH
THE GAUḌAPĀDA-BHĀṢYA
(SĀMKHYA)

Salutations to that Kapila who, feeling compassion on the world sinking in the ocean of ignorance, constructed a boat in the shape of Sāmkhya for crossing (that ocean).

For the good of the pupils, I shall compendiously explain this science briefly and clearly, giving proofs, conclusions and reasons.

Kārikā I

On account of affliction from threefold misery, inquiry (should be instituted) into the means for its removal. If (it be said that) it is useless because of the (existence of) evident means, (then we reply—) no, because of the absence of certainty and finality.

The threefold misery, etc. This āryā is introduced:—The exalted sage, Kapila by name, was the son of Brahman. As it is said:

“Sanaka, Sanandana, Sanātana the third, Āsuri, Kapila, Voḍhu and Paṇcaśikha,—these seven sages are said to be the sons of Brahman.”

Virtue, knowledge, renunciation and power were born with Kapila. Thus born, seeing this world sinking in the blinding gloom and the succession of samsāra (birth and death), he became filled with compassion and taught this knowledge of twenty-five principles to the brahmin Āsuri, born in his own family,—the knowledge by which misery comes to an end.

S. K. 1
"One endowed with the knowledge of the twenty-five principles will undoubtedly get salvation, no matter in what stage of life he is—whether he has matted hair, or is shaved or has top-knot."

So it is said:—On account of affliction from three-fold misery inquiry (should be instituted). The three kinds of misery are, internal, external and divine. The internal is two-fold: bodily and mental. The bodily misery,—fever, dysentery and the rest,—is due to the disorder of wind, bile or phlegm; mental is separation from what is liked, and union with what is not liked and the rest. The external misery, due to four-fold living beings, viz., viviparous, oviparous, born of sweat and born of soil, arises from men, beasts, deer, birds, serpents, gnats, mosquitoes, lice, bugs, alligators, sharks, unmoving objects and the rest. The divine misery,—i.e., daiva, because it belongs to gods or comes from heaven, that which arises with reference to these,—is cold, heat, storm, rain, thunder-bolt; and the rest. Thus, on account of affliction from three-fold misery, inquiry should be instituted. Into what?

Into the means for its removal. Therein which is the means for the removal of that three-fold misery.

If (it be said that) it is useless because of the (existence of) evident means; if (it be said that when) the evident means for removing the three-fold misery are known, this inquiry is useless. For removing the two-fold internal misery, the internal means in the shape of treatment according to medical science, union with the liked ones, preclusion of undesirable, the pungent, bitter and astringent decoctions and the like, are quite evident. In (the case of affliction from) external misery, the evident means for its removal are seen in the shape of protection and the like. If you think that it (i.e., inquiry) is useless in the presence of evident means, (then we reply), no.

Because of the absence of certainty and finality. Because the evident means do not certainly (ekāntatah) and finally (ātyantatah) remove it. Therefore, inquiry should be elsewhere instituted into (finding out) the means which certainly and finally remove (the misery).

If inquiry is to be instituted into other than the evident means, still no. Because the revealed means (are known) to remove the three-fold misery. Anus'rava is that which is revealed; (the means) arising from it are (called) ānus'ravi. That is proved by the Veda; as it is said:

"We have drunk Soma, become immortal, reached the Heaven and become acquainted with gods. Therefore, indeed, O Immortal One, what can an enemy do against us, how can the old age of a mortal affect us."

Once upon a time there was a discussion among the gods, viz., Indra and others: How did we become immortal? Having pondered, (they concluded)—Because we—apāma somam—have drunk soma, we have become immortal. Moreover, aganma jyotih,—we have gone, i.e., achieved jyotis, i.e., Heaven. Āvidāma devān,—(we have) become acquainted with the divine beings. And so,—kim nānā asmān kṛṇavād arātiḥ;—nānā, i.e., certainly, what can arāti, i.e., enemy, kṛṇavād, i.e., do to us. kim dhūrtir amṛta martyasya: O Immortal One (he amṛta), what can dhūrtiḥ, i.e., old age or injury of mortal (martyasya) do to us? Moreover, it is said in the Vedas that final goal (is achieved) by killing animals (in sacrifice): "He who performs the asvamedha sacrifice conquers all the regions, transgresses death, transgresses sin, and also transgresses (the sin arising from) the murder of a brahmin." Thus, when certain and final means are revealed in the Vedas, the inquiry is useless.—No. It is said:
Kārikā II

The revealed is like the evident one. It is linked with impurity, destruction and inequality. Other than that is better,—proceeding from the right cognition of the Manifest, Unmanifest and the Knower.

The revealed is like the evident one: drṣṭavat, i.e., like the evident, namely, that what is revealed. Why is it like the evident one? Because—.

Linked with impurity, destruction and inequality: Linked with impurity, because of the slaughter of animals. As it is said:

"According to the injunction in the as'vamedha, six hundred animals, minus three, are employed (i.e., slaughtered) at midday."

Although, dharma is prescribed by the S'ratis and the Smṛtis, still, on account of the mixture (of items), it is full of impurity. Again, "In every yuga thousands of Indras and gods have been surpassed by the time. Time is (therefore) unsurpassable."

Thus, it is linked with destruction, on account of the destruction of Indra and others. Again, it is endowed with atis'aya, i.e., inequality (due to superiority). By seeing superiority in one, the other feels pain. Thus the revealed means are like the evident ones. If it be asked which is better, then it is replied—

Other than that is better: Other than the revealed and the evident ones is better. Because, it is free from impurity, destruction and inequality. How is it (acquired)? (The author) replies,

From the right cognition of the Manifest, Unmanifest, and Knower: The Manifest are mahat and the rest; that is, intellect, ego the five subtle elements, the eleven organs and the five gross elements. The Unmanifest is the Pradhāna. The Knower is the Puruṣa. Thus, these twenty-five principles are called the Manifest, the Unmanifest and the Knower. In their right cognition lies the preference (over the other means). It has also been said—"One endowed with the knowledge of the twenty-five principles." etc.

Now, what are the special characteristics of the Manifest, the Unmanifest and the Knower? We reply—

Kārikā III

Primal Nature is not an evolute; Mahat, etc., the seven, are evolvents and evolutes: the group of sixteen is evolute; the Spirit is neither an evolute nor an evolvent.

Primal Nature, i.e., pradhāna. (is so called), because it is the origin of the seven evolvents and the evolutes; Primal Nature, because it is the origin and a non-product, is an evolvent. As it is not produced from anything, therefore, Nature cannot be an evolute of anything.

Mahat, etc., the seven are evolvents and evolutes. Mahat, i.e., intellect. Intellect and the rest are seven, viz., intellect, ego and the five subtle elements. They are seven evolvents and evolutes. That is, intellect is produced from the Nature, therefore, it is a product of the Nature,—an evolute. The same (intellect) produces ego and is, therefore, an evolvent. Ego also, being produced from intellect is an evolute; and it is an evolvent as it produces the five subtle elements. The subtle element of sound, being produced from ego is an evolute; and it is an evolvent, as it produces ether. Similarly, the subtle element of touch, being produced from ego, is an evolute;
and it is an evolvent as it produces wind. The subtle element of smell, being produced from ego is an evolute; and it is an evolvent as it produces earth. The subtle element of fire, being produced from ego is an evolute; and it is an evolvent as it produces light. The subtle element of taste, being produced from ego, is an evolute; and it is an evolvent as it produces water. Thus, mahat, etc., the seven, are evolvents and evolutes.

The group of sixteen is evolute. The five organs of sense, the five organs of action, the eleventh mind and the five gross elements—this group of sixteen is only evolute. It is but a product.

The Spirit is neither an evolvent nor an evolute.

By what and how many means of cognition are these three categories, namely, the Manifest, the Unmanifest and the Knower known?—Which (category) by which (means of cognition)? In this world, the knowables are proved by means of proof, as rice by the (weight) seer and sandal by balance. Therefore, the means of cognition should be defined.

Kārikā IV

The means of right cognition are recognised to be of three kinds,—perception, inference and valid testimony: as all the means of right cognition are proved (to be included in these three). Verily, a provable is proved by means of right cognition.

Perception. The ear, the skin, the eye, the tongue and the nose are the five organs of sense. Sound, touch-
tion, as of horns in a man, or the son of a barren woman, or a flower in the sky. Consequent Negation is the negation due to destruction, as of a piece of burnt cloth. As a consequence of seeing dry grain, negation of rains is understood. Thus, Negation is of various kinds. Imagination, as—

"The country lying to the south of the Vindhyas and the north of the Sahya and extending up to the seas, is lovely"; hearing this, imagination arises that there are lovely qualities in that country. Imagination is a cognition which follows (an utterance). Tradition,—as people say that a yakṣīni resides on this banyan tree; this is tradition. Analogy,—as a gavāya is like a cow; a tank is like sea. These six means of right cognition are comprehended by Perception and the rest. The Presumption is comprehended by Inference; Probability, Negation, Imagination, Tradition and Analogy are comprehended by Valid Testimony.

Therefore, all the other means of right cognition being proved to be included in these three, only three kinds of means of right cognition are recognised, means that by these three means of right cognition, other means of right cognition are established.

Because, the provables are proved by means of right cognition. The things to be proved are—Primal Nature, intellect, ego, the five subtle elements, the eleven organs, the five gross elements and the Spirit. These twenty-five categories are called the Manifest, the Unmanifest and the Knower. Out of these, some are to be proved by means of Perception, some by Inference and some by Valid Testimony. These are the three means of right cognition.

Now the definitions of each are given—

Kārikā V

Perception is the application (of senses) to (their special) objects; Inference is said to be of three kinds: it is preceded by the (knowledge of) liṅga (the Middle term) and the liṅgin (the Major term). And Valid Testimony consists of holy teachers and revelation.

Drṣṭa or Perception is the application of the senses—ear and the rest,—to their special objects, viz., sound and the rest.

Inference is said to be of three kinds: Pūrvavat (a priori), S'eśavat (a posteriori) and Sāmānyatodṛṣṭa (commonly seen or analogous). That which has got (i.e., which is inferred from) an antecedent (i.e., cause) is called Pūrvavat; for example, one infers rain, seeing the rising cloud, as seen before. S'eśavat, for example, after finding a pāla of water from the sea to be saltish, one infers that the rest (of water) is also saltish. Sāmānyatodṛṣṭa, for example—when the moon and the stars are observed to move from one place to another, one infers their locomotion, as in the case of Caitra. Just as when one observes Caitra, leaving one place and reaching another, one infers that Caitra has locomotion, so (have) the moon and the stars (locomotion). Similarly, observing a mango tree in blossom (at a particular place), one infers that the mango trees are in blossom at other places (also). This is Sāmānyatodṛṣṭa.

Moreover, it is preceded by the (knowledge of) liṅga (the Middle term) and the liṅgin (the Major term). That inference is preceded by the knowledge of the Middle term, where a Major term is inferred by means of a Middle term; e.g., by (perceiving) a staff, (the possessor) is inferred to be a mendicant. That preceded by a Major term is—where a Middle term is inferred from the observation of a Major term; e.g., seeing a mendicant, one infers that this triple-staff belongs to him.
And Valid Testimony consists of the holy teachers and revelation; Ṇpta, i.e., holy teachers, like Brahma and the rest. S'ruṭi is the Veda. The holy teachers and the Veda are called Apta-s'ruṭi. They are called Valid Testimony.

Thus three kinds of Means of Right Cognition have been defined. Now, it is explained what is to be proved by which Means of Right Cognition:

Kārikā VI

By means of Inference based on Analogy, the objects beyond senses are proved; that which is not proved by this (Inference) and cannot be directly perceived, is proved, by Valid Testimony.

By means of Inference based on Analogy, the objects beyond senses, i.e., the objects which cannot be directly perceived by the senses, are proved. Nature and the Spirit, which are beyond sense-perception, are proved by inference based on analogy. For, the Middle term, Mahat and the rest, has three Attributes. Nature is that which has Mahat and the rest, possessing three Attributes, as its effect. Again, because, this Unconscious (Nature) appears to be conscious, therefore, (it must have) another, i.e., the conscious Spirit, to superintend it (i.e., Nature). Manifest is proved by Perception.

That which is not proved by this (Inference) and cannot be directly perceived, is proved by Valid Testimony. For example:—Indra, the king of gods; the northern Kurus; the nymphs in the Heaven;—all these imperceptibles are proved by Valid Testimony.

Here, somebody says:—Nature and the Spirit are not perceived; that what is not perceived in this world, does not exist; so Nature and the Spirit also do not exist; for example, the second head or the third arm (of a man do not exist). It is replied:—In this world, the non-perception of objects is caused by eight causes. They are—

Kārikā VII

On account of excessive distance, (excessive) pro-

ximity, injury to senses, inattention, minuteness,

obstruction, suppression and mixture with what is

similar, (even the existent objects are not perceived).

Here, even existent objects are not perceived on

account of excessive distance, for example, of Caitra, Maitra

and Viṣṇumitra living in another country.

On account of excessive proximity: e.g., an eye cannot

perceive collyrium in itself.

On account of injury to senses: e.g., deaf and blind men
do not apprehend sound and colour.

On account of inattention: e.g., a man who is distracted
does not hear anything, however well-said.

On account of minuteness: e.g., the atoms of smoke,
heat, water and frost are not visible in the sky.

On account of obstruction: e.g., an object obstructed by
a wall is invisible.

On account of suppression: e.g., the planets, asterisms
and stars are invisible on account of the suppression (of
their light) by the sun.

On account of mixture with what is similar: e.g., a grain
of bean in a heap of beans, or a lotus and a myrabolan in
a heap lotuses and myrabolans, and a pigeon in a flock of
pigeons, are invisible, because, mixed with what is similar.
Thus, existent objects are not perceived in this world on
account of these eight causes.
Thus, what is ascertained does exist. Now, it is explained why there is no apprehension of Nature and the Spirit, and how can they be apprehended:—

Kārika VIII

The non-apprehension of Nature is due to its minuteness and not to non-existence. It is ascertained from its effects. Those effects are Mahat and the rest, and they are similar and dissimilar to Nature.

Its non-apprehension is due to minuteness. (Non-apprehension) of Nature. Nature is not apprehended on account of minuteness. As even the existent atoms of smoke, heat, water and frost are invisible in the sky. Then, how is it to be ascertained?—

It is to be ascertained from its effects. A cause is inferred from the observation of an effect. Nature, as the cause, does exist, whose effects are these:—intellect, ego, the five subtle elements, the eleven organs and the five gross elements they are the effects of that (Nature).

Those effects are dissimilar to Nature.—Prakṛti is Nature; dissimilar to it, i.e., dissimilar to Nature.

And similar:—and similar in form. Even in this world, a son is similar as well as dissimilar to his father. The causes of similarity and dissimilarity, we shall explain later on.

On account of disagreement among teachers, a doubt arises—. Are all these effects, viz., Mahat and the rest, existent or non-existent in their cause, i.e. Nature?—For in this school of Sāmkhya philosophy, the effect is existent; with the Buddhists and the rest, it is non-existent. If it is existent, it cannot be non-existent; if, however, it is non-existent, then it cannot be existent. This is a contradiction. Therefore, it is said:—

Kārika IX

The effect is existent (in its cause), since, non-existent cannot be produced, since the material (cause) is selected, since everything cannot be produced (from anything), since a potent (cause) produces that of which it is capable and since (effect is) of the same nature as the cause.

Since non-existent cannot be produced; non-existent is that which does not exist. Since there can be no production of non-existent thing, so an effect does exist (in its cause). In this world we do not see the production of a non-existent object, as oil cannot be produced from sand (wherein oil is non-existent). So, since only an existent object can be produced, the Manifest does exist before its production in Nature. Therefore, the effect is existent.

Moreover, since the material (cause) is selected Upādāna is the material cause; on account of selecting it. In this world, a man selects the material cause of that thing which he wants. One who wants curds selects milk and not water. Therefore, the effect exists.

Again, since everything cannot be produced. Everything cannot be produced from anywhere. For example, gold cannot be produced from silver, grass, dust and sand. So the effect is existent, because everything cannot be produced from anywhere.

And again, since a potent thing can produce that of which it is capable. Here we see that only a potent thing, like the potter or the means like earth, wheel, a thread of rags, water etc., can produce, from the earth a pot, which is capable of being produced. Therefore, the effect is existent.

And also, since (the effect is) of the same nature as the cause. The effect is of the same nature of which the
cause is; e.g., barley (is produced) from barley and rice from rice. If the effect were not existent, then rice could be produced from kodravas; and as it is not so, therefore, the effect is existent. Thus, there are five causes (proving) the existence of the mergent, viz., Mahat and the rest, in Nature. Therefore, it is proved that only existent is produced and not non-existent.

Now he explains the similarity and dissimilarity (of Mahat and the rest) with Nature:—

Karika X

The Manifest is caused, non-eternal, non-pervading, active, manifold, dependent, mergent, conjunct and subordinate. The Unmanifest is just the reverse.

The Manifest, viz., the effect like Mahat and the rest, is caused. Hetumat is that which has got a cause. Upadana, Hetu, Karna and Nimitta are synonyms. The Manifest has Nature for its cause; therefore, the entire Manifest upto the five gross elements, is caused. The principle of intellect is caused by Nature; the principle of ego is caused by intellect; the five subtle elements and the eleven organs are caused by the ego; sky is caused by the subtle element of sound; wind is caused by the subtle element of touch; glow is caused by the subtle element of colour; water is caused by the subtle element of taste; earth is caused by the subtle element of smell. Thus, the entire Manifest upto the five gross elements is caused.

Again, it is non-eternal; because it is produced from another. For example, a jar is non-eternal, because it is produced from a lump of clay.

Again, it is non-pervading; that is, it is not all-pervading. The Manifest is not all-pervading as the Nature and the Spirit are.

Again, it is active; it migrates at the time of creation. Because, it migrates along with the subtle body endowed with thirteen instruments, it is active.

Again, it is manifold; viz., intellect, ego, the five subtle elements, the eleven organs and the five gross elements.

Again, it is dependent, i.e., dependent on its cause; intellect depends upon Nature, ego depends upon intellect, the eleven organs and the five subtle elements depend upon ego; and the five gross elements depend upon the five subtle elements.

Again, it is mergent. It is endowed with (the characteristic of) merging. At the period of dissolution, the five gross elements merge in five subtle elements; the latter along with the eleven organs (merge) in ego; ego (merges) in the intellect; and the intellect (merges) in the Nature.

Again, it is conjunct (i.e., made up of parts); sound, touch, taste, colour and smell are the parts,—endowed with them.

Again, it is subordinate, i.e., it is not independent. As intellect is subordinate to Nature; ego is subordinate to intellect; the five subtle elements and the eleven organs are subordinate to ego; and the five gross elements are subordinate to the five subtle elements. Thus, the Manifest which is subordinate, dependent on another, is explained.

Now, we shall describe the Unmanifest. The Unmanifest is just the reverse, i.e., just the reverse of these characteristics belong to the Unmanifest. The Manifest has been described as caused. There is nothing higher than the Nature. And as the Nature is not produced, so the Unmanifest is uncaused.
Similarly, the Manifest is non-eternal; the Unmanifest is eternal, because not produced. It is not produced from anything like the gross elements. So, it is eternal.

Moreover, the Manifest is non-pervading; the Unmanifest is all-pervading, being omnipresent.

The Manifest is active; the Unmanifest is inactive, also because of omnipresence.

The Manifest is manifold; the Unmanifest is one, because it is the cause. The Unmanifest is the only cause of all the three worlds; therefore, the Nature is one.

Again, the Manifest is dependent; the Unmanifest is independent, being a non-effect. There is nothing higher than the Nature of which the Nature could be an effect.

Again, the Manifest is mergent; the Unmanifest is non-mergent, because it is eternal. The mergent, Mahat, etc., merge in one another at the time of dissolution. (But) the Nature is not such. Therefore, the Nature is non-mergent.

Again, the Manifest is conjunct; the Unmanifest is without parts. Sound, touch, taste, colour and smell do not exist in the Nature.

Again, the Manifest is subordinate; the Unmanifest is independent, is its own master.

Thus, the dissimilarity between the Manifest and the Unmanifest has been described; now, the similarity (between the two) is explained, as it was said that it (i.e. the product of the Nature) is also similar (to the Nature).

Karikā XI

The Manifest is composed of the three Attributes, non-discriminated, objective, general, non-intelligent and productive. So also is the Nature. The Spirit is the reverse of that, as well as similar.

The Manifest is composed of the three Attributes. It has the three Attributes, viz., Sattva, Rajas and Tamas.

The Manifest is non-discriminated; that is, it is devoid of discrimination. It is not possible to discriminate (between the two) that this is the Manifest and these are the Attributes, as we can do (in the case of a bull and a horse) that this is a bull and this is a horse.

Again, the Manifest is objective; that is, it is an object of enjoyment; because, it is an object (of enjoyment) for all the Spirits.

Again, the Manifest is general; because, it is common to all (the Spirits) like a harlot.

The Manifest is non-intelligent; that is, it is not conscious of pleasure, pain and delusion.

Again, the Manifest is productive. For example, from intellect, ego is produced; from ego, the five subtle elements and the eleven organs are produced; from the five subtle elements, the five gross elements (are produced).

Thus, these characteristics of the Manifest ending with productiveness have been described. The Unmanifest is similar in these (characteristics).—As the manifest is, so also is the Nature. The Manifest is composed of the three Attributes; the Unmanifest, whose products, viz., Mahat and the rest, are composed of the three Attributes, is also composed of the three Attributes. In this world, the effect has the same essence as the cause has; e.g., a piece of cloth woven out of black yarn will be black.

Again, the Manifest is non-discriminated; the Nature also cannot be discriminated from the three Attributes. It is not possible to discriminate that the Nature is other than the three Attributes; so the Nature is non-discriminated.

S. K. 2
Again, the Manifest is objective; the Nature also is objective, because it is an object of enjoyment for all the Spirits.

Again, the Manifest is general; so also is the Nature, being common to all.

Again, the Manifest is non-intelligent; the Nature also is not conscious of pleasure, pain and delusion. How do you infer this?—We see that from a non-intelligent lump of clay, a non-intelligent jar is produced.

Thus, the Nature also has been described. Now, we are going to explain—"the Spirit is the reverse of that as well as similar." The reverse of that, i.e., the Spirit is the reverse of the Manifest and the Unmanifest. For example—

The Manifest and the Unmanifest are composed of the three Attributes, the Spirit is Attribute-less.

The Manifest and the Unmanifest are non-discriminated, the Spirit is discriminating.

The Manifest and the Unmanifest are objective, the Spirit is non-objective.

The Manifest and the Unmanifest are general, the Spirit is non-general (i.e., individual).

The Manifest and the Unmanifest are non-intelligent, the Spirit is conscious of pleasure, pain and delusion; it knows them; therefore, it is intelligent.

The Manifest and the Nature are productive; the Spirit is non-productive. Nothing is produced from the Spirit. Therefore, it is said that the Spirit is the reverse of that.

As to the remark that the Spirit is similar to that, it has been explained in the previous verse, viz., as the Nature is uncaused, so is the Spirit. It was said there that the Manifest is caused, non-eternal and so on, the Unmanifest is the reverse of that.

Here, the Manifest is caused; the Unmanifest is uncaused; so is the Spirit uncaused, because it is not produced.

The Manifest is non-eternal; the Unmanifest is eternal; so also is the Spirit eternal.

The Manifest is non-pervading; the Unmanifest is pervading: so also is the Spirit pervading, being omnipresent.

The Manifest is active; the Unmanifest is inactive; so also is the Spirit inactive, again because, it is omnipresent.

The Manifest is manifold; the Unmanifest is one; so also is the Spirit one.*

The Manifest is dependent; the Unmanifest is independent; so also is the Spirit independent.

The Manifest is mergent; the Unmanifest is non-mergent; so also is the Spirit non-mergent, because it does not merge anywhere.

The Manifest is conjunct; the Unmanifest is non-conjunct; so also is the Spirit non-conjunct. There are no parts (in the shape) of sound and the rest in the Spirit.

And again, the Manifest is subordinate: the Unmanifest is non-subordinate; so also is the Spirit non-subordinate, i.e., is its own master.

Thus, the similarity of the Unmanifest with the Spirit was explained in the previous verse. In the present verse, viz., "Composed of the Attributes, non-discriminated, etc.," the similarity of the Manifest with the Nature and the dissimilarity with the Spirit have been explained.

* Paramārtha's original here reads—"Spirit differs from Nature in this point alone, that it is multiple." Tak. S. K. p. 16; also see the footnote; JRAS. p. 628 (d), July 1931.
It has been said that the Manifest and the Unmanifest are composed of three Attributes. Now, what are these three Attributes? — The following is stated to explain their nature: —

**Kārika XII**

The Attributes are of the nature of pleasure, pain and delusion; they are adapted to illuminate, to activate and to restrain. They mutually suppress, support, produce, consort and exist.

The Attributes, viz., Sattva, Rajas and Tamas are of the nature of pleasure, pain and delusion. The Sattva is of the nature of priti; priti is pleasure; it is of this nature. The Rajas is of the nature of apriti; apriti is pain. The Tamas is of the nature of viṣāda; viṣāda is delusion.

Again, they are adapted to illuminate, to activate and to restrain. The word artha stands for ‘competency’. Prakīrtha Sattva means ‘competent to illuminate’. Rajas is adapted to activate. Tamas is adapted to restrain, i.e., is competent to fix a thing. That is, the Attributes are of the nature of illumination, activity and fixture.

Again,—and they mutually suppress, support, produce, consort and exist. That is, they are mutually suppressive, mutually supporting, mutually productive, mutually consort and mutually existing. Mutually suppressive; they mutually, i.e., one another, suppress, i.e., manifest themselves with the characteristics of pleasure, pain, etc. That means,—when Sattva is predominant, then it is so by suppressing the Rajas and Tamas with its characteristics: and it exhibits itself as pleasure and illumination. When Rajas is (predominant), then it is so (by suppressing) the Sattva and Tamas with its characteristics of delusion and fixture. And the Attributes are mutually supporting like a binary. They are mutually productive, as a lump of clay produces jar. And they are mutually consort: as husband and wife are mutually consort, so are the Attributes. And it is said: —

“’The consort of Rajas is Sattva, the consort of Sattva is Rajas; the consort of Sattva and Rajas, is said to be Tamas.’ (Deviḥāgaṇavatā, III, 8). That is, they are the help-mates of one another. And, they mutually exist, i.e., they co-exist, according to the text, “The Attributes exist in the Attributes,” (Bhagavadgītā, III, 28). Just as a beautiful and virtuous woman is a source of pleasure to all; but the same woman is a source of pain to her co-wives; and the same woman produces delusion in the passionate (people); similarly, Sattva is the source of the existence of Rajas and Tamas. Just as a king ever assiduous in protecting his subjects and punishing the wicked, produces pleasure in the good (people) and pain and delusion in the wicked, similarly, Rajas brings about the existence of Sattva and Tamas. In the same way, Tamas brings about the existence of Sattva and Rajas by its own nature of covering (things). For example, the clouds, covering the sky, produce pleasure in the world;—they urge the farmer to activity by their rain, and produce delusion in the separated (lovers). Thus, the Attributes are mutually existent.

Moreover: —

**Kārika XII**

Sattva is considered to be light and bright, Rajas exciting and mobile, and Tamas is only heavy and enveloping. Like a lamp, their function is to gain an end.
Sāmkhya Kārikā

**Sattva is light and bright.** When Sattva predominates, then the limbs become light, the intellect becomes bright and the organs become clear (i.e. acute).

**Rajas is exciting and mobile.** Upāstambha is that which excites or stimulates. Just as a bull is very much excited at the sight of another bull, so is the nature of Rajas. And Rajas is observed to be mobile. A man of the nature of Rajas is fickle-minded.

**Tamas is only heavy and enveloping.** When Tamas predominates, then the limbs become heavy and the organs become enveloped (i.e., dull)—incapable of apprehending their objects.

Here, one may ask—How do the mutually opposed Attributes produce one common effect, although acting according to their own individual intentions?—(Reply), like a Lamp, their function is to gain an end. Pradipavat means like a Lamp. Their function is considered to be aiming to achieve a common end. Just as a lamp composed of oil, fire and the wick, which are opposed to one another—, illuminates objects, so Sattva, Rajas and Tamas, although opposed to one another, produce an effect.

Another question arises here,—you have explained that the Nature and the Manifest are “composed of the three Attributes, non-discriminated and objective.” How do you know that the Nature, and the manifested Mahat, etc., are composed of the three Attributes, etc.? This is answered—

Kārikā XIV

The qualities of non-discriminatedness and the rest (of the characteristics of the Manifest) are proved (to exist in the Manifest) by the possession of the three Attributes and by the absence of its (i.e. of the Manifest) reverse. The Unmanifest is also proved by the effect being of the same nature as its cause.

The characteristics of non-discriminatedness and the rest exist in Mahat and the rest, because they are of the nature of the three Attributes; but they (i.e., the characteristics) are not proved (to exist) in the Unmanifest.—Therefore, it is said—By the absence of its reverse; the reverse of it, the absence thereof; i.e. the absence of the reverse; thus the Unmanifest is proved. For example, wherever there is yarn, there is cloth; the yarn and the cloth are not different things;—Why? Because, there is absence of the reverse. Thus, there is a relationship (sambandha) established between the Manifest and the Unmanifest. Far away is the Unmanifest, but the Manifest is at hand. So, one who sees the Manifest, sees also the Unmanifest; because, there is the absence of its reverse.

Hence also the Unmanifest is proved—Because of an effect being of the same nature as its cause. We see in this world that whatever the essence of a cause, the same is that of the effect. As—from black yarn, only black cloth is produced. Thus, the mergent Mahat and the rest are non-discriminated, objective, general, non-intelligent and productive. So, whatever the essence of the mergent, the Unmanifest is also proved to possess the same essence.

"On account of the possession of the three Attributes, non-discriminatedness and the rest are proved to exist in the Manifest: By the absence of the reverse and by the effect being of the same nature as its cause, the Unmanifest is also proved"—, this is false. Because, all what we do not apprehend in this world, does not exist.
this it is replied)—do not say so; because one cannot apprehend smell in stones, etc., although it is there. Similarly, the Nature also does exist, but is not apprehended.

Karikā XV

(The Unmanifest cause does exist), because of the finiteness of the specific objects, because of natural sequence, because of activity depending upon efficiency, because of distinction between cause and effect and because of the merging of this diverse (evolved).

The Unmanifest cause exists—this is the relation of government of subject and predicate in the sentence. Because of the finiteness of the specific objects. In this world, wherever we find an agent, we see a finiteness of his. For example, a potter makes only finite jars from finite lumps of clay; so does Mahat also. The mergent Mahat and the rest are finite and are the specific effects of the Nature. Intellect is one, ego is one, the subtle elements are five, the organs are eleven and the gross elements are five.—Thus, on account of the finiteness of the specific objects, there is Nature as the cause which produces the finite Manifest. If there were no Nature, then even this Manifest would have been infinite. And so, on account of the finiteness of the specific objects, there is Nature, wherefrom this Manifest has sprung up.

Again, because of natural sequence. This is quite well known in this world that when one sees a boy engaged in performing sacred rites, one infers that his parents are naturally brahmmins. Similarly, seeing this mergent (i.e. the evolved), we arrive at a thing which must be its cause. Thus, by natural sequence there is Nature.

Again, because of activity depending upon efficiency. Here, a man does that for which he is efficient. For example, a potter who is efficient to produce a jar, produces only a jar and not cloth or chariot.

Again, there is Nature as the cause. How?—Because of distinction between cause and effect. Kāraṇa is that which produces: kārya is that which is produced. (There is) a distinction (of functions) of cause and effect. For example, as a jar is competent to hold curds, honey, water and milk, so is not a lump of clay (competent). Or, a lump of clay produces a jar, but a jar does not produce lump of clay. Thus, seeing the mergent Mahat and the rest, it is inferred that there is a separate cause from which this Manifest has separated (i.e., evolved) itself.

And again, because of the merging of the diverse (evolved). Viśva means universe; its rūpa is manifestation. The abstraction of viśo varūpa is vaiso varūpya (i.e., manifested or evolved); on account of its merging there is Nature; because there is no mutual distinction between the three worlds and the five gross elements,—i.e., the three worlds are included in the five gross elements. At the time of dissolution, the five gross elements, viṣ-, earth, water, fire, air and ether, merge into the modified five subtle elements in the order of creation; the five subtle elements and the eleven organs (merge) into ego; ego (merges) into intellect; intellect (merges) into Nature. Thus, the three worlds merge into Nature at the time of dissolution. From such merging of the Manifest and the Unmanifest, like that of milk and curds, there does exist the Unmanifest as the cause.

And for this reason:
Kārikā XVI

The Unmanifest as the cause does exist. It functions through the three Attributes by combining and by modification, like water, due to the particular characteristics of the abode of each of the Attributes.

The well-known Unmanifest as the cause does exist from which proceed the emergent Mahat and the rest.

Trīguṇataḥ.—i. e., from (the Nature) possessed of the three Attributes. Trīguṇa is that which has the three Attributes, viz., Sattva, Rajas and Tamas. Then, what is the sense?—(It is)—that the Nature is the equilibrium of Sattva, Rajas and Tamas.

Again, by combining. As the three streams of the Ganges falling on the head of Rudra, (combine to) produce one stream, so the Unmanifest endowed with the three Attributes produces one Manifest. Or, as the combined threads produce cloth, so the Unmanifest creates Mahat and the rest, on account of the combination of the three Attributes. So, the manifested universe proceeds from the three Attributes and their combination.

Well, as the entire Manifest proceeds from one Nature, so the former must be uniform.—This objection (does) not (arise). Because by modification, like water, due to the particular characteristics of abode of each of the Attributes. The three worlds born of one Nature are not of uniform nature. Gods are happy, men are unhappy and the animals are deluded. The Manifest, proceeding from one Unmanifest, becomes like water on account of modification based on the particular characteristics abiding in each of the three Attributes. The repetition of prati denotes “succession.” Gūṇās’raya means the abode of the Attributes:—its particular characteristic.—Taking into consideration the particular characteristics of the abode of the three Attributes, the Manifest is created from the modification based upon the particular characteristics of the abode of the three Attributes. For example, water falling from the sky is of uniform nature; but coming into contact with different forms, that water becomes of different forms, due to different tastes. Similarly, the three worlds proceeding from one Nature, are not of uniform nature. Among the gods, the Sattva is predominant, and Rajas and Tamas are indifferent; so they are very happy. Among men, the Rajas is predominant, and Sattva and Tamas are indifferent; therefore, they are very unhappy. Among animals, the Tamas is predominant, and Sattva and Rajas are indifferent; so they are very insensible.

Thus, by these two verses, the existence of the Nature is known. Now, after this, the author proceeds to prove the existence of the Spirit :

Kārikā XVII

The Spirit exists, since composite (objects) are meant for another; since it is the reverse of that which has the three Attributes and the rest; since there must be control; since there must be someone who enjoys: and since there is activity for release.

It had been pointed out that the release is obtained by the discriminative knowledge of the Manifest, the Unmanifest and the Knower. So, after (the knowledge of) the Manifest, the Unmanifest has been known (to exist) by five reasons (verse 15). Like the Unmanifest the Spirit also is subtle. Now, its existence is proved by inference. The Spirit exists. How?—Since composite objects are meant for another. It is inferred that the composition of Mahat and the rest is meant for the Spirit, because, it (i. e., composition) is unconscious like a bed. For example, a bed
is composed of gātropalaka(?), a foot-stool, a covering cloth of cotton and a pillow; it serves another person’s purpose and not its own. The different parts, viz., gātropalaka, etc., of the bed cannot serve any mutual purpose. So, it is inferred that there is a man who sleeps on the bed,—for whom this bed is meant. So, this body, a composite of five gross elements, is meant for another. There exists the Spirit for whom this enjoyable body is born;—the body which is a composite of Mahat and the rest.

Hence also, the Spirit exists:—since it is the reverse of that which has the three Attributes. viz., “possessed of the three Attributes, non–discriminated, objective, etc.,” mentioned in the previous verse,—the reverse of this. Because, it was said: “the Spirit is similar and dissimilar to that.”

Since there must be control. As here, a chariot, united to horses capable of leaping, galloping and running, functions only when controlled by a charioteer, so does the body function on account of the control of the Spirit. As it is said in the Saṣṭītantra—“The Nature functions when controlled by the Spirit.”*

Hence, the Spirit exists,—Since there must be someone who enjoys. For example, we infer that there must be an enjoyer of mixed food flavoured with the six flavours, viz., sweet, sour, salt, pungent, bitter and astringent; similarly, because the mergent Mahat and the rest are not enjoyers, (we infer) that the Spirit exists,—for whose enjoyment this body is.

Hence, also (the Spirit exists), since there is activity for release. Kaivalya is the abstraction of kevala (alone);

* Paramārtha’s original also quotes from Saṣṭītantra; “Nature, it is that in which Spirit resides, and it is because of that that she can produce actions.” Tak. S. K., p. 25.

the activity for this purpose; from this activity for its own release, it is inferred that the Spirit exists. For, everybody, learned or otherwise, desires for the cessation of the cycle of his births and deaths. For these reasons there exists the Spirit apart from the body.*

“Is that Spirit one, controlling all the bodies like a string passing through a chain of jewels; or are there many Spirits controlling each body?” —To this is replied:—

Kārikā XVIII

The plurality of the Spirits is established, because birth, death and organs are allotted separately; because there is no activity at one time, and because there are different modifications of the three Attributes.

Jannamaraṇakaraṇāni, means birth, death and the organs; because of their pratiniyama i.e., separate allotment of each. If there were one Spirit, then when one (Spirit) were to be born, all would be born;§ or when one were to die all would die; or when one were to have any organic defect in the shape of deafness, blindness, dumbness, mutilation or lameness, then all would be deaf, blind, mutilated or lame. But it does not happen so. Therefore, because birth, death and the organs are allotted separately, the plurality of the Spirits is established.

* Paramārtha’s original comments: “If there were only our body, we should not have the need of the final Deliverance taught by the sages.... If there were no distinct Spirit by the side of the body, religious practices like cremation or the throwing into water of the remains of dead parents or masters would not have any merit, but might drag in demerit.” Tak. S. K., p. 25.

§ Paramārtha: “The women of different countries would become pregnant at the same time; they would be brought to bed at the same time; they would have all boys or all girls.” Tak. S. K., p. 26.
Again, because there is no activity at one time. Yugaḥpat means at one time;—ayugapat i.e., not at one time, pravartanaṁ i.e. activity. Because we see that all people are not engaged in virtue and the rest at one and the same time. Some are engaged in virtue, others in vice, some in renunciation and some in knowledge. Therefore, by there being no activity at one time, 'there are many Spirits' is proved.

And moreover, because there are different modifications of the three Attributes. Also, by the different modifications of the three Attributes, plurality of the Spirits is proved. For example, in ordinary life, a Sattvika person is happy, a Rājas person is unhappy and a Tāmasa person is under delusion. Thus, by the various vicissitudes, plurality of the Spirits is established.

Now it is stated that the Spirit is inactive:

Kārikā XIX

And from that contrast it follows that the Spirit is endowed with the characteristics of witnessing, isolation, indifference, perception and inactivity.

And from that contrast:—from that afore-saidviparyāsa, i.e., contrast of the possession of the three Attributes. The Spirit is devoid of the Attributes, is discriminative and enjoyer. The contrast is of these qualities in the Spirit, as said before.

Therefore, Sattva, Rajas and Tamas being agents (active), it follows that the Spirit is endowed with the characteristics of witnessing:—that (Spirit) which is the subject of plurality. Only the Attributes which are agents are active; the witness neither acts nor desists from acting.

Moreover, (the Spirit is endowed with) isolation; kai-valya is the property of being isolated or different. That is, isolated or different from that which is possessed of the three Attributes.

Indifference is the property of being indifferent. The Spirit is indifferent like a samnyāsin. Just as a samnyāsin is indifferent towards the villagers engaged in tilling, so the Spirit also remains indifferent (i.e., inactive) while the (three) Attributes are active.

Therefore, (the Spirit is endowed with) perception and inactivity. Because the Spirit is indifferent, therefore, it is the perceiver and not-agent of those actions. The Attributes, Sattva, Rajas and Tamas function as agents and action, and not the Spirit. Thus also the existence of the Spirit is proved.

(Objection)—'If the Spirit is a non-agent, then how does it exercise volition (in the shape of),—'I shall practise virtue, I will not practise vice'. Therefore, it is an agent. But you say that the Spirit is non-agent; in this way there will be fault both ways.' (Answer)—So, it is replied:

Kārikā XX

Therefore, the non-intelligent līṅga becomes as if intelligent on account of its contact with that (Spirit). And although the activity belongs to the Attributes, yet the indifferent (Spirit) seems as if it were an agent.

Here, the intelligence (really) belongs to the Spirit; therefore, the līṅga, viz., Mahat and the rest, coming into contact with the reflection of the intelligent (Spirit), becomes as if intelligent. As here, a jar becomes cold when it comes into contact with coolness, and becomes hot when it comes into contact with heat, so the līṅga, viz.,
Mahat and the rest, by coming into contact with that i.e., by coming into contact with the Spirit, becomes as if intelligent. Therefore, the volition is exercised by the Attributes and not by the Spirit.

Although, people use (such phrases), 'a man acts or walks', still the Spirit is non-agent. How?—(Reply)—And though the activity belongs to the Attributes, yet the indifferent (Spirit) seems as if it were an agent. Though the activity resides in the Attributes, yet, even the indifferent Spirit becomes as if it were an agent, not an (actual) agent. There is an illustration of this:—As a person, who is not a thief, when arrested along with thieves becomes a thief, so the (real) agents are the Attributes but the Spirit, although indifferent, yet by coming into contact with them (the Attributes), becomes active,—by coming into contact with the agents. Thus, the distinction of the Manifest, the Unmanifest and the Spirit has been explained; from discrimination of which release is obtained.

Well, for what purpose is the union of the Nature and the Spirit brought about? It is replied:—

Kārikā XXI

(The union) of the Spirit (with the Nature) is for contemplation (of the Nature): (the union) of the Nature (with the Spirit) is for liberation. The union of both (i.e., the Spirit and the Nature) is like that of a lame man with a blind man. The creation is brought about by that (union).

The union of the Spirit with the Nature is for contemplation. The Spirit contemplates the Nature, i.e., its effects beginning from Mahat and ending with the gross elements.

For this reason, the union of the Nature with the Spirit is for liberation.

That union of both should be considered to be like that of a lame man with a blind man. For example, one man is lame, the other is blind. These two men were travelling with difficulty; the caravan was attacked by the robbers in the forest; these two were deserted by their friends and wandered haphazardly; in course of their wandering they encountered each other. This reuion of theirs, on account of each relying on the words of the other, serves the purpose of walking and seeing. The blind man mounted the lame man on his shoulders. Thus, the blind man walks by the road shown by the lame man mounted on the former's body, and the lame man (walks) mounted on the blind man's body. Similarly, the Spirit like the lame man has the power of contemplation, but not of action. The Nature like the blind man has the power of action, but not of contemplation. And just as there will be separation of the blind man from the lame man, after their mutual object of reaching the desired spot is achieved, so the Nature also ceases to act after bringing about the release of the Spirit; and the Spirit becomes isolated after contemplating the Nature. After their mutual object is gained, separation will come about.

And moreover, the creation is brought about by that. Tatkrāt, i.e., brought about by that union; sargah, i.e., creation. Just as a son is born by the union of man and woman, similarly, the creation is brought about by the union of the Spirit and Nature.

Now the author proceeds to explain all the products:—

S. K. 3
Kārikā XXII

From the Nature proceeds the intellect; thence ego, thence the group of sixteen, and from five out of this group of sixteen, the five gross elements.

Prakṛti (Nature), pradhāna, brahman, avyakta, bahu-dhātmaka and māyā are synonyms. From the Nature, devoid of characteristics, the Intellect is born. Mahat is born with buddhi, āsuri, mati, khyāti, jñāna and prajñā as synonyms.

From that Mahat, the ego is born. Ahamkāra, bhūtādi, vaikṛta, tajasa and abhimāna are synonyms.

From that the group of sixteen. From that ego the group of sixteen, the group having sixteen forms, is produced. That is, the five subtle elements, viz., the subtile element of sound, the subtile element of touch, the subtile element of colour, the subtile element of taste and the subtile element of smell; then the eleven organs—the five organs of sense, viz., ear, skin, eye, tongue and nose, the five organs of action, viz., tongue, hands, feet, anus and the organs of procreation, and the eleventh mind having the characteristics of both (organs of sense and action). This group of sixteen is produced from the ego.

And, from five, the five gross elements; out of that group of sixteen, from the five subtle elements, the five gross elements are born. As it is said:—ether from the subtile element of sound, wind from the subtile element of touch, fire from the subtile element of light, water from the subtile element of taste and earth from the subtile element of smell. Thus from five atoms (i.e., atom-like subtile elements), the five gross elements are born.

It has been said before that the liberation results from the discriminative knowledge of the Manifest, the Unmanifest and the Knower. In this connection, (the Manifest) of twenty-three kinds, beginning with Mahat and ending with the gross elements, has been described. The Unmanifest is also explained by “Because of the finiteness of the specific objects” (verse 15). The Spirit also has been explained by the reasons (mentioned in) “Because the composite objects are meant for another” (verse 17). Thus, they make up the twenty-five principles. He who knows all the three worlds pervaded by these (becomes liberated). Tatvā is the abstraction of Tad, i.e., existence. As it is said—

“Hec who knows the twenty-five principles, becomes liberated, no matter in what stage of life he is,—whether he has clotted hair or is shaved or has a tuft of hair; there is no doubt about it.”

They (i.e., the twenty-five principles) are:—The Nature, the Spirit, the Intellect, the Ego, the five subtle elements, the eleven organs and the five gross elements. It has been said that the intellect is born of Nature; what is the nature of that intellect?—It is described:—

Kārikā XXIII

The intellect is determination.—Virtue, knowledge, non-attachment and power constitute its Sāttvika form. The Ṣāṁkṣara form is its reverse.

Determination is the definition of intellect. Adhyāya sāya is ascertainment, and it is (present in the intellect) like the future germination of sprout in a seed. That is, it is the definite cognition which arises when one determines that “this is jar,” “this is cloth.”

That intellect has eight parts, according as it is Sāttvika or Tāmasa. The Sāttvika form of intellect is of four kinds, viz., virtue, knowledge, non-attachment and power,
The virtue is of the nature of mercy, charity, the (five) yamas (restraints) and the (five) niyamas (obligations). The yamas and the niyamas are described in the treatise of Patañjali. “Non-injury, truth, non-stealing, celibacy and non-acceptance of gifts are the yamas.” (Yogasūtra, II, 30). “Purity, contentment, austerity, study of the Vedas and the meditation of God are the niyamas” (Ibid, II, 32). Light (prakīśa), understanding (avāga) and manifestation (bhūna) are the synonyms of knowledge. The external knowledge comprises of the Vedas along with the six branches of pronunciation, ritual, grammar, etymology, prosody and astronomy, the Purānas, the Nyāya, the Mimāṃsā and the Dharmasāstras. The internal knowledge is the (discriminative) knowledge of the Nature and the Spirit. This Nature is the equilibrium of Sattva, Rajas and Tamas. This Spirit is accomplished, free from the Attributes, pervading and intelligent. The result of the external knowledge is celebrity and admiration among the people. The result of the internal knowledge is liberation. The non-attachment also is of two kinds:—external and internal. The external (non-attachment) is freedom from attachment towards the objects (of senses), arising from disgust due to the observation of the defects of earning.

* Paramārtha’s original has different yamas and niyamas.

“Yama has five sub-divisions: (1) not to put oneself in anger; (2) to respect one’s spiritual masters; (3) to possess internal and external purity; (4) to be moderate in eating and drinking; (5) not to become addicted to license. Niyama too is divided into five: (1) not to kill; (2) not to steal; (3) to speak the truth; (4) to practise continence (brahmacārī); (5) not to flatter.” On this Prof. Suryanarayana Sastri remarks in the footnote that the Chinese enumeration “has greater chances of being the original than that of Gauḍapāda. Above all, the adoration of God is very improbable for the atheistic system of the Śāṅkhya. It may be that Gauḍapāda has adopted the ordinary enumeration of the Yoga School.” Tak. S. K., P. 31.

protecting, decreasing, attachment and injury (in those objects). The internal: the internal non-attachment arises in the mind of that person who desires to get liberation, i.e., who becomes dispassionate by observing that even the Nature is like a magic or dream. Power is lordliness. It is of eight kinds:—animā, mahimā, garimā, laghimā, prāpti, prakāmyā, is’itva, vaś’itva and yatrakāmāsāyitva. Animā is the state of an atom. That is, a person (possessed of this power) wanders over the world in an atomlike minute form. Mahimā; (possessed of this power) a man wanders in large form. Laghimā; on account of becoming as light as the fibre of a lotus-stalk, (a person possessed of this power) can stay on the tips of the filaments of flowers. Prāpti; (a person possessed of this power) gets the desired object, wherever it may be. Prakāmyā; (a person possessed of this power) can do whatever he likes. Is’itva; (a person possessed of this power) reigns over all the three worlds on account of his lordliness. Vaś’itva; everything comes in the power (of the person possessed of this). Yatrakāmāsāyitva; (A person possessed of this power) can stand, sit or wander over anything, from Brahman to grass, wherever he desires. These four are the Sāttvika forms of the intellect. When Sattva overcomes Rajas and Tamas, then a man acquires these intellectual qualities of virtue and the rest.

And moreover, the Tāmasa form is the reverse of this. The Tāmasa form of intellect is the reverse of this, virtue and the rest. The reverse of virtue is vice; similarly, ignorance, attachment and absence of lordly powers (are the reverse of knowledge, non-attachment and lordly powers respectively). Thus, intellect having eight forms according to its Sāttvika and Tāmasa nature is born of the Unmanifest possessed of the three Attributes.

The definition of intellect has been given; now, the nature of ego is described:—
Kārikā XXIV

Ego is self-consciousness. Two kinds of creations proceed from it, viz., the group of eleven and the five-fold subtle elements.

The group of eleven: the eleven organs; and the group of subtle elements which is five-fold, i.e., endowed with the five characteristics, viz., endowed with the subtle elements of sound, touch, colour, taste and smell.

(What sort of) creation from what sort,—is now explained:

Kārikā XXV

From the Vaikṛta ego (proceeds) the group of eleven, characterised by Sattva. From the Bhūtādi ego (proceeds) the group of subtle elements which is Tāmasa. From the Taigasa ego (proceed) both.

When Rajas and Tamas are overcome by Sattva in the ego, then that ego is Sāttvika. The ancient teachers have named it Vaikṛta. From that Vaikṛta ego, the group of eleven, i.e., the group of eleven organs proceeds. Therefore, the organs are Sāttvika, pure and capable of apprehending their objects. Therefore, it is said:—the group of eleven characterised by Sattva.

And again, from Bhūtādi, the group of subtle elements, which is Tāmasa. When Sattva and Rajas are overcome by Tamas in the ego, then that ego is called Tāmasa. The ancient teachers have named it Bhūtādi. From that Bhūtādi ego, the group of five subtle elements proceeds. It is called Tāmasa, as it is the origin of the gross elements and abounds in Tamas; from this Bhūtādi proceeds the group of subtle elements.

And from Taigasa, both. When Sattva and Tamas are overcome by Rajas, then for this reason, that ego gets the name of Taigasa. From that Taigasa both are born. Both means, the group of (eleven) organs and the group of five subtle elements. The Sāttvika ego, becoming Vaikṛta, i.e., modified, takes the help of the Taigasa ego, at the time of producing the eleven organs. The Sāttvika ego is inactive; it is capable of producing the organs, (only) when united to Taigasa (ego). Similarly, the Tāmasa ego, termed as Bhūtādi and being inactive, produces the five subtle elements, (only) when united to the active Taigasa ego. Therefore it is said:—from Taigasa both. Thus, the Taigasa ego (in the company of Sāttvika and Tāmasa ones) produces the eleven organs and the five subtle elements.

It has been mentioned that the group of eleven (organs) is Sāttvika. What are the names of those, which are born of the modified Sāttvika ego?—This is explained:

Kārikā XXVI

The organs of sense are eye, ear, nose, tongue and skin. Speech, hands, feet, anus, and the organ of procreation are called the organs of action.

From eye up to skin are called the organs of sense. Sparśana, i.e., by which one touches, is the skin-organ. The word Sparśana is used in that sense. Therefore, the text reads—“Sparśanākāni”. They are called the five organs of sense, because they apprehend the five objects, viz., sound, touch, colour, taste and smell.

Speech, hands, feet, anus and the organ of procreation are called the organs of action. The organs of action are so called because they (perform) action. The speech utters, the hands variously act, the feet perform going and com-
ing, the anus execrates and the organ of procreation (produces) pleasure by procreating children.

Thus, on the basis of organs of sense and organs of action, ten organs have been described. What is the nature, and of what essence is the mind?—this is now explained:

Karika XXVII

Here, the mind is of the nature of both (organs of sense and action). It is determinative, and is also an organ on account of similarity. This diversity (of the organs) and the diversities of external things, arise from the specific modifications of the Attributes.

Here, in the set of organs, the mind is of the nature of both. Among the organs of sense, it is like an organ of sense; among the organs of action, it is like an organ of action. Why?—(Because) it determines the functioning of the organs of sense and action. Therefore, the mind is of the nature of both. Sankalpaka, because it determines.

Moreover, (it is an) organ on account of similarity. That is, on account of possessing similar characteristics. The organs of sense, as well as of action, proceeding along with the mind from the Sāttvika ego, bring about the similarity of the mind. On account of that similarity, the mind also is an organ. Thus, these eleven organs are produced from the Sāttvika or Vaikṣṭa ego. Then, what is the function of the mind? Determination is the function of mind. The functions of the organs of sense are sound and the rest. The functions of the organs of action are speech and the rest.

Now, are these different organs, apprehending different objects, created by God or are they self-generated?—Because, the Nature, intellect and ego are non-intelligent and the Spirit is also inactive.—In this connection it is replied. Herein, among the (followers of the) Saṁkhya (doctrine), there is a certain spontaneity as the cause (?). In this respect it is said.—The diversity (of the organs) and the external diversities arise from the specific modifications of the Attributes. These eleven organs (function in different objects):—sound, touch, colour, taste and smell (are the functions) of the five (organs of sense); speech, taking, walking, excretion and pleasure (are the functions) of the five (organs of action); and determination (is the function) of mind. Thus, these different objects of the different organs, arise from the specific modification of the Attributes. Guṇaparīṇāma is the modification of the Attributes. On account of its (i.e., of the modification) specification, arise the diversity (of organs) and the external diversities. So, this diversity is not caused by God, ego, intellect, Nature or the Spirit, but is caused by the spontaneous modification of the Attributes. But, can there be any activity among the Attributes, which are non-intelligent? Yes, there can be. As it will be pointed out in this very book.—

"Just as there is an activity in the non-intelligent milk for the growth of the calf, similarly, there is an activity in the Nature for bringing about the liberation of the soul." (Kār. 57).

So, the non-intelligent Attributes become modified as the eleven organs. The specifications also are caused by these (Attributes). Hence, the eye is placed at a higher place (in the body) for observation, and so are nose, ear, tongue (placed at their proper places in the body) for apprehending their particular objects; similarly, the organs of action are at their proper places for apprehending their particular objects.—only these (organs) are a result of the spontaneous modification of the Attributes.
butes, and not the objects of these organs (?). For, it is said in another text:—"The Attributes function in the Attributes." The functioning of the Attributes has the Attributes themselves as its own field. So, the external diversities are the result of only the Attributes, whose cause is Nature.

Now the various functions of the different organs are described:—

**Kārikā XXVIII**

The function of five (organs of sense) with respect to sound and the rest, is bare awareness; while the functions of (the other) five (organs of action) are speech, taking, walking, excretion and pleasure.

The word Mātra stands in the sense of 'uniqueness' or the exclusion of what is not specified; as in the sentence, 'alms alone are received,' that is, no other speciality; so the eye functions with respect to colour only and not to taste and the rest. Similar is the case with others. That is,—(the object) of eye is colour, of tongue is taste, of nose is smell, of ear is sound and of skin is touch;—thus the (field of) functioning of the organs of sense is described.

Now, the (field of) functioning of the organs of action is described:—Of (the other) five are speech, taking, walking, excretion and pleasure, i. e., of the organs of action. Of speech speaking, of hands taking, of feet walking, of anus excretion of the filth from the food eaten and of the organ of procreation pleasure and birth of progeny—are the objects or (the field of) functioning. This is the syntactic relation (of the sentence).

Now, the functions of intellect, ego and mind are described:—

**Kārikā XXIX**

The function of the three (internal organs) is the specific nature of each and it is not common (to the three). The common function of the organs is (the circulation of) the five vital airs, viz., Prāṇa and the rest.

The specific nature of each, means 'of the nature of its own characteristics'. The definition of intellect has been given as 'Determination is intellect' (Kār. 23); this is also the function of intellect. Similarly, "Ego is self-consciousness" (Kār. 24), is the definition of ego, and also the function of ego. "Mind is determinative" (Kār. 27), is the definition of mind; therefore, the function of mind is only determinativeness. (Thus) the function of the three, viz., intellect, ego and mind, is the specific nature of each.

Not common. Even that functioning of the organs of sense (as well as of action?) which has been explained before, is specific.

Now, the function which is common is explained. The common function of the organs. That is, the function of the organs which is common (to them). The five vital airs, viz., Prāṇa and the rest. The five vital airs, viz., Prāṇa, Apāṇa, Samāṇa, Udāna and Vṛūna are the common function of all the organs. For, the air named Prāṇa, resides inside the mouth and the nose; its circulation is the common function of all the thirteen organs. Since, the organs come into being when there is Prāṇa, Prāṇa, like a bird in a cage, gives motion to all. It is called Prāṇa, because of breathing. So Apāṇa is so called, because it takes away. Its circulation also is the common function of the organs. So, Samāṇa, residing in the centre (of the body), is so called because it distributes food and the rest properly. Similarly, Udāna is so called, because it
carries up, or draws or lifts. It resides between the naval and the head. The circulation of Udāna is the common function of all the organs. Moreover, that which pervades the body and divides its interior is Vyāna; and it is so called because it pervades the body like space. Its circulation is the common function of all the organs. Thus, these five airs are explained as the common function of all the organs, i.e., the common function of all the organs of thirteen kinds.

Kārika XXX

With regard to visible objects, the function of the four (the three internal organs and an organ of sense) is simultaneous and gradual. So, also, with regard to invisible objects the function of the three (internal organs) is preceded by that.

Of the four is simultaneous. Intellect, ego and mind, when united to any one of the organs become four. Of these four, there is simultaneous functioning with regard to visible objects. Intellect, ego, mind and the eye simultaneously perceive the form, that it is a post; intellect, ego, mind and the tongue simultaneously apprehend taste; intellect, ego, mind and the nose simultaneously apprehend the smell; so do the skin and the ears.

And of that, is also regarded as gradual; that is, there is also the gradual functioning of the four. For example, a man walking on the path, sees something from afar, and is beset with the doubt as to whether it is a post or a man. Then he sees some mark or a bird over it. Then in his doubtful mind arises the determining intellect that it is a post. Thence (comes the) ego for making it a certainty that it is certainly a post. Thus, the gradual functioning of intellect, ego, mind and the eyes is observed. As it is in the case of form, so it is in the case of sound and the rest. Visible means the visible objects.

Moreover, so also with regard to invisible objects the function of the three is preceded by that. In the invisible, i.e., the past and future forms, the functioning of the three, viz., intellect, ego and mind, is preceded by that (of) the eye; in the touch, it is preceded by that of the skin; in smell, it is preceded by that of the nose; in taste, it is preceded by that of the tongue; in sound, it is preceded by that of the ear. With regard to future and past, the functioning of intellect, ego and mind, preceded by that (of any other organ) is gradual; with regard to present, it is simultaneous as well as gradual.

Moreover—

Kārika XXXI

The organs perform their respective functions incited by mutual impulse. The motive (of their action) is the goal of the Spirit; an organ is not caused to function by anyone.

Śvām is repeated (in the sense of respectively theirs). Intellect, ego and mind (perform) their respective functions incited by mutual impulse.

Ākūta means respect or zeal. Intellect, ego, mind and the rest tend to bring about the goal of the Spirit. Intellect proceeds to its particular function after knowing the impulse of the ego.

If it be asked—what is the motive? (then we reply)—The motive is only the goal of the Spirit. The goal of the Spirit is to be achieved; for this purpose do the Attributes act. Therefore, these organs manifest the goal of the Spirit.
How do they act of their own accord when they are non-intelligent?—*An organ is not caused to function by anyone.* The meaning of the sentence is that only the goal of the Spirit causes them to function. The organs are not caused, *i.e.*, actuated by any superior Being.

Now it is described—Of how many kinds (the organs, *viz.*,), intellect and the rest are.

*Kārikā XXXII*

The organs are of thirteen kinds; their functions are seizing, retaining and manifesting. Their objects, (which are of the nature of) what is seized, retained and manifested, are tenfold.

The organs, *viz.*, *Mahat* and the rest, should be known to be of thirteen kinds. Five organs of sense, *viz.*, the eye and the rest; five organs of action, *viz.*, the speech and the rest; (and intellect, ego and mind);—these are the organs of thirteen kinds.

What are their functions?—It is replied:—*Their functions are seizing, retaining and manifesting.* Here, seizing and retaining are performed by the organs of action and manifesting by the organs of sense.

Of how many kinds are their objects?—It is replied:—*Their objects are tenfold.* The objects, *i.e.*, the functions to be performed by these organs, are tenfold, *i.e.*, of ten kinds. The ten kinds of objects, *viz.*, sound, touch, form, taste, smell, speaking, taking, walking, excretion and pleasure are manifested by the organs of sense and are seized and retained by the organs of action.

Moreover:—

*Kārikā XXXIII*

The internal organs are threefold: the *external (organs) are tenfold and they are the objects of the three (internal organs).* The external organs function in the present, and the internal organs function in all the three times.

*The internal organs, *viz.*, intellect, ego and mind, are threefold, distinguished as *Mahat* and the rest.*

*And the external (organs) are tenfold. The five organs of sense and the five organs of action,—these are the tenfold external organs.*

*They are the objects of the three.* That is, they are the objects of enjoyment by intellect, ego and mind.

*Function in the present.* The ear hears only the present sound and not the past or the future; the eye sees only the present form and not the past or the future; the skin (touches) the present touch; the tongue (tastes) the present taste; the nose (smells) the present smell. Similarly, the organs of action: the speech utters the present word and not the past or the future; the hands take the present jar and not the past or the future; the feet walk on the present road and not on the past or the future; the anus and the organs of procreation perform excretion and produce pleasure in the present and not in the past or the future. Thus, the external organs are said (to function) in the present.

*The internal organs function in all the three times.* Intellect, ego and mind apprehend their objects in all the three times. The intellect cognises the jar in the present, past and future times. The ego is self-conscious of the present, past and future. Similarly, the mind ponders
over the present, past and future. Thus, the internal organs function in all the three times.

Now it is explained, which of the organs apprehend specific objects and which non-specific:—

**Kārikā XXXIV**

Of these, the five organs of sense apprehend specific and non-specific objects. Speech has sound (alone) for its object. The rest, on the other hand, have five objects.

*The organs of sense.* They apprehend specific objects (in the case of human beings). The human organs of sense apprehend specific objects, viz., sound, touch, form, taste and smell, endowed with pleasure, pain and delusion. In the case of gods (the organs of sense) manifest non-specific objects.

Again, among the organs of action, *the speech has sound for its object.* The speech of gods as well as of human beings, utters verses and the rest. Therefore, the organ of speech is similar in the case of gods and human beings.

*The rest also,* viz., with the exclusion of speech, termed as hands, feet, anus and the organs of procreation, *have five for their objects.* Pañcaviṣayāni means those which have five, viz., sound and the rest, as their objects. Sound, touch, form, taste and smell are present in the hands. The feet walk over the ground endowed with the five, viz., sound and the rest. The anus excretes that which is endowed with the five (sound and the rest.). Similarly, the organ of procreation produces pleasure by the semen endowed with the five characteristics (of sound and the rest.)

---

**Kārikā XXXV**

Since the intellect along with the internal organs apprehends all the objects, these three (internal) organs are the gate-keepers and the rest are the gates.

*Intellect along with the internal organs,* i.e., along with ego and mind. Since apprehends all the objects, apprehends sound and the rest in all the three times: therefore, these three (internal) organs are the gate-keepers, and the rest are the gates;...the (word) ‘organs’ is understood in the sentence.

And further:—

**Kārikā XXXVI**

These (organs which are the) specific modifications of the (three) attributes, (and which are) different from one another, disclose all the objects like a lamp and present them to the intellect for the sake of the Spirit.

All the organs mentioned (above) are the specific modifications of the attributes. What is their characteristic? (They) are *like a lamp;* that is, they disclose all the objects like a lamp.

*Different from one another,* i.e., dissimilar or having different objects. That is, they have (the modifications of) the Attributes as their objects.

*Specific modifications of the Attributes,* i.e., born of the Attributes.

*All for the sake of the Spirit.* The organs of sense, the organs of action, ego and mind, having disclosed their respective objects, present them to the intellect i.e., place them in the intellect. Because, the Spirit apprehends pleasure and the rest, arising from the objects when they are placed in the intellect.

And also:—

S. K. 4
Kārika XXXVII

As it is the intellect which brings about the entire enjoyment (of objects), so it is again that (very intellect) which discriminates the subtle difference between the Nature and the Spirit.

Entire means the objects of all the organs in all the three times. Enjoyment (means) respective enjoyment. Since, the intellect along with the internal organs brings about or effects (the enjoyment) through the organs of sense and action of gods, human beings and animals, so it is again that (very intellect) which discriminates or distinguishes between the province of the Nature and that of the Spirit: the difference between the Nature and the Spirit means diversity.

Subtle means, which cannot be grasped by people who have not practised austerities...This is the Nature, the state of equilibrium of Sattva, Rajas and Tamas; this is intellect, this is ego, these are the five subtle elements, the eleven organs and the five gross elements; this another one is the Spirit different from all these; thus does the intellect explain by complying with which salvation is attained.

It has been mentioned above that (the five organs of sense apprehend) "specific and non-specific objects" (Kār. 34). Next is explained, which are the objects:

Kārika XXXVIII

The subtle elements are non-specific, from these five, the five gross elements are produced. The latter are called specific and are tranquil, violent and delusive.

The five subtle elements produced from ego are:—
The subtle element of sound, the subtle element of touch, the subtle element of form, the subtle element of taste and the subtle element of smell. These are called non-specific. They are the objects of the gods (i.e., apprehended only by the gods), have the characteristic of pleasure and are devoid of pain and delusion.

From these five subtle elements, the five gross elements termed as earth, water, fire, air and ether are produced. These are called specific. From the subtle element of smell, earth; from the subtle element of taste, water; from the subtle element of touch, wind; from the subtle element of sound, ether; thus these gross elements are produced.

These specific objects are apprehended by men, and are tranquil, i.e., have the characteristic of pleasure, violent, i.e., have the characteristic of pain, and delusive i.e., produce delusion. Just as the ethereal element is tranquil, i.e., gives pleasure to a man coming out of a closed room; (and the same becomes violent, i.e., gives pain to a man who is affected by cold, heat, wind and rain);* and the same becomes delusive, i.e., produces delusion in the mind of a man who loses his way in the forest; similarly, wind is tranquil to a person oppressed by heat, violent to a person oppressed by a cold and delusive when mixed with sand and dust. The same may be said of fire and the rest.

The other non-specific objects are:—

Kārika XXXIX

Subtle (elements) those born of parents and the gross elements are the threefold specific objects. Of these, the subtle are permanent, while those born of parents are perishable.

* The following line has been left out in the text by mistake:—

"तद्दृशः शैललोकाभिःतप्रभृतिस्य दुःखार्थं धीरं भवति"
...Subtle, i.e., the subtle elements; composed of which and characterised by Mahat and the rest, the subtle bodies always exist and undergo transmigration; they are subtle.

And those born of parents which aggregate (i.e., compose) the gross bodies;—they compose the gross body inside the womb by the mixture of the seminal fluids of parents, cohabiting after the menses. That subtle body is then nourished through the umbilical chord by the various saps of food and drink taken by the mother.

The body thus commenced by the three specific objects, viz., the subtle elements, those born of parents and the gross elements, becomes furnished with back, stomach, thighs, chest, head and the rest, and is enveloped in six sheaths. It is endowed with blood, flesh, tendons, semen, bones and marrow, and is composed of five gross elements;—ether provides space (for the body), wind provides growth, fire provides cooking, water provides aggregation and earth provides stability. Thus endowed with all the limbs, the body comes out of mother's womb. Thus, these are the threefold specific objects.

Now the author states, which (of the specific objects named above) are permanent and which temporary:—The subtle ones called tanmātrās are permanent, i.e., lasting, among them. The body commenced by them and impelled by actions (performed in a previous birth), migrates into the species of animals, deer, birds, reptiles and immobile objects; impelled by virtuous actions, it migrates to the regions of Indra and others. Thus, this subtle body migrates till discriminative wisdom is not attained. After achieving this wisdom a wise man leaves the body and attains salvation. Therefore, these subtle specific objects are permanent.

Those born of parents are perishable:—(The elements which are) born of parents perish in this very world, leaving the subtle body at the time of death. At the time of death, the body born of parents is left behind and its elements are dissolved into the earth and the rest.

Now the author explains the way in which the subtle body migrates:

Kārikā XL

The subtle (body) Liṅga, formed primevally, unimpeded, permanent, composed of intellect and the rest down to the subtle elements, incapable of enjoyment, migrates and is endowed with dispositions.

When the Universe is uncreated, then at the first creation of the Nature, the subtle body is formed.

Moreover, (it is) unimpeded: that is, it is not attached to the states of beasts, gods and men. On account of subtlety, it is not impeded anywhere. It migrates or moves, with its gait unimpeded through the mountains and the rest.

Niyatam, i.e., permanent. It migrates till the (discriminative) knowledge is not attained.

That is composed of Mahat and the rest down to subtle elements. Mahādādi means which is preceded by Mahat, i.e., intellect, ego, mind and the five subtle elements;—down to the subtle, i.e., subtle elements, it migrates or moves through the three worlds like an ant on the body of Śiva.

Incapable of enjoyment, i.e., devoid of enjoyment. That subtle body becomes capable of enjoyment, because it assumes activity through the aggregation of the external body born of parents.

Endowed with disposition. The dispositions, viz., Dharma and the rest, we shall explain hereafter; 'endowed with them' (means) 'affected by them.'
Liṅgam—At the time of dissolution, the Mahat and the rest down to the subtle elements, along with the organs, merge in the Nature; when not migrating they remain intact in Nature till creation; that is, tied down by the bonds of delusion in the Nature, they are incapable of actions of migration and rest. Therefore, the subtle liṅga (i.e., mergent) migrates again at the time of creation.

If it be asked,—why do the thirteen organs migrate,—the author replies.—

Kārikā XLIII

Just as a picture does not exist without a substrate, or a shadow without a post and the like, so the liṅga does not subsist supportless, without the non-specific (i.e., subtle body).

Just as a picture does not subsist without a substrate of the wall; just as a shadow does not subsist, i.e., cannot exist without a post and the like, i.e., a stake and the like. The word ādi comprises (of other illustrations also), viz., just as there can be no coolness without water, or water without coolness; fire without heat; wind without touch; ether without space; earth without smell; similarly, (it is so).

According to this illustration, without the non-specific, i.e., without the non-specific subtle elements, (the liṅga) does not subsist. Here, the gross elements, i.e., the body formed of five gross elements, are the specific. For, where can the liṅga (the subtle body) exist, if there be specific (i.e., gross body)? How can it renounce one body and take another?

Supportless, viz., the supportless liṅga, i.e., the thirteen organs.

For what purpose is the liṅga embodied is further explained:—

Kārikā XLII

For the purpose of the Spirit, the liṅga, through its connection with the means and their results, and with the aid of the might of Nature, acts like an actor.

The Nature functions because the aim of the Spirit is to be achieved. That (aim) is twofold:—The apprehension of sound and the rest; and the attainment of discrimination between the Spirit and the Attributes. The apprehension of sound and the rest is the attainment of enjoyment of sound and the rest in the regions of Brahman and the like. The attainment of discrimination between the Spirit and the Attributes is salvation. Therefore, it is said that this subtle body is active for the purpose of the Spirit.

Through its connection with the means and their results. The means are Virtue and the rest, the results are ascending the heaven and so forth;—they will be explained further. Prasangena means through its connection.

With the aid of the might of Nature i.e., Pradhāna. Just as a king, being mighty in his kingdom, does whatever he likes, similarly, on account of the supreme authority of Nature over everything (the liṅga) acts through its connection with the means and their results. (That is, the Nature) determines (the conditions of) liṅga in assuming the different bodies.

Liṅgam—The subtle body composed of minute particles, i.e., the subtle elements, and endowed with
thirteen-fold organs, acts in the bodies of gods, men and beasts. How?—Like an actor. Just as an actor entering behind the scenes comes out as a god, then as a man, and afterwards as a buffoon, so the subtle body, through its connection with the means and their results, enters the womb and comes out as an elephant, a woman or a man.

It was stated that endowed with dispositions, the liṅga migrates; now the author explains the dispositions:

**Kārika XLIII**

The dispositions, viz., virtue and the rest, are connate, natural and acquired. They subsist in the instrument (i.e., intellect). The embryo and the rest subsist in the effect (i.e., the body).

The dispositions are considered to be of three kinds:… Connate, natural and acquired. The connate dispositions are virtue, knowledge, non-attachment and power, and they were born along with the revered Kapila at the first creation. The natural ones are described:—Sanaka, Sanandana, Śāntāna and Sanatkumāra were the four sons of Bhraman. These dispositions were produced with them, who were invested with bodies of sixteen years of age, and whose (disposition) were a result of the relation of cause and effect (i.e., as a result of the merits performed in previous birth); therefore, these dispositions are called natural. The acquired dispositions (are to be found in men) like us, to whom the knowledge comes from the corporeal frame of a teacher; from knowledge, non-attachment is produced; from non-attachment, virtue arises; and from virtue, power is attained. As the corporeal frame of a teacher is a product of Nature, so these dispositions are called acquired.—Endowed with these (dispositions), the subtle body migrates. These four dispositions are Sattviṇa; the Tāmasa ones are the reverse; they have been explained in—“This is the Sattviṇa form and the Tāmasa is its reverse.” (Κα. 28). Thus, the dispositions are eight:—Virtue, knowledge, non-attachment, power, vice, ignorance, attachment and absence of power.

Wherein do the eight dispositions subsist?…They are seen to subsist in the instrument. Intellet is the instrument; they subsist in that. This has been explained in: “intellect is determination, virtue, knowledge,” etc. (Κα. 23).

The effect is body, subsisting in that are embryo and the rest, which have been referred to before as born of mother. With the union of sperm and ovum, are produced embryo and the rest, viz., bubble, flesh, muscles etc., which cause the growth of the body; and the state of infancy, youth and old age are produced as a result of the saps of food and drink. Therefore, they are called as subsisting in the effect, and are caused by the enjoyment of objects like food and the rest.

Next is explained what has been said before, viz., “Through its connection with the means and their results”. (Κα. 42).

**Kārika XLIV**

Through virtue (comes about) going upwards, and through vice, going downwards; through knowledge salvation (is acquired), and through the reverse (i.e., ignorance) the bondage.

Through virtue going upwards. A man goes upwards through the instrumentality of virtue. Upwards stands for the eight regions viz., of Bhraman, of Prajāpati, of Soma, of Indra, of the Gandharvas, of the Yaksas, of the Rak-
sasas and of the Piśācas. There the subtle body goes. For migrating to the bodies of animals, deer, birds, reptiles and immobile objects, the instrument is vice.

And again, through knowledge salvation is acquired: Salvation is the knowledge of the twenty-five principles. By this instrument (of knowledge), salvation is brought about. Then the subtle body ceases and (the Spirit) is called the Supreme Spirit.

Through the reverse the bondage. Ignorance is the instrument; the effect is the bondage called prākṛta (connate), Vaikṛta (natural) and dākṣina (personal); this will be explained further. It is also said—"He who is bound by the connate, natural and personal bondages, is not liberated by anything else (except the knowledge)."

And there are other instruments also:......

Kārikā XLV

Through non-attachment (comes about) the absorption into nature; through passionate attachment, migration; through power, unimpediment: and through the reverse, its contrary.

Suppose, one is possessed of non-attachment, but has no knowledge of the principles. Then, through that non-attachment preceded by ignorance, comes about the absorption into Nature. After his death, such a person is absorbed into the eight evolvents, i.e., the Nature, intellect, ego and the five subtle elements, and gets no liberation. He migrates again.

And, even as regards this Rājas (passionate) attachment, e.g., 'I perform the sacrifice, and give gifts so that I may enjoy divine and human happiness in Heaven and on this earth'. From this passionate attachment, results migration.

And through power, unimpediment. The power is eightfold, and comprises of anīmā and the rest. From the instrumentality of power, results unimpediment, i.e., there is no obstacle to power in the regions of Brahman and the rest.

And last, through the reverse, contrary: The contrary of that unimpediment, i.e., impediment, results. On account of absence of power, obstacles come in everywhere.

Thus sixteen effects along with their means have been explained. Now, what is their nature, is next explained:—

Kārikā XLVI

This is a creation of intellect, and is distinguished as ignorance, incapacity, contentment and attainment. On account of the conflict among the inequalities of the attributes, this (creation) has fifty varieties.

This sixteen-fold aggregate of the means and effects, which has been explained before, is called a creation of intellect. Pratyāya stands for intellect, (which has been explained in)..."Intelligence is determination, virtue, knowledge," etc. (Kār. 23).

This creation of intellect is divided into four classes:—Ignorance, incapacity, contentment, and attainment. Ignorance is doubt as when a man after seeing a post is in doubt whether it is a post or a mar. Incapacity; e.g., even after observing that post well, he cannot remove his doubt. The third is called contentment; e.g., when a person does not want to know or to be in doubt about the same post, thinking, what have I to do with this. The fourth is called attainment; e.g., when a person with delighted senses,
sees that post surmounted by a creeper or a bird, he attains (the knowledge) that it is a post.

Thus, on account of the conflict among the inequalities of the Attributes, there are fifty varieties of that creation of intellect. This conflict endowed with (i.e., among) the inequalities of Sattva, Rajas and Tamas—from this, there arise fifty varieties of intellect. Somewhere Sattva predominates and Rajas and Tamas are subordinate, somewhere Rajas predominates and somewhere Tamas.

The varieties are described:

Kārikā XLVII

Five are the varieties of ignorance; due to defect in organs, there are twenty-eight varieties of incapacity; contentment is of nine kinds and attainment is eight-fold.

Five varieties of ignorance, are Tamas (obscenity), Moha (delusion), Mahāmoha (extreme delusion), Tāmisra (gloom) and Andhakāmāsira (utter darkness). Their varieties will be presently explained.

Of the incapacity there are twenty-eight varieties, due to defect in organs. They also will be explained.

Contentment is of nine kinds, viz., the kinds of knowledge characterised by Rajas in an ascetic.

Attainment is eight-fold, viz., the kinds of knowledge characterised by Sattva in an ascetic. All this will be explained in order.

Now the varieties of ignorance are described:

Kārikā XLVIII

The varieties of obscurity and delusion are eight, extreme delusion is of ten kinds, gloom and utter darkness are eighteen-fold.

Obscurity is of eight kinds. Final dissolution is differentiated by ignorance. A man merges into the eight evolvents, viz., the Nature, intellect, ego and the five subtle elements. When merged in these if he thinks, 'I am liberated' (then) this is called (the variety of) obscurity.

The varieties of the eight-fold delusion are also eight. The gods like Indra and the rest do not obtain liberation on account of attachment to eight-fold power; but after the destruction of this (power) they again migrate. This is eight-fold delusion.

The extreme delusion is of ten kinds. Sound, touch, form, taste and smell,—these five are the objects of enjoyment for the gods; these five, viz., sound and the rest, are the objects of enjoyment for men also. Thus extreme delusion arises with regard to these ten.

The gloom is eighteen-fold. Eight-fold power and the ten objects of human and divine enjoyment,—they make up eighteen. When people approve of their increase and disapprove of their decrease, then arise the states of eighteen-fold gloom.

Again, as the eight-fold power and the ten-fold human and divine objects go to make up gloom, similarly the utter darkness is also eighteen-fold. But (the difference is that) when a person dies at the moment of enjoying the abundance of sensual pleasures or falls from the eight-fold power, then profound grief comes to him. This is utter gloom. Thus the five varieties of ignorance, viz., obscurity and the rest, are severally divided and go to make up the sixty-two varieties.

The varieties of incapacity are explained:
Kārikā XLIX

Injuries of the eleven organs along with those of intellect are termed as incapacity. The seventeen injuries of intellect result from the inversion of contentment and attainment.

"There are twenty-eight varieties of incapacity due to the defect of organs,"—this has been said above (in Kār. 47). The injuries of the eleven organs are—deafness, blindness, paralysis, loss of taste, loss of smell, dumbness mutilation (of arm), lameness, constipation, impotence and insanity.

Along with those of intellect are termed as incapacity. Along with the injuries of intellect, the varieties of incapacity are twenty-eight.

Seventeen are the injuries of intellect. These seventeen injuries result from the inversion of contentment and attainment. The varieties of contentment are nine, and those of attainment are eight; along with the inversion of these, the injuries of the eleven organs go to make up the twenty-eight-fold incapacity.

The order of the varieties is to be observed as laid down in, "From the inversion of contentment and attainment." (Kār. 49). The nine-fold contentment is now described:—

Kārikā L

Contentment is said to be of nine kinds: four internal, viz., prakṛti (Nature), upādāna (Means), kāla (Time), and bhāgya (Luck) and five external, viz., those due to aversion from the objects of senses.

There are four kinds of internal contentment. The word adhīyatma means residing in the self. They are Nature, Means, Time and Luck. Now, what is termed as Nature (is explained):—for example, a man knows about the Nature and about its having the Attributes or otherwise; if he remains content with the knowledge of the Nature and its effects, then he cannot get liberation; this is called the Nature-contentment. That what is called the Means (is explained);—e. g., when a man without understanding the (twenty-five) principles, gets hold of the means (of asceticism) and thinks that salvation is attained by a triple staff, a pot and vidīkā (?) then he also does not obtain liberation; this is called the Means-contentment. Now the Time-contentment (is explained); e. g., (when a man thinks), well, I shall get salvation in time; what is the use of practising (the knowledge of) the principles;—such contentment is called Time-contentment and such a person gets no liberation. Similarly, the Luck-contentment is:—when a person thinks that salvation will be attained by luck; this is Luck-contentment. Thus, (this) contentment is four-fold.

The five external, due to aversion from the objects of senses. The external contentment arises from the aversion to the five objects of senses. A person feels aversion to sound, touch, form, taste and smell, seeing that these have the evils of acquiring, protecting, waste, attachment and injury. For one’s prosperity, one should pasture the cattle, engage in trade, accept gifts and engage in service; these are the troubles of acquiring. There is trouble in protecting the acquired objects. Things become wasted by enjoyment; this is the trouble of waste. The senses can never have any cessation from attachment to sensual pleasures; this is the evil of attachment. There can be no enjoyment without causing injury to the living beings; this is the evil of injury. Thus, aversion from five objects of senses, resulting from seeing the evils of acquiring and the rest, is five-fold (external) contentment.
Thus there are nine kinds of contentment according to internal and external varieties. In other works they are named as Ambhas, Salila, Ogha, Vṛṣṭi, Sutamas, Pāra, Sunetra, Nārika and Anuttamāṁbhāsika. From the inversion of these kinds of contentment, constituting the varieties of incapacity, the injuries of intellect arise. By such inversion the injuries of intellect are called:—Anambhas, Asalila, Anogha and so on.

Now Attainment is defined:

Kārika LI

The eight Attainments are reasoning, oral instruction, study, the three-fold suppression of misery, intercourse of friends and gifts. Those mentioned before (ignorance, incapacity and contentment) are the three-fold curb on attainments.

Reasoning; e.g., somebody might daily reason: What is true here? What is the future? What is the highest good? By doing what can I attain my goal?—While pondering like that he attains the knowledge that the Spirit is quite distinct from the Nature; intellect is quite distinct; ego is quite different; the subtle elements, the organs and the five gross elements are quite different. Such knowledge of the principles arises, from which salvation is attained. This is the first Attainment termed as Reasoning.

From the knowledge obtained by oral instruction proceeds the knowledge about the Nature, Spirit, intellect, ego, the subtle elements, the organs and the five gross elements. Thence arises salvation. This is the Attainment known as Oral Instruction.

From Study, i.e., the study of the scriptures like the Vedas and the rest, one attains the knowledge of the twenty-five principles and afterwards salvation. This is the third Attainment.

The three-fold suppression of misery. In order to destroy the internal, external and divine miseries, when a person goes to a teacher, and after getting instruction from him gets salvation;—then this constitutes the fourth Attainment. This should be split up into three, on account of the three-foldness of misery. Thus, (they make up) six Attainments.

And intercourse of the friends; e.g., a person attains salvation through the knowledge (got) from a friend. This is the seventh Attainment.

Gifts. For example, a person helps the holy men by making gifts of dwelling, medicine, triple staff, bowl, food, clothes and the rest to them; he gets knowledge from them and attains salvation. This is the eighth Attainment.

In other treatises these eight Attainments are termed as:—Tāra, Sutāra, Tāratāra, Pramoda, Pramudita, Pramodamanā, Ramyaka and Sadāpramudita. The injuries of intellect arising from the inversion of these (Attainments) are included under Incapacity. They are Atāra, Asutāra, Atāratāra and so on.

The varieties of Incapacity have been mentioned to be twenty-eight. They are the injuries of intellect along with the eleven injuries of organs. The injuries of intellect are seventeen in number, viz., nine contraries of Contentment and eight contraries of Attainment. Along with these, the injuries of organs make up the twenty-eight varieties of Incapacity mentioned before. Thus the varieties of Ignorance, Incapacity, Contentment and Attainment have been stated and explained.

Again, those mentioned before are the three-fold curb on Attainment. Ignorance, Incapacity and Contentment, which are (mentioned) before Attainment (in Kār. 46), are
the curb and are three-fold on account of their being of three sorts. Just as an elephant is curbed by a man with a goad in his hand, so people curbed by Ignorance, Incapacity and Contentment suffer from ignorance. Therefore, leaving aside these, Attainment (alone) should be pursued. A person endowed with Attainment, acquires knowledge and thence salvation.

It was stated: “The subtle body is endowed with dispositions,” (Kār. 40); the eight dispositions, viz., Virtue and the rest, which are the modifications of intellect and which are again modified as Ignorance, Incapacity, Contentment and Attainment, have been described. This is the creation of intellect known as “dispositions”. “Liṅga” has also been mentioned as the creation of the subtle elements ending with the fourteen kinds of created beings. Now, when the aim of the Spirit can be attained by one sort of creation only, where is the necessity of both kinds of creations?—This is explained:

Kārikā LII

There can be no Liṅga without dispositions, nor elaboration of dispositions without Liṅga. Therefore, proceeds the two-fold creation, viz., that of Liṅga and that of dispositions.

Without dispositions,—the creation of intellect,—there can be no liṅga—the creation of the subtle elements. Because every successive body is acquired by the impressions of the actions performed in previous birth.

Without liṅga—the creation of intellect,—there can be no elaboration of dispositions; because, Virtue and the rest can be acquired by the (formation of) subtle and gross bodies. The mutual dependence of these two, like that of seed and sprout, is not a fault, because the creation is beginningless; and although the different species stand in need (of mutual dependence), the different individuals do not. Therefore, two-fold creation proceeds, namely, that of liṅga and that of dispositions.

Moreover:

Kārikā LIII

The divine class has eight varieties, the sub-human has five and the human has one (only). Such, in brief, is this creation.

The divine is of eight varieties, viz., Brāhma, Prājāpatya, Saumya, Aintra, Gāndharva, Yāka, Rāksasa and Paisāca. Animals, deer, birds, reptiles and immobile beings,—this is the five-fold sub-human (variety). There is only one human race. These are the fourteen varieties of living beings.

The three Attributes pervade all the three worlds. Now it is explained:—what is supreme in which world:

Kārikā LIV

Above, there is predominance of Satvā; below, the creation abounds in Tamas; in the midst, the Rajas predominates; (this is so) from Brahman down to stock.

Above; i.e., in the eight regions of gods, (the creation) is sattvasīla, i.e., has prevalence of Satvā; (in other words), has excessiveness or predominance of Satvā. (Of course), Rajas and Tamas also reside there.

Below (the creation) abounds in Tamas. From animals down to immobile beings, the entire creation is pervaded.
by Tamas in excess. (Of course), even there Sattva and Rajas are present.

In the midst, i.e., in human creation, Rajas is strong. Even here, Sattva and Tamas are present. Therefore, human beings are mostly in pain.

Thus, from Brahman down to stock, i.e., from Brahman down to immobile beings. Thus, non-elemental creation, creation of the subtle elements, creation of dispositions, creation of the gross elements and the divine, sub-human and human creations are the sixteen varieties of creation produced by the Nature.

---

Kārikā LV

There, the intelligent Spirit experiences pain due to old age and death, till the cessation of the Liṅga; hence misery is of the nature of things.

There, i.e., in the divine, sub-human and human bodies; misery produced by old age and produced by death, is experienced by the intelligent Spirit, and not by the Nature, or intellect, or ego, or the subtle elements, or the organs, or the gross elements.

Now, (the author) discusses—How long does the Spirit suffer from misery? Till the cessation of the Liṅga. As long as the Mahat and the rest, which manifest themselves after entering the subtle body, do not cease, i.e., (as long as) this migratory body (does not cease), so long, in brief, does the Spirit experience pain due to old age and death in the three worlds. Till the cessation of liṅga (means), till the subtle body has ceased to be. After the cessation of the subtle body there is salvation; after the attainment of salvation there is no misery. By what is it (the subtle body) removed? By the attainment of the knowledge of twenty-five principles in the shape of the distinctness of the Nature from the Spirit. By such knowledge, i.e., this is Nature, this is intellect, this is ego, these are the five gross elements, different and distinct from which is the Spirit,—the subtle body ceases to be, and then the salvation is attained.

Next is explained the purpose of Nature’s activity or effort:

---

Kārikā LVI

Thus, this effort in the activity of the Nature, beginning from Mahat down to the gross elements, is for the liberation of each Spirit; (and although) it is for another’s benefit (yet) it seems as if it were for itself.

The phrase ityāsah (this one), implies ‘finishing’ and ‘pointing out’. Praktikaṁtau means, in the instrumentality or the activity of the Nature. This effort, beginning from Mahat down to the gross elements—from Nature intellect, from intellect ego; from ego the subtle elements and eleven organs; from the subtle elements the five gross elements; this one—

(Is) for the liberation of each Spirit i.e., for every Spirit which has assumed divine, sub-human or human forms; for the liberation (of these Spirits) is the effort (of the Nature).

How?—(Although) this effort is for another’s benefit, (yet) it seems as if it were for itself. The Nature behaves like that man who forsakes his own business and performs that of his friend. The Spirit in no way does any good to Nature in return. It is, as if it were for itself, not actually for itself i.e., for another’s benefit. The benefit
is the acquisition of the objects of senses like sound and rest, and the comprehension of distinctness between the Attributes (i.e., Nature) and the Spirit. The effort of the Nature is for this purpose.—In all the three worlds, the Spirits are to be supplied with the objects of senses like sound and the rest, and at the end (the Spirits are to be provided) with salvation. As it is said: “The Nature is like a jar and having fulfilled the purpose of the Spirit, it ceases.”

It may be argued that the Nature is non-intelligent and the Spirit is ignorant. Then, how can the Nature act like an intelligent principle, thinking, ‘I should supply the Spirit with the objects of senses like sound and the rest in all the three worlds, and (should) provide (the Spirit) with liberation at the end’? True, (we reply). Because activity and cessation (from activity) have been observed in the case of non-intelligent things also; therefore, says the author, (the Nature acts):—

**Kārikā LVII**

As non-intelligent milk functions for the nourishment of calf, so does the Nature function for the liberation of the Spirit.

Just as grass and the like consumed by a cow and modified as milk nourish the calf and after its nourishment cease, so does the Nature (function) for the liberation of the Spirit. Thus, there is activity in the non-intelligent (Nature).

Moreover,

**Kārikā LVIII**

As people engage in action for relieving desires, so does the Unmanifest for liberating the Spirit.

As people having some favourite desire, for relieving that desire, engage in action, i.e., the activity in the shape of going and coming, and after its accomplishment desist, so, for liberating the Spirit, the Nature ceases to function after having effected the purpose of the Spirit which is two-fold, viz., one, the enjoyment of the objects of senses like sound and the rest; and the other, the knowledge of the distinctness of the Attributes (i.e., the Nature) from the Spirit.

And again,

**Kārikā LIX**

As a dancer desists from dancing after showing herself to the audience, so the Nature desists after showing itself to the Spirit.

As a dancer, having exhibited to the audience the episodes which are set to music in the form of songs, and which are full of the sentiments of love and the like, by means of her graceful movements, desists from dancing after discharging her duty, so also does the Nature, having exhibited itself to the Spirit in the different characters of intellect, ego, the subtle elements and the gross elements desist.

Next is explained—How and what is the cause of the cessation of (the activity of) Nature:—
Kārikā LX

Generous Nature, endowed with the Attributes, without any benefit to itself, causes by manifold means the benefit of the Spirit which is devoid of the Attributes and which confers no benefit in return.

*By manifold means does the Nature benefit the Spirit* which *Spirit confers no benefit in return*. In what way (does the Nature benefit)?—By transforming itself into divine, sub-human and human forms; (by transforming itself) into pleasure, pain and delusion, and by (transforming itself) into the objects of senses in the shape of sound and the rest.

In this way, having exhibited itself (to the Spirit) by manifold means,—‘I am one; thou art another’—, the Nature desists. Thus, *it causes the benefit of the eternal Spirit without any benefit to itself*. Just as a generous person does good to all and wants no good in return, so does the Nature effect the purpose of the Spirit, without any return.

It was said above (under Kār. 59):—“The Nature desists after exhibiting itself.” Next is explained what it does after having desisted:

Kārikā LXI

Nothing in my opinion is more modest than Nature, who because (of thinking that) “I have been seen”, never again exposes itself to the view of the Spirit.

In this world, *nothing is more modest than Nature,—such is my opinion*. Because, such an idea (to be stated below), arose for another (i.e., the Spirit). Why? “I have been seen by this Spirit”, thinking so, the Nature *never exposes itself to the view of the Spirit*, i.e., becomes invisible to the Spirit. Now the characteristic of being more modest is explained. Some advocate God to be the cause:—

“*The ignorant being is helpless with regard to his pleasure and pain. He goes to heaven or hell, as impelled by God.*” (Mbh. III, 30. 88).

Others who advocate Spontaneity as the cause, say:—

“Who whitened the swans? Who made the peacocks variegated?” (The reply is), the Spontaneity alone. Here, the teachers of Śaṅkhya say in this connection:—

How can the beings endowed with the Attributes be created by God who is Attributeless? Or, how even by the Attributeless Spirit? Therefore, (the causality) of the Nature is proper. Just as from white yarn, only white cloth is produced and from black yarn, only black cloth, so it is inferred that the three worlds endowed with the three Attributes, proceed from the Nature endowed with the three Attributes. God is Attributeless; therefore, production of this world endowed with the three Attributes is illogical from Him. This explains (away also the possibility of) the Spirit (being regarded as a cause). Some regard Time as the cause; it is said:—

“Time rears (lit. cooks) the beings; Time withdraws the world; Time is awake while the others sleep: Time is not to be surpassed.”

(To this we reply)—There are (only) three categories, *viz.*, the Manifest, the Unmanifest and the Knower. Time also is included under (one of) them. Time is Manifest. (And as) the Nature is the producer of all, (so) it must be the cause of Time also. Spontaneity is also included there. Therefore, neither Spontaneity nor Time is the cause; the Nature alone is the cause and there is no other cause of the Nature.

*Does not again come within the view of the Spirit.* Therefore, in my opinion, there is no other cause, like
Išvara and the rest which may be more modest, more enjoyable than the Nature.

But if it be urged that it is a practice in this world to say that the Spirit is liberated, the Spirit migrates.—To this the author replies:—

Kārikā LXII

Therefore, not any (Spirit) is bound or liberated, nor (does any) migrate. It is the Nature, abiding in manifold forms, that migrates or is bound or liberated.

For this reason, the Spirit is not bound or liberated, nor does it migrate: because, it is the Nature alone, abiding in manifold forms, i.e., abiding in divine, human and sub-human forms, which is bound or liberated or migrates in the forms of intellect, ego, the subtle elements, the organs and the gross elements.

If the Spirit is spontaneously liberated and is all-pervading, then why does it migrate? The migration is for the purpose of acquiring that which is not previously attained. (To this the reply is)—The phrases, 'the Spirit is bound', 'the Spirit is liberated', 'the Spirit migrates', are used because (the nature of) migration is not (properly) understood (by people). By discriminating between the Spirit and the Nature, the real character of the Spirit is manifested. After its manifestation, the Spirit becomes single, liberated and established in its own nature.

Well, if the Spirit is not bound, then it is not even liberated. To this we reply:—It is the Nature alone which binds or liberates itself. For, wherever, the subtle body, endowed with the subtle elements and the three-fold internal organs, exists, such body is bound by triple bondage. As it has already been said:—(under Kār. 44)—

“'He who is bound by the connate, natural and personal bondages is not liberated by anything else (except knowledge)’.

And that subtle body is endowed with Virtue and Vice.

How is it that the Nature is bound, the Nature is liberated and the Nature migrates?—It is replied:—

Kārikā LXIII

The Nature binds itself by itself through seven forms alone; the same (Nature), for the purpose of the Spirit, liberates itself through one form.

Through seven forms alone. These seven (forms) are:—Virtue, Non-attachment, Power, Vice, Ignorance, Attachment and Absence of Power: these are the seven forms of the Nature. Through these the Nature binds itself by itself. The same Nature (thinking), that the purpose of the Spirit is to be accomplished, liberates itself through one form of knowledge.

How is that knowledge produced?—(It is replied):—

Kārikā LXIV

By practising the principles thus, there arises the knowledge, viz., 'I am not, naught is mine, there is no Ego', which is complete, absolute and pure, because there remains no doubt.

Thus, in the way described above, by practising the meditation of twenty-five principles, viz., 'this is Nature; this is Spirit; these are the five subtle elements, the organs and the gross elements', there arises this knowledge in the Spirit:—'I am not, i.e., I do not exist; naught is mine, i.e.,
this body is not mine, for I am one thing and the body another: there is no ego, which is complete, i.e., I am exempt from ego: which knowledge is complete.

Pure, because there remains no doubt. Viparyaya means doubt. Aviparyaya, i.e., because there remains no doubt, it (knowledge) is pure. Absolute, i.e., only this (knowledge) is the cause of salvation and no other. There arises i.e., is manifested, the knowledge, viz., the knowledge of twenty-five principles in the Spirit.

What does the Spirit do after obtaining this knowledge?—

Kārikā LXV

By this knowledge, the Spirit, seated composed like a spectator perceives the Nature which has ceased to be productive and, consequently, which has now reverted from seven forms.

By this pure and absolute knowledge, the Spirit perceives the Nature, preksa'kat, i.e., like a spectator, seated composed; as a spectator of play perceives an actress from his own seat. Composed, who stays in self, i.e., seated in his own place.

What kind of Nature?—Which has ceased to be productive, i.e., which has ceased (to produce) the effects in the shape of intellect, ego (and the rest). Consequently, which has now reverted from seven forms. Because, it has fulfilled both the purposes (of enjoyment and release) of the Spirit. The Spirit perceives the Nature which has reverted from the seven forms,—the seven forms of Virtue and the rest by which the Nature binds itself.

One (the Spirit) is indifferent like a spectator in play; one (the Nature) desists, (saying) that I have been seen. (Now), in spite of their contact, there is no motive for creation.

Rāgastha, etc., Like a spectator in a play, the one, absolute and pure Spirit is indifferent. 'I have been seen by it (the Spirit)', thinking like that desists the one, i.e., the Nature, which is the sole and the chief cause of all the three worlds. There is no second Nature, because, if there be another form, then it will be a variety of genus

Although, the Spirit and Nature both desist thus, and on account of their omnipresence there is contact (between the two), yet there is no creation resulting from that contact. In spite of their contact, i.e., on account of the omnipresence of Spirit and Nature, though there is contact between them, there is no motive for creation, for creation has served its purpose. There are two motives for creation: (i) the apprehension of the objects of senses, like sound and the rest, and (ii) the apprehension of discrimination between the Attributes and the Spirit. When creation has served both the purposes, there is no motive for it, i.e., for further creation. As the contact between a debtor and a creditor is for receiving loan; after the payment of debt, in spite of contact between them, there is no money transaction, similarly, the Spirit and the Nature also have no more purpose (i.e. transaction).

(One may ask)—If after the production of knowledge, a man attains salvation, then why do I not attain it?—To this it is replied:
Kārikā LXVII

(Although) by the attainment of perfect knowledge, Virtue, and the rest cease to be producers, (yet) because of past impressions, the Spirit remains invested with a body like a potter’s wheel with a whirl.

Though the perfect knowledge of twenty-five principles is attained, yet, because of past impressions, a yogin remains invested with a body; how? Like the whirl of a wheel. As a potter, having set his wheel in motion, makes a pot by putting clay on the wheel; after making the pot he forsakes the wheel, but the wheel continues to turn round on account of the past momentum.

Thus, by the attainment of perfect knowledge, i.e., in the case of a man in whom perfect knowledge is produced Virtue and the rest cease to be producers. That is, these seven forms of bondage are burnt (destroyed) by perfect knowledge. And as seeds burnt by fire cannot germinate, so these forms of bondage in the form of Virtue and the rest are incapable (of producing bondage). When Virtue and the rest cease to be producers then, because of past impressions, the Spirit remains invested with a body. Why does not the knowledge destroy Virtue and Vice of the present (birth)?—Because, they are present. Of course, the next moment they are destroyed. Knowledge destroys all the future actions, as well as those which are done by the present body, by engaging in actions prescribed (by the Scriptures). After the exhaustion of the (previous) impressions, the body perishes and salvation results.

Of what nature is that salvation?—This is now explained.

Kārikā LXVIII

After obtaining separation from body and after the cessation of the Nature, (the Spirit) acquires the salvation which is both certain and final.

On account of the destruction of all the impulses generated by Virtue and Vice, after obtaining separation from body and after the cessation of the Nature, (the Spirit acquires salvation); then certain, i.e., absolute and final, i.e., unobstructed salvation, liberation due to singleness, both, viz., certain and final salvation, acquires (the Spirit).

Kārikā LXIX

This abstruse knowledge of the aim of the Spirit, wherein the existence, origin and dissolution of beings are considered, has been expounded by the great sage (Kapila).

The aim of the Spirit is salvation; for that purpose, this abstruse i.e., secret (knowledge) has been expounded, i.e., fully explained, by the great sage, viz., the sage Kapila. Wherein, i.e., in which knowledge, are considered, i.e., discussed, the existence, origin and dissolution, i.e., the being, appearance and disappearance of the beings, i.e., the products (of Nature). From meditation upon which there arises the perfect knowledge about the twenty-five principles.

“Sāmkhya, the cause of liberation from transmigration, has been expounded by the sage Kapila; in which there are seventy verses and the Bhāṣya of Gauḍāpāda.”

Kārikā A

This sacred and supreme (knowledge), the sage (Kapila) gave to Āsuri out of compassion. Āsuri also (gave it) to Pañcasīkha, who elaborated the doctrine.
Kārika A

Handed down by tradition of disciples, this was summarised in Ārya verses by Is'varakṛṣṇa of noble mind, having fully understood the demonstrated truth.

Kārika I

The topics of these seventy verses are those of the entire Śaṣṭītantra; they are devoid of anecdotes and also omit discussions of rival views.

SĀMKHYA KĀKIKĀ

NOTES

I

About the sons of भ्रण, कपिल, आधुरि, प्रताशिका and र्रवरक्षण see Introduction. The quotation ‘प्रतियापितस्व; ’ etc., is taken from प्रतियक्ष; see Introduction.

अधिनिर्देश. The word भुत stands for living beings, according to चन्द्रेश.

अधिनिर्देश, according to गोहो, includes miseries due to cold, heat, wind etc., because these are due to supernatural powers. On देवानागिरि हैव, Davies remarks—“But in old time, gods of higher class, and not demons merely, were supposed to afflict men with disease and pain. In the Rig-Veda (ii. 33, 7), Gritsamada prays to Rudra that he may be freed from his bodily pains, which he affirms to have been sent by the Devas or gods ( daivyā ).” ( p. 15 ).

The reading adopted by गोहो, vis., तद्द्वयुस्तत्त्तक्ष is more expressive of the संस्कर्त idea of complete cessation of pain, than तद्द्वयुस्तत्त्तक्ष of वाच ( See, S. N. S., 1, 11n.). cf. तत्व बिन्धनुस्तत्त्तक्ष ( सम. म. १.) The reading of देवो vis., तद्द्वयुस्तत्त्तक्ष does not materially differ from तद्द्वयुस्तत्तक्ष. Compare also Wilson, pp. 6–7; Davies, pp. 13–14, note on this reading.

विश्वुवरण describes the three द्वय in the following verses:
अध्यायमिनीन्द्रिय विन्द्रिय: शारीरो मानसस्तः
शारीरो वृत्तिमिन् विन्द्रियो श्रेयं च सः \ II ॥ ॥
सिरोभागितिश्चयनवयश्चमम: \ ॥
गुल्माच्छवियस्वायांविविधोऽभिप्रेर कर्ष: \ II ॥
तथातिशारोग्यो:सारक्रुष्णांगमाकृच्छते: \ II ॥
भौतिके देहस्तापोऽभन्ते श्रोतामहतस्म: \ II ॥
With the sense of this कारिका, cf. श्रीमद्भागवत—
हृद च द्रववहुः साराचार्यवत् ग्रन्थ: 
व द्रववहुः साराचार्य निर्पलसमु: (11.10.21)
एवं द्रववहुः साराचार्य कर्मसिद्धतमः
सतुप्राप्तिवाच्चत्रं यथा मण्डलविभिः (11.2.20)

The reconciliation of वैदिक हिंसा with the अस्ति text—मा हिंसात् सत्वोऽशुःनि—is an interesting topic which has taxed the ingenuity of all the orthodox systems of philosophy (See, S. N. S., p. 5, In.; Sovani, p. 400). वात्राम has discussed this question at length, quoting extensively from the standard authors (See pages 24-36).

The order of व्यतिकरणाविवाद is based on the procedure of cognition. The same order is observed in the following संस्कृत—
—रूपाणि व्यतिकरणार्थिणां तेनाङ्गुलिर्भर्ति (1.15);
तेनाङ्गुलिर्भर्ति (1.64); तत: प्रश्नः: (1.61); and संहृतपरस्त्रसाक्ष्येऽदस्य (1.66).

Sovani is quite pertinent in pointing out the confusion with regard to the meaning of the word व्यतिकरणाविवाद. Some call the महाभाष्यम as व्यतिकरणाविवाद, whiles the author of कारिकाद्वितीय seems to regard everything व्यतिकरणाविवाद (and, therefore, प्रत्ययोग्यानि), except the प्रमाण and पुरुष. वात्राम agrees with the latter explanation, in his commentary on this कारिका, but, changes his opinion in the comment on the 6th कारिका. At the latter place he says—
—सामावतो रद्धियुतात्रु अतिकल्पिनां प्रथानुपचारणांग्रतीति: He would seem to include महाभाष्य etc., by the word आदि (See वात्राम p. 16 In.). In order to avoid the contradiction, we should interpret the word आदि, according to वात्राम, to mean the union between प्रश्निति and पुरुष. cf. आदिन्ति तस्मानखः: प्रश्नितिरुपचारणांग्रतीति: (वात्राम, p. 183)। See Sovani, pp. 401 and 405, and notes 36 and 37.
III

In connection with Jacobi’s remark that it is very strange that intellect should be regarded as a form of matter by the Sāmkhyas (See Ent. Gott. Ind. p. 32), it is interesting to compare Davies (p. 17, 3n)—Modern Science, like the system of Kapila, makes intellect, a mere form of matter. “Mind, used in the sense of substance or essence, and brain, used in the sense of organ of mental function are at bottom names for the same substance.” (Maudsley’s Physiology of Mind, 3rd Ed., p. 38).

The nature of पुरुष is explained by चन्द्रिका as अजस्ततुन्त्रे सत्यज्ञ इत्यये: 1 आयाति शेषं प्रमुखिनिरासः, हि तत्त्वेनिष्ठ्यसमाप्तियादिनिरासः।

Unlike the नेत्रादित्य, the सांस्कृतिकs maintain that सामान्य is a product.

On पुरुष as pure inward light, Davies (p. 18, 1n.) Hegel on Thought (Das Denken), in connection with the Absolute:— “It is that light which lights; but it has no other content except that light.” (Phil. der Rel., i. 117) [Translated from German by H. Sharma].

From अह्वार (Ego) proceed not only the दृष्टिक, but everything material cognised by them. That is, the Ego (which is the I-principle) is the ‘base of the reality of all our sense-perceptions’ (Davies, p. 21, note 1), and consequently of all the existence. Davies quotes Schelling (System des Transc. Idealismus, p. 60) in support of this idea— “If at all there exists Something Real as opposed to ideal, then that Something Real must be I, because it is the principle of all reality.” (Translated from German by H. Sharma). This position, of course, differs from that of the वेदान्तिक, who does not regard the reality of the I-principle (अह्वार) even, but that of the Pure Consciousness (प्रदक्षिण),—the I-principle itself being imaginary and due to माया. Distinction should be drawn from the विज्ञानतात्य–वीद also, who denies the existence of everything external, except consciousness. The सांस्कृतिकs do not deny the external existence, but considers it to be a modified product of consciousness, in which it lies latent. cf. न विज्ञानमात्र वाच्यतयतीति: (सां. र. ६. ६२.).

IV

Apart from the three Means of Right Cognition, viz., प्रत्यय, अनुमान and श्रवण, recognised by the सांस्कृतिकs, the commentators discuss the other Means of Right Cognition, recognised by other schools. The चार्चिक materialist recognises only प्रत्यय, the जीन and वेदांतिक schools recognise प्रत्यय and अनुमान, the मायाः also recognise only two प्रमाणस, but they are प्रत्यय and श्रवण according to them. The followers of रामायाण, the जातेष्वाङ्गिकs, and the सांस्कृतिक and the योग systems recognise प्रत्यय, अनुमान and श्रवण. The oldest and the most modern नेत्रादित्यs and the followers of the महाघर school recognise उपमान in addition to the three named above. The मामांसालकs of प्रभाकर school add अधिपयति as the fifth. The मामांसालकs of कुमारिक्ष्ण school and the अदेतिनिष्ठ्यस नेत्रादित्यs recognise one more, viz., अनुपयुक्त or अदला. The number of प्रमाणs reaches eight in the case of the प्राचीनांक who add संस्कृत and वेदांत to the list. Some नेत्रादित्यs recognise चेतन also in addition to the above; others add श्रवणa to the list, and thus the total reaches ten. The commentators have tried to show that all the seven प्रमाणs, apart from the three recognised by the कार्तिक, fall under the latter.

1. उपमान—

वाच्य splits it up into प्रत्यय, अनुमान and श्रवण;

मातर regards it to be अनुमान;

जया includes it under अनुमान and श्रवण;

गोड includes it under श्रवण;

and चन्द्रिका under अनुमान.

2. अधिपयति—

All the commentators include it under अनुमान.
3. अभावः—

वाचः and जयः regard it as प्रत्ययः; एकौर includes it under अत्युमिन. Although गौड़ो’s remark—सम्बन्धायत्नसर्वत्रिक्षुप्रायन्तसाधनांचे, suggests its inclusion under शब्दः, yet another remark of his, "युक्तबाह्यसंक्षेपमेनादिवेदंबांगोपये, would lead us to infer that he will have it under अत्युमिन; चन्द्रिका regards it as a help-mate of प्रत्ययः, and, therefore, no independent प्रामाणः.

4. सांभूः—

वाचः, जयः and एकौर include it under अत्युमिन; गौड़ो and चन्द्रिका include it under शब्दः.

5. एतिष्ठा—

वाचः opines that if it is pronounced by a reliable person, then it is शब्दः, otherwise it is no प्रामाणः; गौड़ो and चन्द्रिका also include it under शब्दः.

एकौर includes it under अत्युमिन.

6. प्रतिभा—

वाचः and चन्द्रिका do not mention it; जयः includes it under प्रत्ययः and अत्युमिन, when it is correct, otherwise it is no प्रामाणः; एकौर includes it under अत्युमिन; and गौड़ो includes it under शब्दः.

7. चेदा—

Noted only by चन्द्रिका and एकौर, and included under अत्युमिन.

Wilson is right in remarking that although the भीमांलक्कक do recognise six प्रामाणः, yet गौड़ो’s remark that they are अथ्यपर्यतः, संभवः, अत्युमिन, प्रतिभा, एतिष्ठा and वपमाणः, is not correct; for संभवः, एतिष्ठा and प्रतिभा are nowhere recognised as प्रामाणः by the भीमांलक्कक; rather, “the author of शब्दाधिशिक्षा excludes expressly संभवः, प्रतिभा and एतिष्ठा from the character of proofs.” (p. 28). जयः nowhere mentions the प्रामाणः, but the six प्रामाणः (viz., वपमाणः, अत्युमिन, शब्दः, अथ्यपर्यतः and अभावः) are discussed by शब्दाधिशिक्षा in his भाष्य on भीमांलक्कक 1. 1. 5. प्रामाणः does not recognise अभावः, but इत्यादि does.

\[ \text{NOTES} \]

प्रामाणः has been defined as the instrument of प्रामा. प्रामा is that state of mind which is free from doubt, mistake, indecision and memory—, and which arises from the contact of the sense-organs with their objects. The result is the cognition by mind. But वाचः says—बोध धार्मिकः: पल्लेत प्रामा. This might mean that the result of the mental state is cognition in the Spirit. Does it mean that the cognition arises in the spirit? No, we reply—what happens is that when the Spirit is reflected in the mind, which has assumed the shape of the object with which the sense-organs come into contact, it (the Spirit) also appears to be cognising. This is a kind of mis-apprehension arising from the mistaken identity between the Spirit and the mind. This is what is expressed in the योगासुत्रः—'हे दया दुष्कृष्णः: छठोधर्व प्रत्ययपुर्वः' (11. 20) and ‘सिद्धेर्वादिः
कर्मयोगसाधनाकारापती लिङ्गधिशिरं' (IV. 22).

V

Following the न्यायात्मकः—तत्त्वकृत्व विविधानमुखः पुर्ववत् शेषवत् सामान्यतोद्वृत्ति च (1.1.5), वाचः first divides अत्युमिन into three kinds. Again he gives another classification:

\[ \text{अनुभाव} \]

\[ \text{श्रीति} \]

\[ \text{अथ्यपर्यतः or शेषवत्} \]

\[ \text{पुर्ववत्} \]

\[ \text{सामान्यतोद्वृत्ति} \]

The commentators differ in the explanation of these terms. बाल्यायण himself proposes two alternative explanations.

(1) (a) पुर्ववत्—A priori or inference of effect from cause,—as of rain from the clouds in the sky.

(b) शेषवत्—A posteriori, or an inference of cause from effect,—as of rain from the flood in a river.
(c) सामान्यतः—Commonly seen, or based on Analogy,—e.g., we observe that a particular man in one town now, is seen in another next day, because he has moved. Similarly, the Sun must also move, as he is seen at different places in the sky at different times.

Or

(2) (a) पुष्पादन—If we have seen two things together in the past, then when we see one of them now, we infer the existence of the other also. For example, from smoke on the hill, we infer fire.

(b) सेवनन्—Inference by exclusion (प्रस्तुतार्थवेदथा: प्रस्तुतार्थवेदथान्वयमन्य:—संप्रेष्य: परिषेष्य:). The question is,—under which of the seven categories (क्रय, गुण etc.) should we include स्वर (sound)? Now, स्वर cannot come under सामान्य, विशेष and the rest, and its inclusion under क्रय has been denied. Therefore, by the law of the residue, स्वर falls under गुण.

(c) सामान्यतः—Where the relation of the व्यास्ति is not within ordinary perception, there we take another object within ordinary perception and similar to the हेतु in question; and on this similarity or Commonness, we transfer the व्यास्ति from the perceived to the unperceived instance. For instance, we have got to infer the existence of the Spirit. We do so on the basis of the qualities like the desire, etc. The desire, etc., are qualities. Qualities always reside in objects (as we perceive in the case of form, taste and the rest). Therefore, the desire etc., must also reside in some object; and that object is the Spirit.

The two alternative explanations given by वास्त्यययाम show that the meaning of these terms had become doubtful at his time. Cf. Principal A. B. Dhrava’s paper—‘Trividham anumānam’. POC., Poona, pp. 251–280.

वार्षयः agrees with the second explanation of वास्त्यययाम. But अवार्षयः or शेषार्षयः according to वार्षयः, is a negative reasoning. वास्त्यययाम’s instance of शेषार्षयः, viz. गुण, is a गुण, is rejected by

वार्षयः in his ताल्पर्यः (p. 183, कालीसामस्यावतीर्यार्). According to him शेषार्षयः or शेषार्षयः stands for व्यास्तर्यययाम. The inference of शेष गुण a गुण is not a व्यास्तर्यययाम but अस्तर्यययाम. The correct example of शेषार्षयः, therefore, is that the qualities desire etc., reside in the आर्यम्य. These qualities cannot reside in दृष्टि, ज्ञान, तेजस्विण्य and वाद्य: nor can they reside in आर्यम्य, because the qualities of the latter are perceived by the external sense—organ (ear). Similarly the desire etc. being विद्यययहत् cannot be the qualities of दृष्टिः, ज्ञान and वाद्य—for the qualities of the latter three गुण are साध्य. Thus ultimately the desire etc., reside in the ninth गुण, viz., आर्यम्य. So there being no आर्यम्य it is an instance of व्यास्तर्यययाम. जयः and गोहः agree with the first explanation of वास्त्यययाम. गोहः and मार्थार explain शेषार्षयः differently—साध्यसाध्य जडपठल वर्णभाषाय शेषार्षयययाम वर्णभाषाय वदि (गोहः)।

विद्यययहत् हृदयययादिकाः—वार्षयः would read one more द्विः i.e., द्विः
विद्यययहत् हृदयययादिकाः. गोहः has a curious explanation to offer—तद्वादनां
विद्ययहत् यत्तं हृदयययादिकाः अदानी, तथा दृष्टिः यथा। विद्ययहत् यत्तं
हृदयययादिकाः अदानी, तथा स्नायुः तथा, अस्पदेष्य विधिभिमित्ती। जयः agrees
with it. It enumerates seven kinds of शेषार्षयः which ought to exist between the द्विः and the द्विः. They are—

1. स्वामिभावम् as between राज: and उस्तः
2. प्रकृतिभावम् यथा यथा, यथा, सकृतः
3. कार्यार्थप्रभावम् यथा, वेत्त, वत्तः
4. पारमामिक, परिशेष्य, विधिभिमित्ती
5. शाङ्कार्यं, चक्रवाकाः, चक्रवाकाः
6. प्राचेदिकाः शीताः, उत्तमः
7. मनस्तामित्तिकाः भोगः, भोगः.

As pointed above, the Buddhists and the followers of the भेकिक्य school do not recognise शेष as a separate प्रभाव, but include it under अभाबम्. वार्षयः says that the relation between a नाम and its अभाब is not that of द्विः and द्विः, as between उस्तः and वदि. वार्षयः, being only an object of cognition cognised by the नाम, cannot be known by inference.
It will be interesting to know how वाचः has tried to bring the other प्रमाणस under the three recognised by the लोकस्य.

उपमान. According to the नैपायिक्ष (प्रक्ष्तिविन्दविषयति धार्मिकता—यास सौ १ १. ६), उपमान is that sentence which establishes a relation between a word and its sense. But, according to the लोकस्य, a वाचः is not a प्रमाण, but the knowledge (साधन) derived from the वाचः. It is the चिन्तामणि alone which is प्रमाण. So, उपमान cannot be a separate प्रमाण, but is included under अभावम. According to the भीमाणस्य, उपमान is the साहाय्य (or the cognition of similarity, as of गो, residing in the directly perceived गायय). A man who saw a cow in the town, now observes a गायय in the forest. At this moment he is reminded of the cow which is qualified by the similarity of गायय directly perceived. This is the रूप of उपमान. वाचः replies that this उपमान and its रूप are both included under प्रयुक्त. For, साहाय्य is like the सामान्य. Just as we have गोवलिन गो, so we have गोसाहाय्य गो। And as we directly perceive गोवलिन, so we perceive गोसाहाय्य and गायसाहाय्य along with गायय. Therefore, गोसाहाय्य (उपमान) and गायसाहाय्य (उपमानकुल) both are प्रयुक्त. साहाय्य is not a relation (like संयोग) which should reside on two objects; it is only सूक्ष्मज्ञानार्थशास्त्रियोग, that is, the existence of a large number of qualities of one object in another. This साहाय्य is, thus, one like गोवलिन; and if it is perceived in गो, then it is perceived in गायय also.

अभावम is Presumption. We presume the existence of living चेतः outside the house, if he is not visible inside the house. But, the भीमाणस्य objects—देशायमायन्च्येंच्यें गृहविशेषयायोऽपि पायोऽपि: etc. He says that when we hear जीवन चेतः भविष्यति, then the substratum of the existence of चेतः is देशायमाय (or space in general), which includes the particular space of गृह also. Thus, चेतः's non-existence in the गृह is opposed to यह also. And, in order to remove this opposition, we have to resort to अभावम. वाचः replies that गृह (in which the non-existence of चेतः has been established by means of Right Cognition) cannot be included in देशायमाय. Similarly चेतः's non-existence in गृह (which is opposed to his existence in गृह) cannot be a case of opposition to his existence everywhere.

अभावम is no प्रमाण, but is included under प्रयुक्त. For, अभावम वस्तुतः is merely a modification of चृतध्वनि. But, says an objector, how can अभावम (a negation) be a परिणाम (something positive)?

Answer. Under एतन चृतध्वनिदेशपि चृतध्वनि: चृतध्वनिः, चृत has defined परिणाम as अवस्थितव अवस्थय पूर्वस्थमिबि चृतध्वनिदेश: परिणाम हि—i. e. modification is the manifestation of another characteristic on the removal of the previous characteristic of an object, which (object) always remains constant. So, when घर was on the चृतध्वनि, then it was स्थितिभयपरिणाम of चृत; and when there is no घर, then it is the बीतित or अवस्थितीयपरिणाम of चृतध्वनि.

VI

Things directly perceived by the senses need not be taught by the शास्त्र, as they can be easily cognised by even an ordinary person. Now "things beyond the senses are not only those which are too subtle for organs of the sense, but those which are imperceptible by accident, as the fire in a mountain that smokes" (Davies, p. 27). The latter is an instance of पूर्ववेतां अभावम, which वाचः regards to be as unimportant for our inquiry as the प्रयुक्त. The most important kind of अभावम, from our point of view, is लोकायत्योर्ज्ञान (and ज्ञात्वत्, which is not mentioned by the शास्त्र), but added by वाचः, which leads us to infer things which are too subtle for the organs of sense. But ज्ञात्वत् rejects पूर्ववेताः and ज्ञात्वत् both (p. 9).
VII

पतिः भ्राणि lays down six causes of अनुपानिधि (महाभाष्य I. 1. 3).
See Introduction. The eight causes of अनुपानिधि mentioned in
the कारिका are reduced to four by नवो—
(1) भेदाध्योय includes अनित्त and अनित्तमिता.
(2) विद्यायोग „ विद्यायत and मनोवशस्त्र.
(3) विष्यपूर्ण = श्रीमण, and
(4) अनुवृत्तमि includes नववचन, अनिवर्त and स्वतान्त्रय.
Sovan is right in remarking that all these can be reduced to
two—विद्यायोग and विष्यपूर्ण (See p. 405). बाद lays down the
causes of अनुपानिधि of अस्थित (non-existent) things even—
हृदय, शुद्ध, नववचन भवति. तत्रोत्त्वे-पाक्षात्मानसात् तदाक्षात् भोगः…. नवमिं द्वारा "पथपुरुषिकः. सतात् भवति चतुरः.

VIII

On the reading प्रकृतिस्वरूपः, Davies remarks—"Lassen has
in the text स्वरूपः (having its own form), from the संस्कृतोपयुक्ती.
which must be referred to intellect (मन्त्र). All the Mss.
but one have स्वरूपः (like), which the sense requires. In his
translation he has " dissimile et simile." " (p. 27, 1n).

IX

बाद भरा here lays down the opinions of (1) the बाद, (2) the
भेदाध्योगिक and the बेदाध्योगिक, and (3) the भेदाध्योगिक as पूर्वपकः.
(1) The बाद maintain that existence comes into being
from non-existence (अस्थित: संहारये).
(2) The भेदाध्योगिक and the बेदाध्योगिक maintain that an
existent cause produces a non-existent effect (सतोसोत्ततायथा).
(3) The भेदाध्योगिक maintain that the cause alone is existent,
the effect being only an apparent change (यस्य ततो विन्यास: न
कार्यार्थं वस्तू तत्). All these views are fully discussed in the
Introduction.

X

उपायात्मकः—बाद भरा interprets ध्वरणाय as समयात्मकः. But
जयो, गौरो, माधव and चित्रकृत explain it as taking or seeking.
S. N. S. observes that although गीतोऽ is simpler,
yet apparently, the same idea is repeated in शास्त्रय स्वरूपमयात्मकः.
बाद भरा's explanation is also included in स्वरूपमयात्मकः. "It is also
to be noted that while उपायात्मकः emphasises the adequacy of
the cause to the effect, शास्त्रय स्वरूपमयात्मकः looks at the
adequacy of the cause to the effect; hence, the latter does not
merely repeat the idea of the former." (S. N. S. p. 28, 1n).

कार्यात्मकः—जयो gives two explanations of this phrase—
कार्यात्मकः तंत्राधिलैः। यस्तत्कार्यकृतपरते किंभवत कार्यानेन कार्यम् भयो
तत्रति च। तस्मात्तत्त्वाच एव विनिविर्धमीति गवते। अथवा-कार्यात्मकः
वादित्ति कार्यात्मकः बावः। तस्मात्तत्वात् कार्य तत्त्वात् कार्योः। यथा तिपस्यात्मकः
तन्नामित्यः सन्धिमेव तेनृः। शुद्ध सत्वाधो वयः। (p. 12). माधव
and चित्रकृत agree with the latter explanation. बाद, on the other
hand, explains it as कार्यायृत्तिक कार्यात्मकः—on account of the
identity of cause and effect.

X

हेतुमयः, i.e., caused. व्यक्त or the evolved is caused.
Cause, according to माधव, is of two kinds: कार (producer)
and शाक्त (illuminator or indicator). प्राण, व्रति, शक्ति and पवि-
tात्मिक's are the कारकेषु, as they produce effects. That is,
व्रति, शक्ति and पवित्रात्मिक are हेतुमयी and हेतुमयी both, whileas,
अयथयः (i.e. प्राणाय) is only a हेतु. The शाक्त हेतुमये are five-fold, विप्रयः,
विप्रयः, अश्वि, तृषि, सिद्धि and अश्वि. Now, विप्रयः, अश्वि,
tृषि and सिद्धि are the प्रयत्नात्मिक (i.e. creations of Intellect),
and thus they pervade all the twenty-three तत्त्वम्. (But what is
this अश्वि?) Thus अश्वि is only a कारक हेतु.

अनिवृत्त—non-eternal, destructible. Destruction is the
return of a product to its cause. cf.—माधव: कार्यात्मकः (साहो सो १, शो ११३१).
For, according to the theory of स्वरूपमय, there can be
no real destruction or annihilation. प्राण is निवाय, because it
has no कारण to which it could return.
contrast intended between the evolved and the unevolved."
(p. 32, In.)

**NOTES**

**XI**

The three गुणs or Attributes are the essence of प्रकृतिः. प्रकृतिः is nothing but these three गुणs in equilibrium. The kinds of temperaments observed in living beings may broadly be divided into three—spiritual, passionate and dull. Therefore, the संयम theory of three गुणs, although a mere hypothesis, is yet a very useful and appropriate hypothesis. Davies remarks—"In the system of Valentinus the
Gnostic, all men and all substances are divided into three classes: (1) spiritual, (2) the vital and (3) the material (Hylic). This corresponds to the गुण of कारक and is probably an importation from India.” (p. 37, 2n.)

विषयः—The viewpoint of the विज्ञानवादिङ्ग बौद्ध is that there is no existence of the external objects, except in mind. That is, concept and the object denoted by the concept are identical, because both are comprehended simultaneously. Things, which are not identical, are not necessarily comprehended simultaneously; cf. ‘सहारापदमनियमाभ्येदि नीतित्तदिया’। भेदेश आत्मिविद्याेथेतेवेन्द्राविवादोऽ।” (सर्वदर्शी, p. 32), वाच्यार्थें′ s refutation of this view has been thus illucidated by बाद्राम—ययस्मितेस्योपिनान्ते रुद्रिकां रुपाहिकात्वुदातानां कल्पवीणि सुविदिकामति जायमाने पुष्पमालें तत्र प्रामाण्यस्य परप्रणोत्तमादाः वस्तुक्रेवेदि क्षणान्तां दस्येले। यदि हि वस्तु विज्ञानस्य क्षणे तथो तिथे विज्ञानस्यार्थार्थान्तव्याहारोत्तमाने सार्थां सदर्वा न सम्मिले। अतः वस्तुसार्थायोपपत्तियो विज्ञानसिद्धां तदर्शतमयमिति।” (p. 128).

अच्छेनाम्—अद्वैत (intellect) is merely an instrument of Pure Intelligence or चेतनय, and not identical with it, because अद्वैत is a material product of प्रकृति.

The phrase तत्सिद्धिनित्यया च पुष्पान् means that in some respects the Spirit is similar to चेतन and अद्वैत, and in other respect it is different from चेतन and अद्वैत.

Difference of पुष्प from चेतन and अद्वैत—

चेतन and अद्वैत

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>पुष्प</th>
<th>अद्वैत</th>
<th>चेतन</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>निगुण</td>
<td>अनिगुण</td>
<td>निगुण</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>अविशेषक</td>
<td>विशेषक</td>
<td>विशेषक</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>विषय</td>
<td>अविषय</td>
<td>अविषय</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>सामान्य</td>
<td>असामान्य</td>
<td>असामान्य</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>अचेतन</td>
<td>अचेतन</td>
<td>अचेतन</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>प्रसारपयमि</td>
<td>प्रसारपयमि</td>
<td>प्रसारपयमि</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

—XII]

Similarity of पुष्प to चेतन and अद्वैत and difference of चेतन from अद्वैत—

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>पुष्प</th>
<th>अद्वैत</th>
<th>चेतन</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>निगुण</td>
<td>अनिगुण</td>
<td>निगुण</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>अविशेषक</td>
<td>विशेषक</td>
<td>विशेषक</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>विषय</td>
<td>अविषय</td>
<td>अविषय</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>सामान्य</td>
<td>असामान्य</td>
<td>असामान्य</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>अचेतन</td>
<td>अचेतन</td>
<td>अचेतन</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>प्रसारपयमि</td>
<td>प्रसारपयमि</td>
<td>प्रसारपयमि</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

It should be noted that गोपि and मानि say पुष्प एक:, which is opposed to the doctrine of पुष्पबुधुलम् (१५६) जयो and वाचो, therefore, rightly point out that पुष्प is similar to चेतन with regard to अद्वैत. After discussing this point, Wilson concludes—“Either, therefore, गौरापाद्य गौरापाद्य has made a mistake, or by his eka is to be understood, not that soul in general is one only, but that it is single, or several, in its different migrations; or, as Mr. Celebreke renders it (R. A. S. Trans. Vol. I., p. 31), ‘individual’. So in the सूत्रस it is said, ‘that there may be various unions of one soul, according to difference of receptacle, as the ethereal element may be confined in a variety of vessels’ (I., 150). This singleness of soul applies, therefore, to that particular soul which is subjected to its own varied course of birth, death, bondage and liberation; for, as the commentator observes ‘one soul is born, not another (in a regenerated body)’. The singleness of soul, therefore, as asserted by गौरापाद्य, is no doubt to be understood in this sense.” (p. 65)

XII

गुणs do not mean qualities residing in a substance, as understood in the चेतन and अद्वैत systems. They are of the S. N. 2
nature of substance; they are the constituent elements of प्रकृति. Hence, नाथ देव says—गुण इति पराकरान:। That is, they are called गुण (secondary), because they exist for the Spirit and not for themselves.

गोप देव, नाथ देव and जय देव mention अन्यो:प्रायुत्तय: also, while as वाच देव and चन्द्रनाथ add अन्यो:प्रायुत्तय: before and बुद्धी after अभिभ, आभभ, जनन and नियुक्त इत्या. बुद्धी according to वाच देव, means किया (operation). जय देव explains बुद्धी as सुझावमहिः सरिपुत्रा. According to गोप देव, अन्यो:प्रायुत्तय: means रसरसा विनम्रता, i.e. are reciprocally present. नाथ, however, seems to take बुद्धी in the sense of function. In a note on this word, Davies remarks—"\(\text{बुद्धी} \) means state, condition, or manner of being, and the meaning is that each गुण may, in some circumstances, assume the nature of the others or be the same in effect."

( p. 36, In.)

गोप देव, नाथ देव and जय देव quote one verse, viz., रजसोऽप्रियं सत्यं, etc.; जय देव ascribes this verse to विभुमि, which it is difficult to identify, unless it stands for दक्षिणताः भक्ते भक्ते. But there is no such verse in the भक्ते. The verse found there is—रक्तवर्णाकारिण्यं सत्यं भवति भक्ते। रजस: तथेऽविष्णुस्य तस्य रजस्य मुखं, रजस्य रजस्तथा: (XIV. 10). We find a similar verse in the अयुग्म-पवित्र- of the महाभारत—तमसोऽप्रियं सत्यं सत्यं मिलते तस्मां रजस्य मिलनः रजस्य:। रजस्तथा: सत्यं सत्यं मिलते तस्मां रजस्य मिलनः तस्मां (35. 6).

XIII

अथ:—जय देव and वाच देव explain it as वुढ़दत्व:; but गोप देव takes it in the sense of साक्ष्या, and नाथ explains it as कार्यशक्ति।

Now, these गुण, on account of their having the characteristics of अत्याधिकूप, etc., assume different shapes. But, how do these गुण perform functions of so different a nature? In reply to this वाच देव gives an example of a woman, who, according to him, illustrates all the different functions of the गुण। गोप देव, नाथ देव and जय देव, on the other hand, illustrate तस्मां रजस्य, रजस्य by warriors and तस्मां by clouds. A virtuous woman (and therefore, a साक्ष्या type) pleases her husband, pains her rivals and deludes the passionate people. The brave soldiers (and therefore, representing राजस्य) of a king please their master, pain their opponents and delude the fugitives. The dark clouds covering the sky (and therefore, a तत्त्व type) please the people suffering from heat, rouse activity among the peasants and delude the lovers in separation. But, there is one difficulty. The 3 गुण ( = प्रकृति or मुक्तीकारण ) assume various shapes by permutation and combination. This amounts to saying that the मुक्तीकारण is not one but many. Now, how does this position differ from that of the देवीप्रकाश who also assume the plurality of causes? Cf.—गोप देव मुक्तीकारणपरिवर्तिलासंहस्य{\(\text{र}^\text{v}\text{र})\} को षिक्षा हृदयं ष्ठेत—The reply is कारणवेदम् स्थानोत्वात्तिष्ठिते। श्रव्यस्यात्तिष्ठिते हृदय{\(\text{र}^\text{v}\text{र})} विनिमयः। गुणवृत्तिः तत्त्वसर्वात्तिष्ठिते। ष्ठेति ष्ठेति विनिमयः। ष्ठेति विनिमयः। ष्ठेति विनिमयः। ष्ठेति विनिमयः।

But are not these गुण opposed to one another? The reply is—yes. Still they unite for रूपार्थव: as, wick, oil and lamp. The illustration is not a happy one, as we do not find any apparent opposition between तेल, तालिका and श्रव्य in spite of the attempt of वदिप्रकाश:—स्त्रीपति तेलपलन श्रव्यायाम, देवपति देवपति, श्रव्यपति, एवं वाति श्रव्यपलन श्रव्यायामकृति॥। For this reason बाच देव gives another example of this विनिमय:—विनिमयः, यथा यथा वाति पालनेत्रोऽविनिमयः।

रसरसरो:विनिमयः विनिमयः। विनिमयः। यथा यथा विनिमयः। रसरसरोऽविनिमयः। रसरसरो:विनिमयः। रसरसरो:विनिमयः। रसरसरो:विनिमयः। रसरसरो:विनिमयः। रसरसरो:विनिमयः।

( pp. 139-140 ). Really speaking, there can be no विनिमय of these गुण in any evolved thing (say, a human body). If at all there could be any विनिमय, then it would be in the साक्ष्या i.e. प्रकृति। In no परिणाम of प्रकृति are the गुण in equal quantity. On the other hand, there is predominance of one over the others. So, there is no तत्त्वसर्वोऽविनिमय in the विनिमय। Cf.—स्थानस्थानः स्थानस्थानः परिवर्त्यं विनिमयं शास्त्रानां शास्त्रानां शास्त्रानां शास्त्रानां।

( यथा यथा on योग सू. II. 15 ).
The difficulty lies in the expression तद्विवर्यायमानः. गोळे और मार्टी explain it as on account of the absence of the contraries of वृक्षण in the प्राप्त, अविवर्यायमः resides in the प्राप्त, 'वाच्य offers an alternative explanation—on account of the absence of अविवर्यायमः in the contrary of वृक्षण, i.e., पुष्प, अविवर्यायमः resides in the प्राप्त and its constituents.' चान्तिका adopts the second explanation. जयः also agrees with it. cf. वृक्षणसायनेनविवर्यायमेवोपयोगात् (1)। न हि विवर्यायमः वृक्षणसायनेनविवर्यायमः संबंधत। तत्साधू वृक्षणसायनेनविवर्यायमः: सिद्धः (p. 20). The explanation of गोळे, as rightly pointed out by S. N. S. (See p. 41, 1n.), renders the other half of the कारिका redundant, because, it simply repeats the same argument.

**XV and XVI**

The term भूत बोधi stands for the diverse forms of the evolved which differ from one another. As compared with its effects, a cause is unlimited and thus unmanifest. जयः uses a curious expression, (संपर्कित) for cause. It seems that the word संपर्कि stands for the union or contact of different effects in their cause; cf.—तत्साधू वृक्षणसायनेनसंवर्यायमः विभवतः (p. 21).

समन्वय = एकरुपता, similarity, or एकरूपन्यायम् (i.e., belonging to one genus), according to जयः. गोळे understands समन्वय in the sense of ‘inference’—यथा ज्ञातार्थमः इति इत्यतः समन्वयम्, नूनम्रय पिताः ब्रह्माण्डकिति (1). The explanation of समन्वयम् (Sū., I. 131) as offered by विज्ञान, viz., उपज्ञातार्थम् धीम हि इत्यतिवर्यायमानः सम्बन्धितः समन्वयम् पुष्पसुता (i.e. intellect and the rest, emaciated by fast, are again strengthened by food, etc.), ’does not directly fit in this कारिका,’ as rightly pointed out by Sovani (p. 411).

‘ emergence ’—just as the jar, etc., emerge from the clay.

etc. जयः, मार्टी and गोळे explain it as ‘separation’ or ‘distinction’ between the functions of the cause and the effect; just as you can bring water in a jar but not in clay. Thus, there is a distinction between a cause and its effect, because both serve different purposes (प्रयुक्तिका विभवतः). But, it is difficult to understand how one can conclude from this argument that तस्मादन्यः कारणः भवत्वम्. जयः here quotes the explanation of some other commentary (which is not traceable):—अभिन्नम् वाच्यम्, ‘कारणस्तुल्यतःवेदाङ्गस्माधारितः तत्कारणः’ इथ्येति, ‘वाच्यसाधू वेदाङ्गार्थणम्—युक्तेष्ठार्थम् सत् कारणम्, युक्ताः वेदाङ्गम् तत्कारणम्, वेदाङ्गभागम्, उपकार्यपकारकार्यभागार्थणम्:। यथायापार्थिवान् ब्रह्मान्तः चौपकार्यपकारकार्यभागान्तः इति हेतुः इत्यतः तद्यतः कारणम् वेदाङ्गपार्थिवः परस्तरः इति।

अविभावम् वेदाङ्गम्—According to वाच्य, गोळे and मार्टी, the term अविभाव means ‘merging’—because this diverse evolved merges into the unevolved. जयः also quotes the opinion of some unknown commentator who adopts the reading अविभावम्, where अविभाव means वेदाङ्गम्. जयः’ own explanation is different. It takes अविभाव in the sense of अभिविभाव, and explains the phrase as—because this diversity is produced out of unity.’ cf. इह देवेत्विभविभावस्यायम् वेदाङ्गम्भविभावसायनेन सन्तानं धीम हि. प्रक्रियापार्थिवान् ब्रह्मान्तः चौपकार्यपकारकार्यभागान्तः इति।

**ADD TO COLUMN**

**NOTES**

21

**ADD TO COLUMN**

20

**ADD TO COLUMN**

XIV

**ADD TO COLUMN**

[1]
The reading संहतपारथवाक, adopted by Wilson, is not supported by गोडे, who reads संहतपारथवाक. Wilson's reading of the text is an obvious mistake (based upon, perhaps, the राम. म. —संहतपारथवाक, I. 140), as it is not supported by any commentary.

अधिकारात्—पुरुष is the अधिकारा of प्रकृति, as a charioteer is that of a chariot. Question:—But, a charioteer is active, and your पुरुष, being निर्गुण—निविज्ञान, is not active; how can he become an अधिकारा? Reply:—It is not essential that only an active entity can move or urge anything. Sometimes mere proximity or contact brings about activity, as we see in the case of iron and load-stone. Cf. तत्सर्वार्थवाकप्रकीर्तीभ्रमण (सार. म. I. 96). Or, mere presence also can bring about an activity, as in the case of a King. Cf.—

* न च सर्वम् तुवर्यं स्वप्रमोचरनं कामसुः।
  भलेन सार्वस्म गोडे सुकुद्रोऽद्वितीयः ।

सार्वस्मा कपिलविम्बमाणेन बिनिगुणं केतरचनं ।

तत्सर्वार्तवाकप्रकीर्तीभ्रमणः।

( कुमारिन्द्रप्रकृतिवस्त्रि on मी. म. I. 5,
Chowkhamba edn., p. 710).

वाराण्य thinks that this argument about the अधिकारा of पुरुष answers all the criticisms brought forward by शत्रुतायां in his आयन on 'प्रबन्धपरमस्तथा' and 'प्रवृत्तिः' (ब्र. म. II. 2. 1 and 2).

केवलयां प्रवृत्तिः—मार्ग assigns this प्रवृत्ति to प्रवाह, whileas, वाचः and others take this प्रवृत्ति as belonging to the शाश्व and the sages—आमान्यान्महानियन् च।

— XVIII —

On जन्म and मरण, विषाणः says—जन्ममनो चात्र नित्यातिविनाशी दुःखपादिवालायम्। ।

हितकृत्यं वेदनिशिवात्तिविविवेकिणं संयोगम् विनेत्रवर्षण भोतमहानियन्नकारिणः।

(सार. म. I. 149).

The view of the वेदेन्तिनः is that one and the same आत्मा assumes plurality on account of being conditioned by the different bodies. Cf. 'उपाधिकर्मण्युपक्रमं नानायोग आचारायेऽयाः प्रतिहितः।"

'उपाधिकर्मण्युपक्रमं न तदविरोधः।' 'वेदवेदे करितम् परिवर्तितम् न विनेत्रवर्षितम्।'

(सारं म. I. 150-152). वाचः sets the पूवपाख in the following words—

हि केवलवाकप्रकीर्तीभ्रमणम् सः तथा मन्यते—, एकं जनमं पुनः सत्यविद्यमयं अन्तःपुर्वःः।

इह रसनायं यावतः मन्यस्ते श्रवणेक्षेत्र श्रवणेक्षेत्र प्रवत्तते एवं मणिक्युलपुरुषोऽविचित्रेऽविचित्रेऽविचित्रेऽत्वत्त्वत्तेऽत्वत्त्वत।

(This verse from प्रहारविद्यमानद, १, २, is quoted by विषाणः also on सार. म. I. 153).

But, does not this doctrine of हि पुरुषवेदः contradict the सूत्रम् which lay down the unity of soul (i.e. आत्मन्)? The सार. म. says, नो—"नामस्नातितिविनाशी जातिसत्तानम्।" (१. १५०).—These scriptures speak of one आत्मा in the sense of class notion. वाचः also tries to reconcile the अनुसारतुकित्विनाशी as follows—

एकजन्मार्थात्तिनिर्धरितता कर्मिनिविद्यमानम् कर्मभ्रमणम् प्रवृत्तिः। प्रवृत्तिः विनेत्रवर्षणम् शुचिः साम्यात्तिनिर्धरितता। 'अनामेकां दीर्घिधूषकुरुण: बलः प्रजाः समायात।' अऽ श्रवणे श्रवणे समायाते जहां श्रवणे शुचिविवेकिण:।

(त. आ. ५. ५)।।

तत्सर्वार्थवाकप्रकीर्तिः, on पो. म. II. 22.

Further on, says the सार्वम्, if you are going to explain away this नात्मा by वाराण्, then you will land yourself into another absurdity. For, as शरीर is the जन्माकारिणः of the आत्मा, so the limbs (अनुवन्ध) are the उपाधिः of a body (साधिना). And
when we see the appearance and disappearance of the limbs in a body, will the वेदांतिः call these phenomena the births and deaths of the same body?

XIX, XX and XXI

वाचोऽनन्नम् (or आऽतान्सिः) is of seven kinds according to जयोऽ—
सततिः चार्वात्सास्विः। तथा चौलि—परत्यति श्रृणागति सवं करोति शिष्ठिति
प्रसेठु च नापे। सततो न परतो... आऽतान्सिः। जयोऽ, further raises the question that if पुरस्य is महाभ and अत्रोऽ, then how is he a भोक्ता?—नहूँ च यूक्तोऽ सरकथे आऽताःशास्त्रुः।? तथा चाहुः—
वाचायुक्तातुः: स्वमहबलाः यथा हि भोक्ता। पुरणोपि विपरयायां
स्वमहबलाः सतताः यथि भोक्ता। हि ततः।

अचेतनं चतुरायुस्तिः वेदृशः etc. Intellect and the rest, although non-intelligent, seem to be intelligent, on account of the proximity of the Spirit. Thus alone can the experience—'I know' be explained. Although the entire activity belongs to the Attributes (transformed into महाभ, अत्रोऽ and the rest), yet, on account of its reflection in the Intellect, the really indifferent Spirit seems to be active. Cf. उपमानं केणाः
विद्वानानिपातूः (सं. स. I, 164). The Spirit in its turn transfers its intelligence to matter. This transference is thus illustrated by various commentators—'वधातिःसयोगाः तोऽहमराजितरत्नाः' (जयोऽ)
'अल्पान्सततिः एदृशैत्याः: चतुरायुस्तिः: संतान: शीतोऽ भवति, अभिन्न संयुक्त उणोऽ
भवति। (वाचोऽ) 'वधातिःसयोगाः: परस्य परस्याविक्षेपातु परस्यस्वित्त्रभावार
अपाशिकोः यथा वा जत्त्वयोः: सत्तमातुः परस्यस्वित्त्रभाव उविद्धायारस्यात्
भव:।' (विज्ञानोऽ, सं. स. I, 164)।

अरंकुशं च पुरस्य is further supported by जयोऽ by the following quotation—प्रज्ञानस्य 
प्रहोरसिंहास्य हृदयत्तोमिघुः तिपरविद्धान। अर्य
करोतीस्युप्स्यप्रियमिते हृदयत्तोमिघुः हृदयित्यविद्धान।।
This quotation is found in the तत्त्वसमसत्त्वम् (Chow. S. S. No. 246, p. 124) and
sांनुस्स्तविस्तवचि also (ibid, p, 12) with slight variants.

वाचोऽ connects प्राणस्य (in पुरस्य प्राणस्य केल्वयार्थतः तथा प्राणस्य)
with प्राणस्य, and केल्वयार्थतः with पुरस्य. The other commenta-

tors take the line as it stands, i.e. पुरस्य प्राणस्य and प्राणस्य
केल्वयार्थतः. While explaining ‘विज्ञानस्य सत्त् यथा ब’ (सं. स. II, 1). विज्ञान also connects केल्वयार्थतः with प्राणस्य.

XXII

In his भाष्य (on सं. स. II 19) वाचोऽ describes the तत्त्वस्य as
the products of महाभ (ey. तत्त्वस्य अर्यस्यात् महाभ परविद्धान।।)
But there the महाभ should not be taken as the immediate
cause (i.e. producer) of these तत्त्वस्य. वाचोऽ has himself said
at another place (सं. स. I, 45) that these तत्त्वस्य are the
products of अत्रोऽ.

महाभ and अत्रोऽ hold that these तत्त्वस्य singly produce the
महाभवस्य. The other commentators hold that each succeeding
महाभव स्य is produced from the combination of the preceding
तत्त्वस्य. For example, स्वतत्त्वस्य and स्वतत्त्वस्य produce बायः
वाचायुस्तिः, स्वतत्त्वस्य and स्वतत्त्वस्य produce तेजः and so on. But
this theory of वाचोऽ violates the orthodox पाद्वीरण theory of the वेदांतिः.
The point is noticed by कल्याणक, who says—

सम्मुदायाभावा पञ्चीकरणं यथाव विद्यमान।
तथापि वृक्षतंवद्वालक्ष्यत्तमतम् हृदयम्।
हृदयित्यविद्धान स्यानि यथास्वित्त्रभावः यथा
हृदयित्यविद्धान स्यात् यथास्वित्त्रभावः यथा।

(quoted by बेंशीर in his comm. on तत्त्वसमस्य, p. 293
Chow. S. S.).

वाचोऽ gives a queer and fantastic derivation of the word
अत्रोऽ—पञ्चीकरणं: परातिवरीयंप्रयत्नार्थस्वित्त्रभावार्थस्य दुःखम् मयः
तत्त्वसमस्यामाकारः परातिवरीयंप्रयत्नार्थस्वित्त्रभावार्थस्य रिणां
हृदयित्यविद्धान हृदयित्यविद्धान।
XXIII

गृहोऽ and मात्र curiously divide जान and वेरायण into two kinds—internal and external. Sovani is right in criticising this classification (p. 414), as जान means only प्रामाणपद्यतात्सान in this कारिका, and not the knowledge of the वेद and the rest. Similarly, the आयुर्वेद-योग (viz., प्रामाणपद्य चक्रवर्तात्सानात्सानि विज्ञान संवेदनायतेः) is the principal वेरायण which leads to the वाहिकरायण also. For, who will be indifferent towards the worldly objects unless he is मोहोऽ?

पारालम does not read गरिम िन his text of तत्त्वादार्दी. Our edition of तत्त्वादार्दी, जयो, मात्र and गृहोऽ mention nine kinds of अष्टेयिः although each one (except वाृऽ) says अष्टभिन्नाँवमयम. It seems, therefore, that पारालम's text is the correct one. Our edition of तत्त्वादार्दी दी and वंशीर्वं's edition, however, combine इत्वित्र and वित्रित्र and thus make the total eight.

जयो reads यथाकालसाधिलयम in place of यथाकालसाधिलयम, and derives it as—कमिनेच्यावाचेंशे च मया यथा यथाकालसाधिलयम । तस्य भावः यथाकालसाधिलयम। अनेकार्थताल पातानूः 'श्री' नित्यात वातिते।

XXV

अत्त्विर is divided into three kinds—

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>आत्माः</th>
<th>साधिक</th>
<th>राजस</th>
<th>तापस</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>or वेक्त्र</td>
<td>or तेजस</td>
<td>or तृतीयिः</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

the eleven इन्द्रिया

This is the scheme adopted by वाचऽ and others. But विजयाः (on सान्त्र. तृत्तीयं I. 18) would have—

XXVII

The first phrase उभ्यत्वः gives the general characteristic of the mind and the second phrase सङ्क्तत्वः मनः gives the proper function of the mind. गृहोऽ interprets सङ्क्तत्वः as गृहृति कल्पितिः, i.e., which determines the functioning (of the two sets of इन्द्रिया). वाृऽ understands सङ्क्तत्वः as विशेषणविशेषस्यकल्पिति i.e., perceives the definite properties as belonging to the thing apprehended. जयो and चन्द्रिका agree with वाृऽ. What वाृऽ means is that all the senses of perception cognise their respective objects vaguely, and this is निरोधमग्नायाश्च or simple-perception. But as mere simple-perception of an object is of no use in our every-day life, so the help of mind is
sought to give a definite and concrete shape to that perception. This is what is called सत्विक्यप्रमाण or complex-perception. The first is नामजाययाजियोजानि आदेवमणि, and, therefore, निर्दितमक; the second is नामजाययाजियोजानि आदेवमणि, and, therefore, सत्विक्यप्रमाण. In his support, ओपावो cites अतिद्विभिषेकानि etc., from इमार्ति’s त्वमासवित (on मी. म. I. 4, verses 112 and 123, pp. 168 and 172, Chow. S. S.).

The reading adopted by महाकाव्य तथा चैन्ट्रि—यथास्वरूप समाहल्लानम् (See S. N. S., p. 126; but he quotes सत्त्वं—कामस्य मनः; अन्यायसंक्षिप्तिः या साध्यमात् in J. R. A. S., July 1931, p. 631). The Chinese version of the Sāṁkhya Kārikā also reads “Manas is that which discerns” and thus agrees with महाकाव्य’s reading. अन्यायसंक्षिप्त has been thus illustrated by परमार्थ—“It is in the same manner that a man can pass for an artisan or an orator at the same time.” (Tak. S. K., p. 35).

इत्याच च साध्यमात्—एवम् remarks—यथायत्प्रति सत्त्वं—पीपालस्य, But ओपावो criticises this view—:—प्रत्येकाणि: सत्त्वं—पीपालस्य च साध्यमात्, न तिकसचिनिः। महाबाहुतार्यायायामात्राहृदयलग्नितेऽपवस्त्रिताः प्रसूर्वान्। तत्त्वावस्तुर्मायात्मानिन्द्रानुपात, न नु प्रत्यावर्जितां।

महार reading यावेदनें in place of यावेदनें. This is noted by चित्रकार also. महार’s reading is preferable, because the second line of the कार्यक्रम lays down the reasons of the नामावलि of इत्यादि, the two reasons being, गुणपरिवर्तनमार्गित्वात् and यावेदनें.

The question is—how can one अहंकार create these manifold दिव्यस whose functions differ? This question is raised by ब्रह्मलक्ष्य in his त्वमासवित (Chow. S. S., p. 70)—यथा दुनियायें—कार्याङ्गिनि स्वतः, कार्यान्यायायायायायायायायायायायायायायाय न स्वातः, सर्व साध्यान्यात् द्वारा स्वाध्यायात् द्वारा। The reply to it is—गुणपरिवर्तनाविशेषायात्। Although अहंकार is one, yet the three गुण, accompanied by चैन्ट्रि and अस्मि, act and react upon one another; therefore, the modified effects of अहंकार (i.e., the दुनियायें) differ in their functions.

इति साध्यान्यात् गुणमयो नाम कथित कार्यान्ति। This seems to be an interpolation or a mistake. In the first place, गुणमय is not recognised as a cause in the सांस्कृत philosophy. महार, in his श्रद्धा on the 31st कार्यक्रम says—इति सांस्कृत गुणमयार्थभावना न कार्यक्रम। Secondly, even गोपी himself says so in the भाव on the 61st कार्यक्रम—वेदकोशालाय वाह्यप्रपत्र वाह्यप्रपत्र कार्यक्रम। स्वाभावक्यातः स्वाभावक्यातः। तत्त्वाति कार्यक्राय न कार्यक्राय, नाति स्वभाव द्वित। Whosoever is responsible for the mistake, he has continued his notion of स्वभाव being a कारण, further in the भाव. Cf. अध्यात्मकार्यमें नेत्र, नाइयार, न रुपम् न प्रस्तुतम्; न पुनः, स्वभावात् गुणपरिवर्तनानिति।

But if we compare महार on the 31st कार्यक्रम, we find—अध्यात्मकार्यमें नेत्र न पुनः महाकाव्यकार्यक्रम न प्रस्तुतम् न पुनः न स्वभावात् इत्यम्, गुणपरिवर्तनानिति। On the basis of महार’s reading, I propose that we ought to read न स्वभावात्, इत्यम् गुणपरिवर्तनानिति। That is, this, नामावलि is not caused by God………or Spontaneity, but by the modification of the Attributes.

Wilson has translated it—“but from modification of qualities produced by spontaneity.” Keeping the text as it is, I have tried to steer clear of spontaneity as the cause. My translation is—“but is caused by the spontaneous modification of the Attributes.” But to have this sense even we ought to read गुणपरिवर्तनानिति.

परमार्थ seems to translate the word स्वभाव by ‘Special Being’ or ‘a Special Dharma’, which may be called “Being”.

The reading गुणान्यायामेंतनात्स्वाब गुणपरिवर्तन: प्रत्येक: इत्यम् is also faulty. I think we ought to read गुणान्यायामेंतनात्स्वाब प्रत्येक: इत्यम् प्रतिष्ठ:।

The following classification of the organs by परमार्थ, has no parallel in any commentary.

“Among the organs, there are those which apprehend objects close by while others perceive things from afar. Their object is double; (1) to avoid danger, (2) to protect the body. To avoid danger (relates to the eyes and ears, which ) in seeing and hearing from afar, avoid the danger. ‘To protect the body’ (relates to the eight other organs, which) perceive the eight species of objects, from each of the objects
approaching the corresponding organ; that permits us to regulate our body, according to these objects.” (Tak. S. K., p. 37).

Mātra reads स्थानित्व in place of श्यानित्व in the text. वाटिका also adopts this reading and observes:—सहस्राधिकरणम् पूर्वभाणित्याणामभियोगानां श्यानित्वत् धीत पाश्रे न सत्वाशिष्टितां। (p. 184, In.)

The word मात्र stands in the sense of “uniqueness” according to गोड़े and माठर; but, according to वाच०, this word means “barenness,” परमात्मा, seems to waver between the two senses. [See, Tak. S. K., pp. 37-38; S. N. S., p. 63, In. and J. R. A. S., July 1931, p. 632 (I)].

XXIX

स्थानित्वम्। गोड़े and माठर read स्थानित्वम्.

सामायकरणः प्राणाया वायुः पाथ। Does the word करण stand for बिविष अन्तःकरण or त्रिविषकरण करण? While वाच० adopts the former view, all the other commentators agree to the latter interpretation, although माठर curiously says at one place—समस्तस्तत्तानि: करणमिश्रयेष्ये। विज्ञान also explains the word करण as अन्तःकरण in his वायु (in लो. स., भ. 31). But वाच०, while commenting on समस्तस्तत्तानि: प्राणायाकरणः जीवनम् (योगभाषा on भ. 39), has given a different interpretation, viz., त हि प्रपत्रित्: शरीरस्य प्राणीत्यमयात्विविषिष्ट: संस्कारसाधारणय: यथाः: ‘सामायकरणम्: प्राणाया वायुः पाथ’ हृत। वाटिका correctly points out the discrepancy. He suggests that योगभाषायेष्यि समस्तस्तत्तानि: करणमिश्रयेष्यि पाथ, न तु वाणितित्वयः, because in deep sleep when all the external sense-organs are dormant, we see the five vital airs functioning. Therefore, these vital airs cannot be said to be the function of external sense-organs.

XXX

Cognition has been divided into three kinds in the सांख्य philosophy, viz., perception (प्रयत्न), inference (अनुमान) and valid testimony (सत्य). Now, in प्रयत्न, the three अन्तःकरणस and one of the organs of sense,—all four seem to function simultaneously and gradually. But, according to the वैद्यतिकs there are only gradual stages, which, however, are not observable on account of the swiftness of the different functions. Cf. ज्ञानार्थप्रयोगम् मनः (न्या. सू. III. 2. 57), न युगपतःकनियोगम् (ibid, III. 2. 58). अन्तःस्वाधेःन: तुस्त्वायित्यमास्त्वाचारात् (ibid, III. 2. 59). For, according to the नैपरिच्छेदः, the mind is अरुपस्तात्म. The followers of सांख्य, on the other hand, regard the mind to be of मध्यमपरिभाषा, and, therefore, there can be युगपतःकनियाः.

In the case of अनुमान and वायु, only the three अन्तःकरणs function. They can operate simultaneously and gradually both, but they do not depend upon the cognition of senses at that particular moment.

XXXI

आहुर—Davies observes:—‘अकुटा is glossed in the Petersb, Lexicon by Axiosicht (= purpose), Antrieb (= motive). Colebrooke’s translation is “incited by mutual invitation”... ...The meaning of “incitation to activity,” mentioned by Wilson, expresses more nearly the sense of अकुटा... It is composed of a, to, towards, and kū, to cry. Gauḍapāda says that it means अदारसामभ्रम (respectful eagerness in action).’ (p. 68, In.).

Davies is wrong in considering that गोड़े is correct in applying this verse to the three internal organs only (See Davies, p. 68, In.). All the other commentators apply it to all the organs, for each and every उद्दित functions for पुष्पायः.

The spirit of the सू. म्., “त हि सत्यि सन्तः” (III. 55) and “इंद्रेष्यसिद्धि: सिद्ध” (III. 57), goes directly against the theory of the कार्यम्, where no इंद्रि is mentioned. Nor is the position helped by विद्याः remark, viz., प्रकृतितपथस्य जन्मे। प्रथेष्यसिद्धि: ‘य: सत्यि: सत्यसिद्धि सन्तः। इंद्रेष्यसिद्धि: सिद्धिः। सत्यितियम् विनिवेशार्थेऽभित्वेष्येष्यसिद्धिः।’ (सू. म्. III. 57).
The word सम्मानः has been rendered as "The will of Spirit" by नन्दाके. The idea of the Spirit having a will is further strengthened by परमाथ—"Spirit has this will: 'you have to manifest yourself, and find for me a solitary existence'. To obey this will of Spirit, the three gunas produce all the organs. It is in accord with the will of Spirit that each one acquires itself of its appropriate function; besides the will of Spirit, there is not any other instigator." (Tak. S. K., p. 41)

This soul of परमाथ is more akin to the इंद्र of the डाबिकास who is endowed with इवद्व (and other शुद्ध); such a soul is foreign to लोक्ष्य [See also, J. R. A. S., July 1931, p. 632, (m)].

XXXII

The three functions of seizing, retaining and manifesting are, as Davies rightly points out (pp. 69-70), common to all the organs. Thus "the organ of sight seizes and holds the impression conveyed by an external object and manifests it to manas." (ibid). According to गाड़ा, आहारण and धारण belong to केमेंद्रियas and प्रत्यक्ष to बुद्धिनिर्देश. मात्र ascribes आहारण to इंद्रियas in general, and प्रत्यक्ष to अहारण and बृहि respectively. बाचो follows by चालित, would relegate आहारण to केमेंद्रियas, प्रत्यक्ष to शुद्ध, अहारण and मनस, and प्रत्यक्ष to बुद्धिनिर्देश. According to परमाथ, आहारण belongs to अन्तःकरण, प्रत्यक्ष to बुद्धिनिर्देश and धारण to केमेंद्रिय [see Tak. S. K., p. 42].

The word दशा in the second half of this verse presents a difficulty. बाचो takes दशा with आहारण, धारण and प्रत्यक्ष each. The objects seized by the इंद्रियas, being only five, are doubled by dividing them into रिय and अधिय. Similarly, the body which is retained by the अन्तःकरण, is made up of five vital airs; but these are also रिय and अधिय, and so tenfold. The objects manifested by the बुद्धिनिर्देश are also tenfold because of being divided into रिय and अधिय varieties. I think there is another and better way of explaining the कारिका. The objects seized, retained and manifested are altogether ten, viz., five objects of organs of action and five objects of organs of sense. These ten are supervised by the three internal organs.

XXXIII

बाचो explains why काठ is not recognised as a separate category in the माध्यम philosophy. According to the अध्यात्मिकस "अर्द्धारितत्वा सुपरिपक्षित स्विप्रभित विस्मात" (II. 2. 6), काठ is one category which is divided into three parts—past, present and future—according to different circumstances. प्रवतपाद clarifies this point—"एकत्रिति सत्यकारणानाममक्षयमात्मन्वितियत्वित्विन्योजयमेवतप्रभावस्थानिकाविवाहमहानात्मोपाताः; that is, just as one and the same man is called a पाठक or a पाचक in different circumstances, or just as one and the same piece of crystal assumes different colours according to the objects placed near it, so all the effects, though of one nature, become different under the different circumstances of beginning, ending, remaining and perishing. Thus, there is only one काठ. To this बाचो replies—Why should we first assume one काठ and then assume different circumstances or उपाय to make this काठ multifarious? Why should we not recognise the उपाय only? Cf. सत्यनयक काठय सत्यनयकयुक्तम ब्रह्मिनम: श्रद्धानानुपपत्ती तीर्थकारानां भुवितरं श्रवित्वां वस्तुस्तृत्य देवादासे-योगमायण on III, 52.

XXXIV

अविशेष = non-specific, i. e., तन्मास. विशेष = specific, i. e., पद्मादासातृष्ण.

XXXV

The word हारि has been translated by S. N. S., as 'principal'. The translation is based upon त्वयो's phrase हारिन्य सन्तीति. I think that 'warder' expresses the sense of हारि better than 'principal'. For, in spite of the fact that all the sense-organs bring their percepts to the अन्तःकरण, the latter itself receives these percepts for delivering them to श्रुत, as S. N. 3
is clear from the next कारिका. The criticism of S. N. S. would have been right if अनु:करण were to retain these percepts for itself and not present them to the Spirit. Therefore, the three-fold अनु:करण acts as a warder for the Spirit and not as the principal (one). परमाण्य renders विविध करण द्वारा as “the three internal organs master the gate.” (Tak. S. K., p. 44).

XXXVII

वाचः interprets both the lines of this कारिका as the causes of the superiority of बुद्धि. गौड़, on the other hand, interprets the first line as the cause of the second;—because intellect brings about the entire enjoyment of the Spirit, therefore, it brings about also the discrimination between the Spirit and the Nature. मात्र quotes the following speech of अहंकार—

अहंकारी द्विपिंचे होते मैं मुळ्य प्रबोधय।
प्रेयूँ परमाणुदेवे न संवे मात्र न तजगतः।
मय निरीक्षणहते पुरुषः पञ्चविशेषः।
तत्रतत्वनुमुळे प्रक्षेपणे स कथं मोक्षप्रमथितः।
योंसी स्वेच्छसंहए देवं सच्चियापि जगतः।
मेहितम पद्धुच्छयं हि सांस्कृतिक्या व्युः।
हेतुः।

मात्र further remarks—त हि समात: कवयित्य में कविकि
कलेपमुद्यूऽन्तमयः, किं तु सांस्कृतिक्याः पञ्चविशेषतत्तत्तवाश्चात्मकाः साध्यप्रायं वेय्यम्ययं च
अनु:न्द्रसद्यां। उपरः।

हस विच ठठ मोद मित्र मित्रमच्छुरुं: कु: च मा तह्राम। यदि विचित्र: ते
कवित्तमत तद्वरप्य्यो मेहितम:।

This verse is more of a tirade against the सांस्कृतिक philosophy than an exposition.

XXXVIII

Why तत्त्वादि are called अविशेष?:—This has been explained by गौड़ and मात्र as देवात्मास्ते साध्यप्रायं विषया युः: समोहरिताः, which is wrong. For, तत्त्वादि, being evolved out of विषयानिकिता प्रकृतिः, cannot be said to be devoid of दृ:ख च मोह ( = रजस्व

—XL] NOTES

तमः). Therefore, the explanation of वाचः, viz., चः चैसी शास्त्राविहितकारणो साध्यप्रायं विषय कृत्य नावान्मयः, is better. That is, all the Attributes are present in the तत्त्वादि, but they are not patent enough to be enjoyed.

XXXIX

The specific elements are divided into three divisions—

(1) Subtle body; (2) those which are born of father and mother; and (3) gross substances or inorganic matter...........

It (subtle body) becomes ‘specific’ by the aggregation of the subtle elements which in themselves are ‘non-specific’ or diversified.” (Davies, p. 76). But, according to वाचः, मुक्ताधीर शास्त्राब्रह्माण्डीपितांतलाभेः (Kā. 40)—the subtle body is called specific because it is endowed with the sense-organs possessed of the qualities of calmness, violence and delusion.

XL

पूःत्त्वापम—According to वाचः, each Spirit is endowed with a subtle-body at the beginning of the creation. But according to साधारणं विकारं (III. 9), there is an aggregate of subtle-bodies which is created in the beginning. Cf. विकारं, विकासंबंधत, तत् साधारणं समाधीपक्षमेव भवति, इत्यतः.. Then, how do the subtle bodies separate? To this, the श्रृः replies—पर्यावरणसाधारणं (III. 10)—they are separated or differentiated according to particular actions. On this वित्तमत comments—यद्यपि साधारणं हिरण्यामोत्तमसाधारणं समाधीपक्षमेव भवति, तथष्ठाय गतेष्व विद्यायाः साध्यावमामासाधारणं समाधीपक्षमेव भवति। But, is not this idea of हिरण्याम अविशेष to साधारण?

The word विद्याय is explained as प्रगतिश्रवःमेव नामस्त्राविहितात्मानं करणां गृहान्तः द्वारा त्योऽत्मास्ते गौड़, वाचः और मात्र अनु:न्द्राः, which is wrong. For, तत्त्वादि, being evolved out of विषयानिकिता प्रकृति, cannot be said to be devoid of दृ:ख च मोह ( = रजस्व और
According to this कारिका, the number of the constituents of विद्वेशिर is eighteen, but according to सूत्र, it is seventeen.

विद्वेशिर has ingeniously removed this discrepancy by saying—

अहिन्नत्व च वुभावतान्तर्भवः।

XLII

A distinction should be made between विद्वेशिर and विद्वेशिर. The latter is the vehicle of the former, which consists of thirteen principles, viz., intellect, ego, mind, five organs of sense and five organs of action, and which is referred to as अभिकार्य: पुरुष: in the authority quoted by वाचः.

The reading of गोडः and मात्र is तिना अविशेषः, while as वाचः has तिना अविशेषः: वाचः calls the सूतमसेर as विशेष in कारिका XL.

So विशेष: means विशेष परम: शरीरः: But this is confusing because, to say that the विद्वेशिर (composed of thirteen principles) cannot exist without सूतमसेर (composed of विद्वेशिर and प्रणमसारास) is not logical. गोडः’s explanation is better when he says that विद्वेशिर cannot exist without अविशेष: प्रणमसारास, the five subtle elements.

The reading of परमार्थ also seems to be तिना अविशेषः: and he agrees with गोडः in explaining अविशेष as the five subtle elements. (Tak. S. K. p. 50.) चन्द्रिका gives a different opinion of some commentator: —केबिन्दु सूतमसेरसत्करिक्षातिनिमित्तमाक्षिपाराकामीत माणिक्यः तथा हि, चिन्दु सूतमसेरसत्करिक्षातिनिमित्तमाक्षिपाराकामीत माणिक्यः सति तिनौ, किंतु सूतमसेरसावळितविशेषः तिनौ। अतः न चिन्दुसत्करिक्षातिनिमित्तमाक्षिपाराकामीत माणिक्यः॥

XLIII

According to वाचः and जयः dispositions may be divided like this—

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>भाषा:</th>
<th>प्रकृत:</th>
<th>करणान्वित:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>वेदित:</td>
<td>वेदित:</td>
<td>करणान्वित:</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

XLIV and XLV

The प्रकृतिनाथस, which are innate, are of four kinds, viz., भाषा, ज्ञान, वेदीत एवं एक्ष्य: They belong to कारिका only. Those depending on the instruments (करणान्वित:) are eight, viz., भाषा, अर्हताः, ज्ञान, अर्हसय, अर्हायपय, अर्हवयस, अर्हवयस्तस्य: एवं अर्हवयस्तस्य: Those dispositions which depend on the effect or body (कारणान्वित:) are also eight, viz., five when the body is in the womb and three, i.e., childhood, youth and old age, when the body is outside the womb. गोडः and मात्र, however, divide the भाषाः into three kinds—सातिरित्य, प्रकृतिनाथस एवं कारिका. भाषा, ज्ञान, वेदीत एवं एक्ष्य: are born along with कारिका, so they are सातिरित्य-when innate in his case; but they come to सत्कर्म, सत्कर्मम्, सत्कर्मम् and सत्कर्मम् (the four sons of विद्वेशिर) after their birth, and are therefore, प्रकृति or natural in their case. The वेदित or acquired dispositions reside in ordinary human beings and depend upon the instruments and the affected body.

परमार्थ, however, explains सातिरित्य-भाषा “as the state acquired by goodness”, i.e., acquired by good deeds performed in previous birth. But this does not agree with the case of कारिका, whose भाषा are सत्कर्मम्.

XLV

According to मात्र, the सूतमसेर rises to the eight states by practising virtue. The states are भाषा, प्राणावस्था, भाषा, विद्वेशिर, गणना, राशिः, राशिः and वेदित: गोडः gives सातिरित्य for विद्वेशिर, and गोडः has been dropped in Wilson’s text and ours, but is given in the Benares edition. By practising vice, the सूतमसेर sinks to the five states of शुतः, पश्ची, सम्रथा, शरीरविश्रास्या and वेदित: The प्रकृतिनाथस, according to वाचः, is due to the identification of the Spirit with प्रकृतिनाथ itself; but मात्र includes the eight kinds of evolvents (प्रकृतिस) in this bondage. The वेदित: according to जयः, is the identification of the Spirit with the विद्वेशिर of प्रकृतिस (i.e. the evolutes); but according to मात्र, this bondage is brought about by making the eight states, viz., the भाषा, प्राणावस्था and others, as the sumnum bonum. These three
kinds of bondages are explained by वाचः at length in his
tarkavagdhî on गोपलय 1. 24.
The word श्रृंगति in प्रकृतिष्व, stands for महार्यानातित्रियमि, according to वाचः but, according to गोदः and माघः. the word
denotes थ्रायुधवहक्कत्मशासि:

XLVI

For the criticism of Keith, see Sovani ( p. 424 ). This
creation of intellect or "the conduct of the human under-
standing" ( Davies, p. 84 ), distinguished by Ignorance.
Incapacity. Contentment and Attainment, is divided into fifty
kinds.

गोदः and माघः illustrate all these four states by means of
an example of post. There is विपयय्य, when you are in doubt,
whether you are seeing a man or a post. There is अचाक्य, when even after seeing the post clearly, you are not entirely
free from the doubt. There is गुष्टि, when you do not want to
remove the doubt as to the identity of the post. There is सिद्धि,
when you succeed in establishing the correct identity of the
post. The explanation of वाचः is better. विपयय्य is that which
obstructs the path of the Spirit to liberation. " Incapacity
(अचाक्य) arises from the imperfection of senses. Acquiescence
or Contentment (गुष्टि) is a passive state of intellect. Perfection
(सिद्धि) means perfect knowledge, not completeness in moral
virtue." ( Davies, pp. 84-85 ).

XLVII

विपवय्य or अचाक्य is of five kinds:—अचाक्य, अचाक्य, रागः, द्रोह
and अभिनिर्वेद, which are called तमस्, मोहः, महामोहः, भावसि
and अन्यातात्मा by the कारिका.

XLVIII

तमस् or अचाक्य is of eight kinds and arises on account of
identifying the Spirit with Nature, Intellect, Ego, and the five
usblle elements.

—L

मोह or अस्मिता is also of eight kinds. The gods and the
rest consider the eight varieties of Attainment or सिद्धि as the
sumum bonum.

महामोह or रागः is of ten kinds and arises from the attach-
ment to the objects of five senses; these objects are ten, five
belonging to gods and five to human beings.

ताम्मिस or द्रोह is of eighteen kinds, and arises from the
hatred towards one or the other of the ten objects of sense
(mentioned above) and the eight varieties of Attainment or सिद्धि.

अन्यातात्मा or अभिनिर्वेद is also of eighteen kinds and arises
from the fear of losing the eight सिद्धि or the ten objects of
sense. Or it may be the fear of death which might obstruct
the enjoyment of these eighteen objects. Cf. स आयातात्मा.
केशः स्वरतवनाहि क्षरति न सूतमा श्राध्वितयायम्वयः मरणात्म
उच्छदत्याक्षः पूवेनन्दुवतुष्यत मरणुः समस्यपति ( जासावधि on योि. भ.
II. 9 ). " मरणसाधारणातात्मा उच्छदते।" ( जावः p. 51 ).

Thus, there are 62 kinds of विपयय्य.

XLIX

The quotation in वाचः, enumerating the list of the injuries to
organs, is found with a variant ( युद्धता: for मन्त्रता: ) in the
सांतक्षेत्र ( Chow. S. S. No. 246, p. 77 ). गोदः uses प्रयुम (or
paralysis) for कुष्ठ, and उपजन्यक्ष for जातका. Cf. " द्रोहमास
जातका," in जावः, p. 52. माघः and गोदः adopt युद्धता for उपजन्य
(= obstruction of bowels).

L

माघः (and not गोदः, as S. N. S. says, page 91, 1n ) reads
आयातात्मक्ष: in place of आयातात्मक्ष:. आयातात्मक्ष is grammatically
wrong, as आयातात्मक्ष is derived from आयात + ठु ("आयातात्मक्ष:")
वार्तक on पापिन I. 3, 60). अत्मक्ष = अातक्ष, is an अव्ययीय compound
in the sense of locative case, according to "अव्ययीय विनिर्मिति"
पापिन II. 1. 6. Then the feminine termination द्रोह (and not
I am tempted to quote the interesting explanation of these terms given by Fuji, the Japanese commentator, and quoted by Mr. Suryanarayana Sastri in Tak. S. K., p. 62, in.

(1) 'lubricating water,' because Nature penetrates all, as water lubricates all; (2) 'moving' because by the necessary objects one purifies oneself as water which is moving and of little depth purifies all; (3) 'running,' because with time a river joins the ocean; (4) 'lake-water,' because the influence of the acts committed in other existences is like the water of the lake which the rain refills; (5) 'well-penetrated' because one renounces the acquisition of riches, as a desiccated ground is irrigated by water; (6) 'easily crossed,' because one has not to occupy oneself any more with protecting, as [in the case of a piece of] water that has been crossed; (7) gushes without ceasing; (8) 'transparant,' for there is no more attachment; (9) 'excellent and pure,' for not to injure others is like water of the purest and most excellent quality.

LI

No commentator has given the names of आसिद्धि; जयो which gives them—तालों चासिद्धिं तुपश्च श्रावणिकमिन्याया। (?) संहा—, has a defective reading.

वाचो criticises the view of some writer in para 237. This view, as has been shown by me in my article ("Jayamangali and other commentaries on the Sāmkhya-Kārikā", Indian Historical Quarterly, Vol. V, iii, p. 429), belongs to जयो; this point is of great importance for the question of the relative chronology of the different commentaries. I have discussed it in my article referred to above.
Following is the scheme of the division of सिद्धिः according to वाचः

1. अध्ययन
2. श्रवण
3. कदा
4. सुहृदाप्रति
5. दान

6. प्रमोद
7. शुद्धिः
8. मोदमान

The last three are the effects of all the remaining five together.

परमाञ्चि's original gives a very beautiful tale in explaining how दान secures सिद्धि:

"A brāhmin is hated by others and he sees it. He becomes an ascetic; when he has become an ascetic, his master and his fellow-disciples also hold him in hatred and do not communicate knowledge to him. Conscious of his little chance, he betakes himself to a distant village to remain there, saying to himself: 'In this village, there are no brāhmans; I can pass there my summer (varṣa) retreat.' During his sojourn, one makes him many gifts. He gives the superfluous to his friends and to his acquaintances. He gives of it even to women and to shepherds. All the inhabitants of the village cherish him. At the end of the summer-retreat, everybody makes gifts to him: the triple staff, the water bowl, clothes etc.; at the approach of a festival of S'akra, he says to the villagers: 'Who wishes to accompany me to my native country to be present there at the festival? Those who wish to accompany me should bring each one a gift for me.' Arrived at his place, he betakes himself to his old master. Choosing the best gifts, he makes an offering of them to him. Then, the master, the fellow-disciples and the others commence to love him. His master, by way of gift, communicates knowledge to him. By that knowledge he arrives at absolute knowledge and final Deliverance. That perfection then is acquired by gifts." (Tak. S. K. p. 65)

These eight सिद्धिः, viz. तार, चुरार, etc. are thus translated by परमाञ्चि:

(1) तार = Crossing by oneself.
(2) चुरार = Crossing well.
(3) चुरालर = Crossing all.
(4) प्रमोद = Crossing with joy.
(5) प्रखुदिः = Crossing with an excessive joy.
(6) प्रमोदमान = Crossing with full joy.
(7) रस्युक = Crossing by love.
(8) सुहृदाप्रति = Crossing by universal love.

परमाञ्चि adds to it a lengthy explanation of his own which slightly differs from the original commentary at places. For instance, the दान-सिद्धि, which is equal to सुहृदाप्रति, is explained by परमाञ्चि thus:

'Crossing by universal love'. A man of this class, after having been hated by all, gives in alms all his goods and thus makes himself loved by all. Since all wish him to attain Deliverance, one says in this case 'Crossing by universal love.'

While वाचः construes अध्ययन as निदारक and refers by it to निदीय, अच्छि and भौमि, विग्रहः (on स. म. III. 41) explains अध्ययन as आकर्षक and refers by it to the three सिद्धिः, viz. कदा, श्रवण and अध्ययन, leaving सुहृदाप्रति and दान as of secondary importance. He criticises वाचः as follows—कथितवासामाग्रामकेवलयुक्तो निदारक- पुनःमहिमिः निदीयाभिषिप्तिः भक्ति वन्यप्राप्तिः. तवपः
it as—तत्त्वावलिन्यितिः सत्यामाधुर्यितस्य उत्तरत्योगियाः प्रयोगिता-जन्यन: सांधिनिः लोकों हृदय इत्येक:। This very idea is expressed in the next वारिता.

According to गांड़े there are sixteen forms of creations—“that is, apparently, each of the four classes of beings proceeds from four modifications of nature; or from the invisible principles, from the subtle rudiments, from conditions or dispositions of intellect and from the gross elements.” (Wilson, p. 220). It seems that गांड़े takes रूप, मात्र and तेलोन ( = two, जोड़म and श्वेत ), and divides each of them into four classes, viz., अभावित, निद्रा, मात्र and भूत.

The phrase द्वाराकिष्ठ्यम्यूप्ये: refers to all the three creations above, in the middle and below. Davies thinks (p. 90, 2n) that Wilson construes this phrase with मयः र्वाविष्टवां. Thereupon, Davies remarks, ‘Brahmā does not belong to it (i.e. भ्रमरे), but to the region ‘above’.’ I think Davies has misunderstood Wilson who does not distinctly join the two phrases given above. (See Wilson, p. 220). परमांच explains द्वाराकिष्ठ्यम्यूप्ये: as “Brahmā is at the commencement and pillar at the end.” He goes on to explain वस्त्र—“Why is the last of all the creations called ‘pillar’? Because the herbs, trees, mountains, rocks etc., support the three worlds; that is why one calls it ‘pillar.’” (Tak. S. K., pp. 69-70).

LV

सत्यावलिन्यितिः भर्त्रिकाः प्रयोगित्य विवेकिनी: ( श्र. सू. II. 15 ). Compare also, समानं जन्मपानं हुष्यम् ( सू. सू. III. 53 ).

स्ताथवेन is explained by चन्द्रिका as स्त्रय एव सयों हुष्यस्य:.

मार्ग reads अम in place of त्र, and समानं in place of स्ताथवेन in the text. The former term he explains as विगृहोंकुण्ड and the latter as संध्रेष्ण.
The illustration of a cook cited by वाचः and the (सां. मृ. III 63) —विविक्तचापत्सुधिनिष्ठति: प्राप्यन्त सुधारू, पाके, has got this disadvantage that प्रभृति: is चेतन. The illustration of गोहः विश., यथा काकति: स्वापूर्व्य लक्ष्मणा विश्वाशयित्र करोति:, has the same disadvantage. The second illustration of गोहः, वि., तथा चोकरे कुम्भतः प्राप्यं उत्तर्यां उत्तरे विद्यमाने, is better, because कुम्भ is non-intelligent.

चतुर्विंशतिका quotes two योगमेत्रेः in support of the purport of this कारिका—‘नदर्शये देवः भवानां’ (II 21) and ‘नदर्शये प्रति नह-मन्यतः तदनुभावांभयमात्तरात्’ (II 22).

LVII

मात्र, गोहः and जयः, interpret this कारिका as illustrating the प्रकृति and निष्ठति (of प्रक्षण) both, while as वाचः speaks of प्रकृति only.

LVIII

अनुष्कक्ये means देवता: but it is only a blind instinct or activity, which is the nature of the three गुण: in साधान्य: philosophy. It is not the देवता: of the नैवायिक: according to whom it is the quality of a sentient being. परमाय: explain अनुष्कक्ये as ‘incertitude’. (Tak. S. K. p. 72).

LXI

This कारिका has given rise to a great controversy. With whom should we construe the word मे? Is it पुहः which feels that there is nothing सुकुमारता than प्रकृति: or is it प्रकृति itself which feels that there is nothing सुकुमारता than myself? The first meaning is adopted by मात्र; वाचः and गोहः would seem to mean that it is the author of the कारिका who feels that there is nothing सुकुमारता than प्रकृति.

The next difficulty is about the meaning of the term सुकुमारता. जयः explains it by ‘subtlety’, वाचः and मात्र, by ‘bashfulness’, and गोहः by ‘enjoyability’.

Again, in the 59th कारिका, प्रकृति is compared to a नीति but here to a कुम्भः.

—LXIV

NOTES

As to the existence of another कारिका on the basis of गोहः, see my foot-note to the text of the कारिका and introduction “पुहः देवन्तर्क्षति देववस्य” —वाचः explains it as—अग्रमहः यथेष्ठानां परन्यवन्तराणि न पुहः पद्यित:। This is not a good interpretation. गोहः is much nearer the mark when he says—अहमेन्द्र परन्यवन्ते देवस्यस्य पुहः पद्यित:।

LXIII

Prof. Suryanarayana Sastri remarks (see Tak. S. K. p.77), "This verse is lacking in the Chinese text. That is perhaps an interpolation posterior to the time of Paramārtha (546), though I cannot give the special reason for it. One may, however, affirm that the original of the Chinese translation did not contain that verse, for there is no room to suppose that the translator had by error jumped over this verse and the commentary, if all the time there had been one. This verse is found in the Śīlā, III. 73."

On page 58 of our text, read एतदनि संस्कृते चमः:, वैराय: एवंस्य चमः:, जाने, वैरायः, एवंस्य.

LXIV

The word तत्त्वानाम: according to जयः, गोहः and मात्र, means the अन्याय: or practice of the twenty-five तत्त्वः. वाचः clarifies this अन्याय: as तत्त्वानाम: तत्त्वानाम:, which leads to the realisation of the distinction between दुःख and प्रकृति.

The following scheme shows the different interpretations of the phrases नामिन: न मे and नामः, as given by various commentators.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>वाचः</th>
<th>मात्र</th>
<th>गोहः</th>
<th>जयः</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>नामिन:</td>
<td>अहिः कित्यायान:</td>
<td>नामिन: तत्त्वानाम:</td>
<td>नामिेवं भवानिमः</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>न मे</td>
<td>न मे स्वाभिमानिमः</td>
<td>न मे तत्त्वानाम:</td>
<td>न मयं सर्बान्त:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>नामः</td>
<td>अहिः कित्यान: न</td>
<td>नाईं तत्त्वानाम:</td>
<td>अहिः कित्यानामः- उपरे।</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
LXVI

The idea is that भोग and चित्त are for the purpose of the Spirit (i.e., पुरुषार्थ). They urge the Nature into activity. But, after the Spirit has enjoyed the products of Nature and has attained the discriminative knowledge, there remains no other purpose of the Spirit. भोग and अपवर्ग are no more पुरुषार्थ. So, in the case of this particular Spirit, भोग and अपवर्ग cannot urge the Nature into activity.

LXVII

S. N. S. remarks—"Curiously enough, Paramārtha seems to understand this verse without importing any notion of jīvanmukti. His rendering runs thus: Because of full and perfect knowledge, dharma, etc., have no longer any influence; transmigration is arrested like the body (or force) of the potter's wheel, whose motion one interrupts: see B. F. E. O., IV, 1056. This is, of course, hardly satisfactory." (p. 116, 1n).
You are free:

- to Share — to copy, distribute and transmit the work
- to Remix — to adapt the work

Under the following conditions:

- Attribution — You must attribute the work in the manner specified by the author or licensor (but not in any way that suggests that they endorse you or your use of the work).
- Noncommercial — You may not use this work for commercial purposes.
- Share Alike — If you alter, transform, or build upon this work, you may distribute the resulting work only under the same or similar license to this one.

With the understanding that:

- Waiver — Any of the above conditions can be waived if you get permission from the copyright holder.
- Public Domain — Where the work or any of its elements is in the public domain under applicable law, that status is in no way affected by the license.
- Other Rights — In no way are any of the following rights affected by the license:
  - Your fair dealing or fair use rights, or other applicable copyright exceptions and limitations;
  - The author's moral rights;
  - Rights other persons may have either in the work itself or in how the work is used, such as publicity or privacy rights.

Notice — For any reuse or distribution, you must make clear to others the license terms of this work. The best way to do this is with a link to this web page.